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INTRODUCTION 
DONALD FAVAREAU 
National University of Singapore, Singapore 
A sign addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person 
an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for 
something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in 
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of 
the representamen.1 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) 
And this is just what an interpretative process involves: fitting the sign 
into a wider set of circumstances, a context.2 
Jesper Hoffmeyer (b. 1942) 
 
For over forty years, Jesper Hoffmeyer has been addressing the 
world, fitting the signs of life, science, philosophy, mind and feeling 
into each other’s wider sets of circumstances, and developing these 
signs in profound new ways and provocative contexts – and creating 
in the minds of his readers the grounds upon which to create their 
own equivalent signs, or perhaps more developed ones. 
So when the idea of creating this volume was birthed by Kalevi 
Kull and myself, outside of a French café in Copenhagen on a brisk 
September day in 2011, it was clear that the most appropriate tribute 
we could pay to Jesper on the occasion of his 70th birthday would 
be to compile a scholarly compendium of his most generative 
signs – and of the interpretants, or consequently developed signs, 
that they have inspired in a host of provocative thinkers across the 
world.  
——————— 
1   CP 2.228. 
2   Hoffmeyer 1996: 21; 146. 
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Thus, while the 1000 word limitation that we have placed on 
each of the following contributions was a decision made, at least in 
part, in order to be able to complete such a volume in so short a 
time, the strategy is also a deliberate way of playing with new 
formats, in order to produce new kinds of intellectual experiences in 
the reader – just as Jesper’s words have been doing so delightfully 
for scholars and for laypeople over the course of the last four 
decades.  
Indeed, when presented with the idea for the volume, Jesper’s 
long-time colleague Claus Emmeche humorously (and approvingly) 
envisioned it as “a possible blend of a Catechism, Quotations from 
Chairman Mao (aka the Little Red Book) and the I Ching”.  
 In the end, over 80 world-class scholars responded positively to 
the request to “select a short quotation taken from any of Jesper 
Hoffmeyer’s texts and to provide your own scholarly commentary 
upon that passage – whether in the form of an analytical explication, 
a critical disagreement or a conceptual extension – that you feel asks 
the questions that need to be asked, proposes the ideas that need to 
be proposed, or that draws out the implications that need to be so 
explicitly drawn out, germane to the claims of the selected passage” 
and, as the following pages so well attest, the result has turned out to 
be even more gratifying and fruitful than Claus and the editors had 
originally envisioned. 
The resulting volume is a collection, not of full-fledged argu-
ments, but of a series of brief, suggestive intellectual ‘triggers’ 
inspired by the work of Jesper Hoffmeyer, and designed to, in the 
words of Ludwig Wittgenstein, “not spare other people the trouble 
of thinking; but, if possible, stimulate someone to thoughts of his 
own” (1953: xe). There can be few more perfect encapsulations of 
the spirit of Jesper Hoffmeyer, and of his public project in the 
world, than these humble and, like Jesper’s, militantly human 
words, taken from the preface of Philosophical Investigations. 
In a similar spirit, Jesper’s lifelong commitment to simplicity 
and elegance in his writing – a commitment born of an utter lack of 
need or desire to obfuscate one’s point, or to substitute mere 
sentence-writing for thinking, no matter how deep or difficult the 
topic – was the inspiration behind the idea of titling each of these 
commemorative tributes with a single word, much in the way that 
Jesper chose to title his own chapters (e.g., “Defining”, “Signifying” 
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and “Uniting”) in his landmark volume, Signs of Meaning in the 
Universe.  
The result reads like a tantalizing Index of Hoffmeyerian Ideas, 
with its range and depth a tribute to Jesper’s own wide range and 
depth of thinking and its scope and indication of the range and depth 
of the influence of his thought on others. At once a celebration and a 
serious academic development of the work of Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
with this volume we mark the occasion of his 70th birthday on 
February 21, 2012.  
Every author in this book has been deeply inspired by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer – all by his words, and many by his friendship. Both are 
signs of an abiding reality that is vaster and more profound than we 
can ever give expression to. But as Jesper, of all people, knows: we 
all must yet do whatever little that we can. 
“The sign is itself a kind of pier,” writes Jesper, “uniting ‘some-
thing’ with ‘someone’” (1996: 143). United by the signs you’ve 
given us, Jesper, we hereby give our own consequently developed 
signs back to you – and send them out into the world for even 
further development, just as both your biosemiotic principles and 
your example have taught us to do. 
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AGENCY 
FRANCO GIORGI 
University of Pisa, Italy 
To ask for the origin of life is to ask for the origin of the environment. 
Living organisms are inscribed in their environments much like patterns 
woven into a carpet. The two cannot get apart, and yet there seems to 
be a distinct asymmetry in their relation. 1  
 
As in much of Hoffmeyer’s seminal work, this short citation has an 
underlying initial assumption and a number of robust implications. 
In this brief contribution, it is my intention to make those impli-
cations explicit. 
 In today’s mainstream scientific thinking, entities and activities 
are studied in isolation – such that their structural and functional 
properties are assumed not to change in relation to every environ-
mental setting in which they may be expressed. When Hoffmeyer 
states that the origin of life is inseparable from the origin of the 
environment, he is not referring to ‘life’s properties’ (whatever they 
may be), but to the relationships that living entities are capable of 
entertaining with their surroundings. Taking such relationship as a 
primitive condition implies that no life could ever have emerged 
unless it was allowed to explore the external milieu as a pre-re-
quisite for its own self-description. Hoffmeyer refers to this condi-
tion as a relative being – in opposition to the idea that something 
could exist per se without any reference to otherness. Thus, rather 
than looking at self-replication as an essential requirement for life – 
as most molecular biologists would do these days – Hoffmeyer is 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1998. Surfaces inside surfaces: On the origin of agency 
and life. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5: 33–42 (p. 35). 
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advancing the view that life is built on the fundamental asymmetry 
of a topological closure.  
For if surfaces are ontologically primary structures, it then fol-
lows that the enclosed entity is offered the opportunity to define 
itself in relation to whatever is external to it – i. e., of self-describing 
its own relational autonomy. This entails that the internal space is 
always enabled to grow and differentiate, as a spatially confined and 
temporally extended entity, in relation to an ever changing and 
unpredictable environment. In spite of this apparently paradoxical 
view, a number of implications can be logically drawn from this 
initial assumption. 
Persistence of an inside/outside asymmetry allows the internally 
confined space to grow in complexity and to be indefinitely 
maintained far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Such topological 
asymmetry provides an energetically favorable situation for creating 
a developmental path-dependency sufficient to counteract any 
entropic decay and catastrophic degradation. 
But even persistence itself may be jeopardized, if simply main-
tained on an individual scale. To be maintained in time and to over-
come any decay, the topologically confined entity has to upgrade its 
self-description from an analogical type of record to a digital one. 
This implies that memory of its environmental coupling cannot be 
simply recorded as it is accomplished in action, i.e. as a rate-depen-
dent morphological change. Rather, it has to be stored in an indelib-
le, molecularly inert, and digitalized form – that is, encoded in a 
rate-independent manner. This is what Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 
have come to call code-duality (Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991: 121). 
Whatever the nature or the order by which environmental inter-
actions are experienced by the living entity, digitalization in the 
form of DNA allows information to be stored in such a way as to be 
always accessible, regardless of the time of initial experience and 
the extent of recombination. Recognizing the primacy of self-
description implies conferring the role of agent to the enclosed 
entity – agency being defined as the capability of interacting as a 
subject with the external milieu.  
One way of conceiving of these agents’ interactions could be as 
resulting simply from the properties of the interacting partners, and 
as such they could be thought to be entirely predictable on the basis 
of prior knowledge. But here Hoffmeyer takes the view that 
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interactions are emergent with respect to the partners’ properties, 
and, as a result, they cannot be deduced from, or guided by, the con-
formity to general laws (Salmon 1998: 127). On the contrary, any 
relationship has to be understood as temporally situated, as creative 
with respect to antecedents, and driven only by local contingency. 
On conceptual grounds, this is not to deny any causal values to these 
partners’ properties, but simply to reduce their role to that of a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the interaction to 
occur – therefore leaving the character of an emerging novelty to the 
contingency of their interaction.  
What then could an agent do whenever confronted with an 
unstable and unpredictable surrounding? Hoffmeyer refers to the 
possibility of the agent to interpret meaningfully any message that 
may cross, either inwardly or outwardly, the membranes enclosing 
living systems (Hoffmeyer 1998: 36). Interpretation in this context 
does not necessary imply ‘self-awareness’ or an elaborate know-
ledge of the contextual setting, but simply the ability to sense the 
exchange of messages, through the exposed interfaces, as signs 
satisfying their need for completeness. Any environmental sensing 
that proved capable of fulfilling their metabolic requirements would 
then be interpreted as a meaningful sign matching their expected 
survival needs.  
In conclusion, due the topological asymmetry of cell membranes 
and to their ontological role in defining the primacy of self-
description, living entities are endowed with the semiotic compe-
tence to recognize and respond to emerging novelties. Given the 
possibility of fixing these novelties into digitalized memories, living 
entities are thus offered the chance of anticipating a foreseeable 
future in which the present incompleteness could be possibly 
satisfied. Any self-description they may attain through genetically 
fixed records has to serve as a present memory; while, to cite Jonas 
(2001: 14), any analogical expression is somehow anticipating their 
role as agents exploring the basic dimension of a needful freedom. 
In Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic thinking, this confirms the essential life 
property of making the initial spatial asymmetry of cell membranes 
functionally equivalent to a temporal surface endowed with the 
ability to develop an agentive role. 
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ALGORITHMS 
AJITESH GHOSE 
Aarhus University, Denmark  
The evolutionary trend toward the production of life forms with an 
increasing interpretative capacity or semiotic freedom implies that the 
production of meaning has become an essential survival parameter in 
later stages of evolution. 1 
 
Is it ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’ that influences human behaviour? Nowa-
days, most psychologists would probably acknowledge the impact 
of both nature and nurture when it comes to behavioural outcomes. 
However, there is still widespread belief in the idea of the 
environment (nurture) and genes (nature) influencing behaviour via 
mutually exclusive pathways. Researchers now know that these 
influences are highly interdependent, and that experience and 
environment (nurture) can modify genes (nature) in ways, which, in 
some cases, can also be passed on to subsequent generations. The 
field dedicated to studying such processes is called epigenetics, 
since its focus is on the role of experience-dependent variations in 
gene transcription. This paper aims to provide a brief review of how 
a particular type of computational search heuristic, called a genetic 
algorithm, may benefit from implementing insights from both 
epigenetics and biosemiotics – and in particular, Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 
notion of semiotic freedom. 
Experience shapes behaviour and memory, and the general idea 
behind epigenetic mechanisms playing a causally deterministic role 
in cognition was first postulated by Francis Crick in 1984. Chemical 
modification to the DNA molecule can affect cognition, for example, 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. A biosemiotic approach to the question of 
meaning. Zygon 45(2): 367–390 (p. 367).  
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and abnormal DNA methylation can lead to severe cognitive 
impairments that can be found in conditions such as Alzheimer’s 
disease and Rett syndrome (see Levenson, Sweatt, 2005 for an 
excellent review). DNA methylation is the term given to the 
biochemical process of altering a strand of DNA by means of a 
methyl group (CH3) added to a cytosine molecule, which is a 
pyrimidine derivative and is a base found in both DNA and RNA. In 
some cases, such methylation of cytosine molecules can lead to gene 
suppression, which is a way of regulating gene expression. And 
these changes in DNA methylation can also be inherited, via mitotic 
and meiotic cell division (Day, Sweatt 2010: 1320). 
According to Hoffmeyer (2010: 367), natural selection would 
have a favourable effect on the evolution of more advanced forms of 
semiotic freedom, given the advantages accompanying being able to 
more readily react to a wider range of signs. Hoffmeyer’s proposal 
seems plausible, given that there is a greater likelihood for an 
organism to pass on their genes if they can successfully adapt to 
their environment, which greater interpretative capacity would seem 
to promote. Given what we now know about epigenetic develop-
ment and semiotic freedom, I propose that we now have the 
opportunity for this knowledge to be implemented in developing the 
next generation of genetic algorithms for running on a computer. 
“Genetic algorithms” are a special class of computational search 
heuristics that attempt to emulate the natural selection process in 
order to, among other things, find optimal solutions to problems 
from a large pool of potential solutions (Goldberg 1989: 24). For 
example: pharmacological researchers may use genetic algorithms 
in order to identify molecules that could be useful in developing 
new drugs. This type of process would typically start with the 
researcher explicitly outlining the initial environmental parameters 
of the potential candidate molecules. The genetic algorithm then 
generates a random set of “solutions” which satisfy the initial 
environmental constraints. The researcher can then rate the mole-
cules generated based on several key characteristics associated with 
the requirements for a molecule appropriate for the given constraints. 
This is usually performed by the researcher, who has to rate several 
characteristics for each and every molecule generated by using a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5, leading to each molecule 
receiving an overall score, which is then fed back into the process. 
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Using this information, the genetic algorithm then generates 
another set of candidate molecules to be rated, so that this iterative 
process continues for several generations, until there is evidence of 
convergence towards a single candidate molecule. During each 
generation, the fitness of every potential solution is measured. Thus, 
this process contains a deterministic, as well as a stochastic, compo-
nent – and similar techniques are also used in automotive and aero-
space design. However, a limitation of this approach is that the evo-
lutionary assumptions made by the genetic algorithm in order to 
generate the next generation of potential solutions is often poorly 
defined and lacks internal consistency. 
An epigenetically- and biosemiotically-inspired genetic algo-
rithm, however, could be one that radically changes the way that 
nature and nurture are represented as mutually exclusive systems, in 
the form of “genetic material” being passed from one generation to 
the next (nature) in an environment (nurture) defined by the initial 
parameter settings. In traditional genetic algorithms, there are no 
genuine higher-order interactions between these “nature” and 
“nurture” elements. This may be sufficient for well-defined search 
heuristic requirements, however, in the case of developing search 
heuristics for innovative product design solutions (for example, 
where the aim is to strive for a radically innovative solution, as 
opposed to a new product design that is incrementally superior than 
its predecessors), it may be particularly important to develop an 
integrative module that computationally emerges from an inter-
action between the initial environmental parameters and the internal 
structure of the solution itself.  
Applying artificial neural networks would be ideal for such a 
task, given their ability to linearly and non-linearly transform input 
data (in this case from the environmental parameters and the internal 
structures) to emergent output data, comprising the novel epigenetic 
component to genetic algorithms. However, a critical aspect of this 
computational modelling strategy would be to have the notion of 
interpretative capacity or semiotic freedom (perhaps rated by a 
human or by using adaptive natural language processors) as the es-
sential ‘survival parameter’ determining which product solutions 
successfully transition from one generation to the next and continue 
down the path of evolutionary convergence until an optimal solution 
is found.  
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The above approach would establish a novel meaning-driven 
evolutionary design strategy, inspired by “production of meaning [as] 
essential survival parameter” model that Jesper Hoffmeyer so writes 
about so profoundly in the quote that begins this article, and may 
enable the discovery of even more innovative solutions, by using 
such biosemiotically-inspired genetic algorithms as search heuristics. 
 
References 
Crick, Francis 1984. Memory and molecular turnover. Nature 312: 101. 
Day, Jeremy; Sweatt, David 2010. DNA methylation and memory for-
mation. Nature Neuroscience 13: 1319–1323. 
Goldberg, David E. 1989. Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and 
Machine Learning. Reading: Addison Wesley Longman. 
Levenson, Jonathan; Sweatt, David 2005. Epigenetic mechanisms in me-
mory formation. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6: 108–118.  
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT ISTRIBUTE
ALTERITY 
AUGUSTO PONZIO 
University of Bari, Italy 
For the idea that personality has a place, a topological site, is not 
especially obvious, and by its very nature cannot be scientifically 
confirmed. The simple fact that our personhood “presupposes” our 
brain does not imply that our personhood is in the brain – and should 
we feel so compelled as to finally place our personhood in a definite 
biological locus, why not place it in the skin? For this is where we 
encounter the world around us and, in so many very obvious instances, 
the place where “all the fun” occurs. And, in fact, the skin is an 
indispensable part of our personality. 1 
 
I’m very happy to contribute to this publication on the occasion of 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 70th birthday. We were born in the same year, 
the same month and under the same sign, Aquarius. From different 
intellectual perspectives, developing different interests, and reading 
different authors we have come to the same conclusion: the other is 
in the self, the relation with the external other presupposes the 
relation with the internal other.  
 Hoffmeyer cites Merleau-Ponty (2002, cited in Hoffmeyer 2008: 
174): “The evidence of the other is possible because I am not 
transparent to myself and because my subjectivity pulls its body 
behind it”. I will now extend Hoffmeyer’s conception, reading it 
together with Levinas and Bakhtin. The author is in my skin, says 
Emmanuel Levinas (the author I began reading first in my 
philosophical studies). In ‘Reality and its Shadow’, Levinas writes: 
“Being is not only itself, it escapes itself. Here is a person who is 
what he is; but he does not make us forget, does not absorb, cover 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. The semiotic body. Biosemiotics 1(2): 169–190  
(pp. 171–172). 
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over entirely the objects he holds and the way he holds them, his 
gestures, limbs, gaze, thought, skin, which escape from under the 
identity of his substance, which like a torn sack is unable to contain 
them” (Levinas 1987: 6).  
 Otherness is in the self, itself a dialogue, a relation between same 
and other. The other is inseparable from the “I”, the same (Même). 
As the absolutely other, it cannot be included in the totality of the 
same. The other is necessary to the constitution of the I and its 
world – but is at once refractory to all those categories that tend to 
eliminate and subject it to identity of the same.  
 Otherness presents a constitutive impediment to the integrity, 
closure of the I as Identity, totality, the same. The relation with the 
other is characterized by excess, excedance. As Levinas reminds us: 
“The principal task behind all these efforts consists in thinking the 
Other-in-the-Same [l’Autre-dans-le-même] without thinking the 
Other [l’Autre] as an other Same [Même]. The in does not signify an 
assimilation: the Other disturbs or awakens the Same; the Other 
troubles the Same, or inspires the Same, or the Same desires the 
Other, or awaits him […] the identity of the Same is not that to 
which all his meaning can be reduced. The Same contains more than 
he can contain” (Levinas 1998: 80). 
The I is opening to otherwise than being, to the outside, without 
shelter, homelessness, worldlessness, without security. But opening 
is not only negation: it also signifies the other side of identity, of 
inwardness, demythization of the self, before closure in the abstract 
notions of freedom and non-freedom, when self is not yet nailed to 
the I.  
 Identity is exposition, without deliberation which in itself would 
already be closure in identity with its illusory barricades. This means 
that self cannot be indifferent. Non-indifference is a passivity. It 
penetrates identity even in the retreats of its inwardness. “The 
exposure precedes the initiative a voluntary subject would take to 
expose itself” (Levinas 1998: 80). It opens on to the world but is not 
in-the-world, is nonbeing in the-world. The restlessness of passi-
vity – a passivity more passive still than the passivity of matter – in 
exposure to an other, restlessness which takes place without a 
decision, is restlessness in exposure to an other exposure, to the 
openness of a face, the face of the other, the openness of its nudity. 
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 Exposure to an other is the asymmetric relation in the face-to-
face position. Face-to-face position is exposition of one’s nudity, 
outside role, position, function, power, defense. It is my relation in 
my alterity to the other in his alterity. Alterity in the face-to-face 
exposition is not relative alterity of roles, positions, functions, power, 
but absolute alterity. Exposure of one alterity to another alterity in 
the face-to-face relation precedes identity, subjectivity, freedom, 
language, being and it is their condition.  
 Concerning Bakhtin, dialogue is not communication of messages, 
nor initiative taken by self. Instead, self is always in dialogue with 
the other, the world, whether it knows it or not; self is always in 
dialogue with the word of the other. Identity is dialogic. Dialogism 
is at the very heart of the self. The self, ‘the semiotic self’, is 
dialogic in the sense of a species-specific modeled involvement with 
the world and with others. Self is implied dialogically in otherness, 
just as the ‘grotesque body’ (see Bakhtin 1984) is implied in the 
body of other living beings. From a Bakhtinian perspective dialogue 
and intercorporeity are interconnected: there cannot be dialogue 
among disembodied minds, nor can dialogism be understood sepa-
rately from the biosemiotic conception of sign. 
 With the shift from identity (whether individual or collective) to 
alterity, a sort of Copernican revolution is accomplished. Bakhtin’s 
‘Copernican revolution’ concerning the self, identity, consciousness 
involves all living beings, not only in the human world, but exten-
sively in the biological. Consciousness implies a dialogic relation, 
including witness and judge: “When consciousness appeared in the 
world (in existence) and, perhaps, when biological life appeared 
(perhaps not only animals, but trees and grass also witness and 
judge), the world (existence) changed radically. A stone is still stony 
and the sun still sunny, but the event of existence as a whole 
(unfinalized) becomes completely different because a new and major 
character in this event appears for the first time on the scene of 
earthly existence – the witness and the judge. And the sun, while 
remaining physically the same, has changed because it has begun to 
be cognized by the witness and the judge. It has stopped simply 
being and has started being in itself and for itself [...] as Well as for 
the other, because it has been reflected in the consciousness of the 
other [...]” (Bakhtin 1981: 137). 
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Bakhtin’s dialogism can be associated with Sebeok’s biosemio-
tics. They both believe that all living beings are interrelated in spite 
of apparent autonomy and separation. 
 Modeling and dialogism are pivotal concepts in the study of 
semiosis. Communication is only one type of semiosis that, with the 
semiosis of information or signification of symptomatization, pre-
supposes the semiosis of modelling and dialogism. 
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GÖRAN SONESSON  
Lund University, Sweden 
Clearly the import to the natural sciences of concepts developed inside 
humanistic disciplines like linguistics and semiotics is bound to provoke 
criticism (for some reason import the other way round is generally 
much more easily accepted, e.g. ‘psychological energy’, ‘social homeo-
stasis’). 1 
 
Jakob von Uexküll, similar to Monsieur Jourdain, invented bio-
semiotics without knowing it; Tom Sebeok also dabbled in it; but it 
only came into force with the work of Jesper Hoffmeyer. It seems 
that Sebeok already used the complementary term anthropose-
miotics a couple of times, but it was Hoffmeyer who acquainted me 
with it, using it as a kind of a short-hand for all the things he did not 
care to study. Like pragmatics, as Yehoshua Bar-Hillel once said, it 
has beome as vast waste-basket.  
From one day to another, I discovered myself to be an anthropo-
semiotician, and of course I was embarrassed. My first reaction was 
to think that, since human beings are animals, anthroposemiotics 
could only be a part of biosemiotics. But, of course, it must be a 
particular part. Not only because we, who are in the business of 
formulating such questions, are human beings ourselves, but, be-
cause of being human, we are the only ones able to study other 
animals – and then, as a kind of a bonus, ourselves. So I discovered 
a task for anthroposemiotics: to find out why human beings are such 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper and Emmeche Claus 1991. Code-duality and the 
semiotics of nature. In: Anderson, Myrdene; Merrell, Floyd (eds.), On Semiotic 
Modeling. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 117–166 (p. 153). 
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peculiar animals. There is continuity between us and the rest of the 
animal kingdom, but there is also discontinuity. Why? 
If biosemiotics is understood as zoosemiotics, it is easy to see 
that there is a great deal of continuity from there to anthropo-
semiotics. For someone like me, who has, in later years, been 
involved with the study of other primates, that gap often seems to 
get ever smaller. Can apes learn to handle signs – even if we define 
that notion much more strictly than Peirce and biosemiotics do – i.e. 
as something analogous to words and pictures? Well, those apes that 
are taught some substitute for language certainly can, but there are 
also indications that apes may use signs without having had any 
language training. Children, in turn, only slowly learn to use signs, 
and the first ones they master are certainly not linguistic signs. 
Using the vague notion of ‘sign’ that is current in biosemiotics, we 
unfortunately have no way of stating this. 
Taking Sebeok’s idea of endosemiosis much further than he 
himself did (or lived to do), Jesper Hoffmeyer also inaugurated 
biosemiotics as the study of meaning internal to cells. This creates a 
problem for us anthroposemioticians, for the continuity from cells to 
that peculiar ape called a human being is very difficult to perceive. 
No matter how much emergence and degrees of freedom we 
introduce, it does not seem to add up. Perhaps we could agree that 
life itself is meaning, but then we still have to bridge the distance 
from meaning to signs.  
Paradoxically, Hoffmeyer sometimes claims (though not with 
these very words) to be using an anthroposemiotic model in order to 
understand biosemiotics. Indeed, he is very content to reverse the 
accustomed order of reduction: instead of using a model developed 
in the natural sciences to study things which are ordinarily the 
subject of inquiry in the humanities, he employs a model derived 
from the humanities to study the customary objects of the natural 
sciences. But is there a difference between reducing signs to cells 
and cells to signs? We are, of course, more used to the former kind 
of reduction, such as when signs and ideas are called ‘memes’, so as 
to become more or less identified with genes. But to quote Hoff-
meyer quoting Bateson (who may be quoting Gustav Bergmann): 
What about ‘the difference that makes a difference’? Isn’t it lost in 
both kinds of translation? 
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No doubt, models and metaphors are asymmetrical. There is a 
difference between taking the known properties of a sign and 
transferring them to a cell, and taking the known properties of a cell 
and transfer them to a sign. The claim that the butcher is a surgeon 
is quite different (pace Lakoff) from the claim that the surgeon is a 
butcher. And, yet, in some ways, both comparisons amount to the 
same thing. In both cases, we are left wondering what the difference 
is. This may be no problem in the case of the butcher and the 
surgeon, which are defined for us by our society – but it may be an 
issue with reference to signs and cells. Metaphors should retain their 
mysterious ring. But scientific models have to account for both the 
similarities and the differences. 
Comparisons are important. But so are distinctions. On this 70th 
anniversary, what I wish for Jesper is a life beyond signs. Or more 
precisely: the discovery that life may be meaning, without yet being 
a sign. In spite of Peirce, the ethics of terminology should teach us 
much. Only then will the marriage of anthroposemiotics and bio-
semiotics be truly consummated. 
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DRUDE VON DER FEHR 
University of Oslo, Norway 
I en biosemiotisk forståelse er mening og betydning (sema) indbygget i 
kroppens natur (soma) og er ikke aspekter, der kan outsources til en 
ubestemt lokalitet i hjernen eller psyken. Uanset hva det psykiske end 
er, så er det også krop. Ikke krop i den fysiske forstand, videnskaben 
hidtil har begrænset kroppen til, men kropp i en semiotisk forstand; dvs. 
en krop, hvis hele dynamik er indlejret i det kommunikative samspil hen 
over de overflader, der omgiver celler, væv og organer i kroppen så vel 
som kroppen selv som enhed i det større sociale spil, den indgår i. 1 
 
In the quote above, Jesper Hoffmeyer states that in a biosemiotic 
understanding, meaning and significance (sema) are part of the 
nature of the body (soma), and not aspects that can be outsourced to 
a locality in the brain or to the psyche. Whatever the psyche is, he 
posits here, it is also body – although not a ‘body’ in the common 
scientific understanding of the word, but a semiotic body: i.e., a 
dynamical body which exists as a communicative interrelationness 
on the surfaces of surrounding cells, tissues and organs in the body, 
as well as the body itself as a unity in the lager social play that it is 
part of.  
Thus, with these words, Jesper Hoffmeyer has given the huma-
nistic disciplines a Body; a body that these disciplines cannot afford 
not to consider in the future.  
Indeed, Hoffmeyer has defined this body in a popular and most 
well-formulated way in the quotation above. But how could this 
semiotic body be of interest to the aesthetic disciplines? The anthro-
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2011. Semiosphaeren. In: Skriver, Morten; Kjeldgaard, 
Inge Merete (eds.) 2011. Livstegn. Kunst + biologi. Morten Skriver og Jesper 
Hoffmeyer. (Katalog.) Esbjerg: Esbjerg Kunstmuseum, 19–20 (p. 19). 
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pologist Ellen Dissanayake, in her books What is Art for? (1988) 
and Homo Aestheticus. Where Art Comes From and Why (1995) 
argues that art has been central to human evolutionary adaptation, 
and that the aesthetic faculty is a basic psychological component of 
every human being. In general, however, the human sciences have 
been unwilling to associate art with biological life.  
Dissanayake’s perspective is bio-evolutionary, and art for her is 
a doing, a behaviour. As she emphasizes in her books, the view of 
art as a bio-evolutionary need has not been common in aesthetics. 
There is one philosopher, however, who long before Dissanayake 
held a comparable view, and this is the American philosopher and 
pragmatist John Dewey (1859–1952). In the one book he wrote on 
aesthetic theory, Art and Experience (1934), he presents a theory of 
aesthetic experience based on the argument that man needs the 
quality of art in his continual interactions with the surroundings. 
Dewey substantiates his theory by entering into dialogue with 
Charles S. Peirce and his ideas regarding evolution, abduction and 
sign action.  
In Art and Experience, Dewey defines art as “a quality of doing 
and of what is done”. Art, according to him, “is an intrinsic quality 
of activity” (1980 [1934]: 214). Dewey’s view of ‘art as doing’ is 
deeply bound to the position he gives experience. Since in Dewey’s 
pragmatist aesthetics or, as Richard Shusterman (1992) puts it, in 
Dewey’s “somatic naturalism”, art cannot be separated from the 
experience of it, and experience is connected with the organism’s 
action and interaction with its environment. Art, in other words, has 
a basis in the organic world. The body is deeply involved in 
experience, and in the negotiations which go on between the human 
mind-body and its environment. This means that both the creator 
and the perceiver of the artwork are bodily involved in a process of 
interaction.  
Art happens in the body, and imagination is involved as the 
“bridge” between the inner and the outer world of the human. A 
work of art lives in the qualitative experience of its materiality and 
outer circumstances. It is itself a total effect brought about by 
vibrations of light, etc. The receiver of an artwork is not a subject 
confronting an object, but him or herself imaginatively involved in 
the creative moment of the perception of the quality in the 
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experience; an interactive process that affects the content of aware-
ness itself.  
Knowledge, too, is a product of art, says Dewey in Experience 
and Nature, not vice versa (Dewey 1958: 382). He or she who 
“perceives aesthetically will create an experience of which the 
intrinsic subject matter, the substance is new” (Dewey 1980 [1934]: 
108). Thus, the uniqueness and spontaneity of the aesthetic expe-
rience does not primarily lie in the meaning of the artwork. In a 
Peircean terminology, we could say that the abductive action of the 
perceptual judgment is where the quality of aesthetic experience 
happens. This event has the character of immediacy.  
If art is a qualitative experience that is important in evolution, 
what is the relation between this qualitative immediacy and 
Hoffmeyer’s emphases, in the same catalogue, of agency and will? 
Does agency and will in humans have to do with qualitative 
immediacy? Is qualitative immediacy simply the underpinning of 
agency in higher forms of life? If so, then art could be one possible 
sort of outbreak of the spontaneity or semiotic freedom, which 
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BACTERIA 
MASSIMO LEONE 
University of Torino, Italy 
When a bacterium cell finds itself in a gradient of nutrients and swims 
right instead of left, the cell is making a choice. 1 
 
How to understand this quote by Jesper Hoffmeyer?  
According to current microbiological knowledge, the motility of 
a bacterium such as Escherichia coli can be described as follows: 
the bacterium is able to make two movements: keep moving in the 
same direction, or change directionality. Through a complex system 
of receptors, the bacterium periodically monitors the concentration 
of a certain chemical element in the surrounding environment. If the 
bacterium ‘realizes’ that it is moving along a positive gradient, then 
it keeps moving in the same direction; if, on the contrary, it 
‘realizes’ that it is moving along a negative gradient, for instance 
from areas with more food toward areas with less food, then it 
changes direction. 
This motility dynamic reveals at least two interesting aspects. 
The first is that the bacterium must be able to compare its present 
state with the immediately previous one. Therefore, it must be 
endowed with a (albeit very rudimentary) form of memory. The 
second aspect is that the bacterium must be able to change direction. 
But the question to be asked, then, is the following: When a 
bacterium changes the direction of its motility, how is the new 
directionality determined in relation to the previous one?  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 194). 
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Current microbiological knowledge claims that such change is 
‘random’– that is, due to chance. But if it is claimed that the choice 
of direction of the bacterium is not necessary, since it cannot know 
in advance in which direction it will come across a more favorable 
gradient, then it is implicitly admitted that the bacterium’s choice of 
directionality is, from a certain point of view, free. The bacterium 
can therefore “choose” – and I believe that this is the sense of the 
term that Jesper Hoffmeyer is employing – where to move when 
searching for a better environment. Hence, one can elaborate a sort 
of micro-semiotics of bacterial motility, in that changes in the 
directionality of this motility seem not to be reducible to pure 
necessity. 
Let us consider now the motility of a human being who walks 
through a city in order to move from home to work. Contemporary 
semiotics tends to include such a phenomenon among its possible 
objects of study. Indeed, the network of urban streets can be 
analyzed as a system of potential alternatives, in relation to which 
each crossing, be it pedestrian or of another kind, actualizes a 
possible path. The ‘meaning’ of such a path, and therefore its being 
analyzable through semiotics, exactly stems from its being opposed 
to a whole series of alternative crossings: some will choose the 
shortest way from home to office, others the one with less traffic 
lights, yet others the one with more monuments or green areas, and 
so on – so that a more or less determined meaning will correspond 
to each of these choices, precisely by virtue of its being in contrast 
with a system of discarded alternatives. 
Hence, one might wonder whether freedom of choice in the 
coming about of a crossing is an essential requirement of its 
appearing as an object of meaning. The answer is certainly positive: 
if the citizen was obliged by nature to always go the same way, then 
such a way would have no meaning whatsoever, since it could not 
be opposed to any alternative one. But one might also wonder what 
the quality of this freedom of choice is from the semiotic 
perspective. From the semiotic point of view, it is not absolute 
freedom, but freedom in relation to a system of potentialities; 
freedom that is, so to speak, limited by the matrix of crossings 
offered to citizens by the network of urban roads as a consequence 
of the complex historical vicissitudes of its development. At each 
moment, the citizen can chose whether to stop or to keep moving, 
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and in this second case in what direction to keep moving. Yet, such 
freedom is not infinite, but always bound to a finite system of 
potentialities. Finally, one might wonder what pushes the citizen to 
change direction in one way or another. Several hypotheses can be 
formulated to this regard, but the ultimate answer will be, in most 
circumstances, that it is random walking – as mathematicians 
designate this kind of stochastic phenomena – i.e., the reasons for 
which a citizen chooses to turn right instead of left are impossible to 
determine. 
Going back to bacteria, what is the deep difference, then, that 
distinguishes their motility from that of human beings? In both cases, 
motility cannot be explained without an – albeit minimal – reference 
to the concept of choice, and therefore to that of freedom. In both 
cases, though, the conception of such choice, as well as that of the 
freedom it implies, seems to be subordinate to the concept of chance. 
It is only because we do not know the physical-chemical causes that 
necessarily determine changes of directionality in the motility of an 
Escherichia coli bacterium that we attribute such changes to chance, 
and therefore project onto them the possibility of a free choice 
among several alternatives. Similarly, it is only because we do not 
know the psychosocial causes that necessarily determine changes of 
directionality in the motility of a citizen that we attribute such 
changes to chance, and therefore imagine the possibility of meaning 
as stemming from the free actualization of one among several 
potentialities. 
In contrast, one can formulate the hypothesis that, with the 
progress of micro-biological research, the bacterium will be more 
and more nailed to a series of necessary acts and that, analogously, 
with the advancement of psychosocial research, the human being 
will end up appearing as more free than a bacterium only in 
quantitative, but not in qualitative terms; that is, it will be more 
difficult to reduce human freedom to necessity, but only because of 
the number of factors to be considered, and not because of their 
quality. Thus, one will end up turning what seems a dice game into a 
chess game, to quote Marcel Duchamp, and chance will increasingly 
look like an old-fashioned concept, a sort of phlogiston, a measure 
of the deficit in the knowledge of things. 
Following this trend one must wind up with a mechanistic 
conception of life, where the notion of freedom inevitably dis-
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appears, or remains only in those cases where the determinations 
that necessarily impose a certain path to the motility of living beings 
cannot be grasped. Every kind of movement, then, from the one that 
swarms in the subatomic structure of mineralia, to the tropism of 
vegetalia, to the simple taxis of bacteria, and above all to the 
complex motility of animalia – human beings included – would be 
part of a complex mechanism whose formula would allow one not 
only to reconstruct the past of the universe, but also to foresee its 
future with certainty. 
Yet, this absolutely deterministic and mechanistic perspective 
would neglect an element that is essential in the philosophy of the 
evolution. On the one hand, finding that at the heart of the motility 
of bacteria, and maybe also in the tropism of plants, not to speak of 
the swarming of the subatomic structure of the universe, subsists the 
same principle of actualization in relation to a matrix of potential 
alternatives allows one to embrace the whole universe in a single 
view, to be configured like the first embryo of a ‘theory of every-
thing’. On the other hand, though, the identification of this common 
principle cannot distract one from considering that, throughout 
evolution, this same principle undergoes reconfigurations that sub-
sequently alter its scope and, above all, its consequences, from the 
point of view of a philosophy (or even a metaphysics) of meaning. 
Let us consider, for instance, the difference between phototropism 
and phototaxis: in both cases, the living being tends to direct itself 
toward what is imposed to it as a positive polarity of the universe, 
that is, abundance of light as opposed to its scarcity. 
Nevertheless, whereas in phototropism, for instance in that of 
vegetables, the living being cannot but grow in the direction of light, 
in phototaxis the living being can, in a certain sense, be mistaken. It 
can be mistaken because, albeit in the short instant in which it 
changes its directionality in relation to a previous path, it can, as a 
matter of fact, orient itself, by mistake, toward a point of the 
universe with less light. In short, the increased motility of the living 
being, besides being adaptive as it enables an active exploration of 
the universe instead of a passive reception of it, augments its 
potential of freedom, introducing a principle of choice. 
Such principle of choice – as Jesper has shown in so much of his 
work – is the cradle of semiosis and, as a consequence, the cradle of 
humanity. 
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ALMO FARINA 
Urbino University, Italy 
Whenever a regular behavior or habit of an individual or species is 
interpreted as a sign by some other individuals (conspecific or alter-
specific) and is reacted upon through the release of yet other regular 
behaviors or habits, we have a case of semethic interaction. 1 
 
The complexity of the natural world may be considered the result of 
a huge number of fluxes of matter, organisms and energy that are 
interconnected in some extension. This model is very popular in 
ecosystem ecology, but is not completely satisfactory and not suffi-
cient to explain all the mechanisms by which, for example, animal 
species actively interact with one another.  
A biosemiotic interpretation, such as the one proposed by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer above, seems to offer a more complete and satisfactory 
paradigm, especially to explain sign interactions between different 
species. For these interactions establish pathways that are them-
selves carriers of information-with-meaning. As Hoffmeyer (2008) 
argues, a communication net connects individuals of different 
species and it seems that a specific process creates the foundations 
for several hetero-specific habits. The interactions he describes in 
the quote above he has called ‘semethic’ (from the Greek, semeion = 
sign + ethos = habit) interactions. 
Semethic interaction is one of the fundamental biosemiotic con-
cepts that is extremely important to introduce into the realm of 
ecological study, where sign systems per se are rarely considered 
and evaluated. And in my own work, I have found this concept 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. The semiotic niche. Journal of Mediterranean 
Ecology 9: 5–30. 
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extremely useful to describe a world of active and adaptive con-
specific and alter-specific acoustic communication. In particular, in 
the study of acoustic patterns between birds inside a community, we 
can invoke a semethic mechanism to explain the creation of a 
dynamic “soundtope”– which I define as an intentional, coordinated 
association of different singing birds that produces a communication 
net necessary to track some resources like food or security (Farina 
2012).  
The clustering of singing birds is quite common in nature, and 
could be produced by the effects of habitat heterogeneity on bird 
distribution, But if we understand that such heterogeneity is not 
recognized in the same way by different species because they each 
have specific umwelten, then the “habitat heterogeneity hypothesis” 
becomes contradictory and insufficient to explain such patterns. 
Definitively, the hypothesis that the complexity of vegetation 
functions as a proxy for the bird sound clustering is not sufficiently 
convincing to explain the “soundtope” patterns observed. Rather, 
there is evidence that birds concentrate their acoustic cues in a 
specific place, but one that can change spatially according to the 
period of the day or the season. The ‘geographical’ and ‘temporal’ 
plasticity of a soundtope is a tangible proof that the cognitive nature 
of such a process is created by a mobile net of semethic commu-
nicative pathways necessary to maintain cohesion inside a bird com-
munity (Farina 2012). 
However, even the semethic interactions based on the acoustic 
performances that have been found in a bird community, especially 
in the breeding season, cannot explain the dawn chorus. At that time, 
birds seem to sing independently of each other, producing an 
extensive overlap of the acoustic cues that results in a random 
portrait. Birds during the dawn chorus are still close to the roosting 
places and probably the selection, the day before, of a safe and 
appropriate roosting site, is a priority despite the acoustic quality of 
the environment. But immediately after that time, a few minutes 
later, birds move around and concentrate their acoustic activity in 
temporally favorable acoustic areas. Such behaviour produces a 
cluster of calls and songs that cannot be explained simply as 
territorial behaviour.  
Instead, we can admit that species composing a community have 
semethic communication strategies with all the other species. This 
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creates cohesion in the community by informing each individual 
about the position and status of the other conspecific or alter-
specific individuals. In fact, some species could be, in turn, more 
active in the sound performance than others that are more comple-
mentary, and this, too, cannot be explained with the usual acoustic 
models (e.g., the eavesdropping model proposed by Burt, Vehren-
camp 2005) based on the individual territorial defense.  
In sum, concepts that Jesper Hoffmeyer have given us, such as 
that of semethic interaction, are the baseline for further paradigms 
like the soundtope, and help open a “gran vista” on the ecological 
functioning of the animal communities.  
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BLADDERWORTS 
    PETER HARRIES-JONES 
York University, Canada 
The tendency of natural science [is] to deny the ontological reality of 
relations […] the self-organizing property of living systems is in 
opposition to the physicalist conception of nature […] 1 
  
I was a very pleased recipient of a signed copy of Jesper Hoff-
meyer’s Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Life of Signs and the 
Signs of Life (2008) which I obtained at the Semiotic Society of 
America meeting in Houston, Texas, during those momentous and 
therefore unforgettable weeks when the stock market crashed. 
Within the first 30 pages, however, I became a puzzled reader, as 
the first example of the significance of signs in Biosemiotics is ‘the 
semiotics of a slap’ – based on human activity – while the first 
example of organization in an eco-niche, the indirect mutualism of 
bladderworts, gives no example of the contribution of semiosis to 
mutual causality. Why human semiotics, first of all, in order to 
illustrate biosemiotics in an eco-system? I suspected that herein lies 
an unresolved dilemma.  
Humans have language, therefore there is always a high degree 
of descriptive symbolism mixed in with their sign use. Moroever, in 
the case of human beings, many signs are polysemous. The 
particular case presented is of a slap interpreted as anger, but it 
could have been a slap that was an accident. Or it could have arisen 
from sexual play. Yet another example of polysemy is that of slap-
stick comedy, where a slap that is not a slap. Then there are cultural 
variations in the use of slaps in human interaction. I am not enough 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 51. 
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of a Peirce scholar to know what Peirce thought about polysemy, 
but I do know that Peirce was more interested in applying semiosis 
to the determinacy of logic, than in the indeterminacy of social or 
psychological events. He was also more interested in the conscious 
appraisal in interpretation of signs, synechism, than he was of 
unconscious appraisal. Peirce died just before Freud’s first English 
publication, and could not have known Freud’s version of how 
polysemy in human dreams plays upon consciousness. 
Thus, we do not see Peirce discuss the difference between 
conscious and non-conscious generalities in relation to changes of 
habit. Yet Peirce’s notion of habit is a particularly important 
concept in biosemiotics because of its close, perhaps synonymous 
implication, with an ‘interpretant’. The issue here is that Peirce, like 
Bateson, is primarily interested in change – yet habituated activity is, 
as Bateson points out, often ‘sunken’ or non-conscious activity, and 
therefore, an activity that is difficult to change because it is non-
conscious (Bateson 1991: 137–138). Now biosemiotics is, surely, 
extremely interested in the precise conditions of change of habit, 
because change of habit effects how semiosis is linked to mutual 
causality in ecosystems – even among bladderworts.  
Moreover, if we were to incorporate Bateson’s insights, we 
would note that every message contains two elements, ‘report’ and 
‘command’. With the use of language, it is very much easier to 
represent a distinction between a report and a command, because it 
is possible to say “My report is not a command”. Much as in slap-
stick, where a slap is not a slap, language use permits a negative in 
order to explain descriptive aspects of the sign – i.e. to say “not”. 
Animals can also indicate that a ‘nip’ is not a ‘bite’, but their way of 
doing so is ambivalent, as the evidence of watching pups at play 
indicates: if the interaction of play results in ‘nips’ interpreted as 
bites, the pups at play cannot easily re-interpret the nips as ‘not 
bites’ and instead have to re-establish the rules of relationship 
(Bateson 1956). 
The point remains that the triadic relations of signification in 
human semiotics are different from the pattern of determinacy in 
communication in the non-human animal world – as a result of 
humanity’s overwhelming reliance on linguistic description. Lack of 
language makes non-human animals unable to take advantage of 
symbolism (Deacon 1997), and this largely limits their descriptive 
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forms of communication. In the animal world, the form of commu-
nication is largely injunctive; and most communication about acti-
vity is purposeful in an injunctive manner . Consider then the slap, 
not of the human, but of the beaver’s tail. It tells that there is danger 
here, now. Animal signification connects a state of affairs directly to 
actions, and to specific things to be done in the face of those states 
of affairs (Millikan 2002: 507).  
Meaning arises from recurrent usage of evident relations, and to 
recursion in their patterning; that is to say, patterns that are con-
textually redundant in relation to very specific times, types of 
occasion and locales. It is an enormous step from this sort of signifi-
cation to a human ‘belief’ – which clearly involves the separation of 
indicative from imperative functions of the representational system 
(ibid). Yet, Millikan argues, the full meaning of a communication is 
not limited to such specificity. Though the initial meaning of a sign 
arises out of a percept-action loop originating in recurrent locales, 
this recursion provides a ground for meaning extensions, wherever 
translocation or distal sets of relations are represented in animal 
communication (Millikan 2004). 
Hoffmeyer objects to Millikan’s explanation, because Millikan 
relies too sweepingly on ‘natural selection’ as her selective process, 
and I suspect that most in the biosemiotics community would agree 
with him. On the other hand, a logical and epistemic cut of symbolic 
representation out of Peircean biosemiotics inevitably affects the 
triadicity of both icon and index. The dilemma is: Can biosemiotics 
live with such deep revisionism to Peirce’s triadicity of relations? 
Kull has already proposed a graded approach to semiotics and 
identifies the following grades of semiotic sign systems: cellular, 
vegetative, animal, linguistic, cultural (Kull 2000). 
Bateson’s insights make Millikan more palatable, in that he takes 
Millikan-style generalizations about natural selection, and re-casts 
that process into a series of temporal levels (which he unfortunately 
labelled a ‘hierarchy’), replete with boundaries, gaps and interfaces, 
at each level. Meaning that arises from contextual signification on 
each level of a recursive hierarchy, each with an interface, also turns 
out to be a flexible way of discussing the semiotic contexts of habit, 
expectancy and surprise (information) – and hence of change, 
because ‘habit’ can then be examined in Bateson’s own triad, the 
context of ‘learning’ (Bateson 1991).  
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For all that, bladderworts and their pattern of indirect mutualism 
begins Jesper Hoffmeyer’s truly satisfying biological tour into that 
which Kant called the beauty of the sublime in nature – form, 
perception, connectivity, awareness, and a totally new under-
standing of active response of organism to the turbulence of en-
vironment and evolution. At the end of the tour, a new conception of 
the relation between nature and culture: no longer a dualism, but a 
continuum in which culture is an extension of nature: a consilience 
to be treasured! May Hoffmeyer’s challenge to the fallacies of 
eugenics, sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology – and even the 
biochemical diehards in molecular biology – long remain! 
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 … if we are to be healed, the only way this can be achieved is through 
the acceptance of the fact that our intelligence swarms out of our 
bodies… 1 
 
Susanne Langer’s analysis of the ‘great shift’ to humanization, 
charted in her monumental trilogy, Mind: An Essay on Human 
Feeling (Langer 1967, 1972, 1982) intersects with and strengthens, 
both conceptually and empirically, Hoffmeyer’s Peirce-based 
charting of the fundamental movement from the iconic and indexical 
orders to the symbolic order. The points of intersection merit close 
attention: (a) an attack on both substance dualism and materialistic 
monism, (b) recognition of the cerebral, hence bodily, aspects of the 
‘great shift’ to human mentality due to an intracerebral surplus of 
images, (c) a foregrounding of the role of abstraction rooted in a 
primordial grasp of form and structure, (d) an acceptance of multiple 
and irreducible symbolic modes defining the space of anthropo-
semiosis, and (e) a rich phenomenology of meaning-systems rooted 
in the fundamental semiotic distinction between discursivity and 
presentationality.  
Langer arrives at conclusions practically identical to Hoff-
meyer’s, but she does not propose to apply a Peircean semiotic 
schema to the data, nor redescribe them in Peircean terms, although 
her own analyses duplicate Peirce’s in many ways. Hoffmeyer 
recognizes the importance of Langer’s work, especially her analyses 
of art, which he traces rightly back to the phenomenon of ‘felt life’ – 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, B. J., 
trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 136. 
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whose ‘morphology’, in Langer’s terms, it is the goal of art to 
objectify in pregnant images. Art for Langer is thus the objecti-
fication of feeling and the subjectification of nature. Langer shows 
that the life of feeling made manifest in art is held together by a 
rhythmic concatenation of integrated elements that are progressively 
more and more unified, giving rise to the essentially embodied agent 
as a vital matrix. An organism, and the mind as the locus or field of 
semiosis, she writes, is “made entirely by processes which are vital 
acts” and “the body, throughout life, is the ‘dynamic equilibrium’ 
itself, growing and differentiating into articulate forms” (Langer 
1967: 184). A fruitful task would be to follow up these pointers, to 
explore in more detail the bodily matrices of artistic images, and to 
investigate these images as heuristic keys to exploring minding itself 
and its roots in vital processes of feeling. 
Similar to Hoffmeyer, also, Ernst Cassirer, in his Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms (1923, 1925, 1929), proposed a triadic schema of 
the symbolic niche created and occupied by humans. But Cassirer’s 
triad is not the Peircean one of iconicity, indexicality, and symbo-
licity, but one of Ausdruck, Darstellung, and Bedeutung – we could 
translate as expression, representation, and pure signification. The 
criterion for distinguishing between these signifying modes or 
dimensions is the relative freedom of the sign from the perceptual-
intuitive level, from which it can never be totally dissociated. The 
sign’s body can never be left behind, any more than we can leave 
our own bodies behind. All three dimensions, at the productive level 
of articulation, including material articulation, belong to the ‘mid-
world’ between the Merknetz and the Wirknetz of the other animals. 
Cassirer, explicitly referring to Uexküll, was aware of what we 
would call today a ‘biosemiotic’ framework, although his focus was 
the human ‘semiotic animal’. Cassirer’s consequent semiotic 
schematization of ‘technics’ in his seminal monograph, Form und 
Technik (1930), throws a helpful light on Hoffmeyer’s insistence on 
the normative role of semiotic freedom. Cassirer distinguishes, in 
accordance with his semiotic schema, between mimetic, analogical, 
and signifying technologies. Evaluating their lived consequences 
forces us to attend critically to (a) the types of experiences generated 
by these technologies and (b) their ‘quality’ of enabling us to move 
freely, with inner and outer richness, in the biosphere. 
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I think that Cassirer’s great insights, both conceptual and 
evaluational, would support, complement, and extend in a genuinely 
‘semiotic’ manner Hoffmeyer’s own concerns for the ‘health’ of the 
biosphere as impacted by our technologies. The semiotic body must 
preserve its health both endosomatically and exosomatically, so 
questions that we may want to ask ourselves are: Is there such a 
thing as ‘semiotic health?’ In what senses is it possible for the great 
exosomatic systems of signs, tools, and models that make up the 
semiosphere to be ‘sick?’ What normative ideals underlie the 
ecological notion of ‘imbalance?’ Are these ideals implicit in semio-
sis itself? Is there maybe even a ‘semiopathic’ medicine? 
Hoffmeyer has established that meaning is always rooted in, and 
structures, some sort of ‘body’. Our natural bodies have a semiotic 
structure, as do our exosomatic bodies. Dwelling in our natural 
bodies, as matrices of meaning, we also dwell in our extended 
exosomatic bodies. Embodiment, in both cases, is essentially 
perilous. Michael Polanyi, in a pregnant passage from his The Tacit 
Dimension, exemplifies this in a most perspicuous way: 
“The structure of tacit knowing […] shows that all thought contains 
components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of 
our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they 
were parts of our body. Hence thinking is not only necessarily 
intentional, as Brentano has taught: it is also necessarily fraught with 
the roots that it embodies. It has a from-to structure” (Polanyi 1966: 
xviii). 
These roots are multiform, encompassing all the dimensions of our 
dual embodiment. Polanyi’s nuanced epistemological framework 
allows us to see that novel systems of signs and meanings and novel 
technologies, including new technologies of the media, are indwelt 
and treated as extensions of our bodily equipment. They define 
novel forms of world-making, from which and through which we 
attend to and interact with the world. These roots are the enabling 
and constraining conditions of the primary ‘biases’ of perception in 
the extended sense. There is a deep inertial drag in these embodied 
commitments. Their originating matrices contain forces - 
psychological, economic, political – that can destroy the health of 
biosphere and semiosphere alike.  
Jesper Hoffmeyer, from the beginning of his career, has pointed 
out just what these commitments are and the risks involved in 
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making them. We often make them without even wanting explicit 
awareness of their consequences. Hoffmeyer’s goal is precisely to 
raise, in a theoretical, critical, and practical way, our awareness and 
to show us, without hectoring and with the deepest ethical concern, 
what is at stake in the embodied circuit of transactions joining the 
biosphere, the semiosphere, and the technosphere in the great spiral 
of creation and destruction that marks life on this planet.  
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Reflections on the emergence of life necessarily brings us to the 
problem of discontinuity and continuity: Should we choose to see life as 
just one particular instantiation of more general tendencies characte-
ristic to the universe we inhabit, or should we rather choose to see 
living systems as decisively different from anything else in the known 
world? 1 
 
As a colleague who has also been trained in biochemistry and 
molecular biology, I have long admired Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 
linguistic dexterity in expressing intricate concepts in plain language. 
And the above quote from his 2001 paper ‘Life and reference’ is 
even more cogent today. During the intervening decade, the success 
of molecular biology has been amplified manyfold. The manifold of 
biochemical relationships among the various ‘-omics’ created during 
this very productive decade has deluged us with data without 
substantially deepening our understanding of our origins.  
For several decades, I explored the biochemical, dynamical, and 
informational basis of mutation, as a path for my contribution to 
public health. The central mystery that captivated my curiosity was 
the realistic question of: How was it possible that a single molecule 
could induce a biological mutation that changed the entire organism? 
The initial conjecture was well grounded in empirical evidence and 
fits well within the paradigms of genomics of today. Today, how-
ever, the same question would be phrased in terms of dynamical 
systems theory and information theory.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2001. Life and reference. Biosystems 60: 123–130. 
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The physical mystery regards discovering what is the antecedent 
quality of chemical information such that it amplifies itself. The 
degree of informative amplification may be from 16 to 30 orders of 
magnitude, depending on the size of the living organism. The 
predicate logic of traditional mathematics (manifesting itself in 
theories of thermodynamics, quantum mechanics and information 
theory) does not offer any concrete calculations that inform us about 
the magnitude of such amplification. These physical theories do not, 
then, suffice as a explanation for life. Rather, life itself appears 
geared to amplifying structural information as a routine habit of 
living in the present. The mystery deepens.  
Indeed, I am beginning to believe now that the conundrum of the 
amplification of biological information appears to be an artifact of 
human communication! The inductive logic of mathematical, 
physical and informational theories has contributed enormously to 
human weal. After all, many natural processes can be linearly 
approximated as mechanical processes, and he human capacity to 
use generalized inductive logic to construct machines has influenced 
human development strongly. Likewise, the symbol system of 
modern mathematics, grounded in the grammar of predicate logic 
(DeMorgan, Boole, Russell) has become an essential feature of 
human economic communication.  
Thus, two related questions emerge. Why does the quantitative 
inductive logic of the modern predicate logic fail as a reference 
system for the amplification of chemical information following 
mutation and for biological communication?2 And if not predicate 
logic and category theory, then what is the logic of amplification?  
The latter question has led to a long and fruitful study of the 
ostension of signs as vehicles of human communication cycles – 
that is, the learned human cultural capacity to express our mental 
activities as signs and the possibility of another human to be 
impressed with a message similar to the original intent. The cycles 
of expressions and impressions as vehicles of human communi-
cation are not based on inductive generalizations of predicate logic, 
but rather they are induced by the particular habits of human 
learning.  
——————— 
2   This question was discussed at length in my 2009 paper ‘Algebraic 
biology’. 
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Human sign systems, with the earliest records dating to the 
Mesopotamians in the fourth millennium BC, have proliferated in 
recent centuries. In particular, at the beginning of the 19th century, 
John Dalton introduced an iconic and indexical symbol system for 
the discussion and examination of individual (but invisible and 
indivisible) gases. Dalton’s grammar was iconic with respect to the 
visualization of quantitative relationships – but the concept of 
‘relation’ in chemistry was not encumbered by the grammar of 
predication, or by the temporality of dynamic changes of place. 
Rather, the simple structural notation of Dalton was based on the 
notion that a sign from an existent sample of a singular chemical 
elements was representable as a symbol for that chemical element. If 
two different elemental signs were emitted by a singular invisible 
gas, then both elemental symbols were logically necessary in order 
to represent the gas. Thus was born the logical foundations of the 
chemical sciences.  
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) generalized the Daltonian 
notion of relation, without invoking the predicate logic of Boole and 
De Morgan, and also without making reference to a specific external 
sign. Peirce used the terminology of Firstness and Secondness as 
mental objects and Thirdness as the concept of relation. Moseley 
(1914) proposed the concept of “atomic number” as a correspon-
dence relation between physical measurements and the listing of the 
chemical elements by weight. Linus Pauling (1931) attempted to 
formalize the relation between atomic structure and molecular 
structure.  
In summary, the quantitative calculations of molecular formula 
and molecular weight and valence do not depend on the predication 
associated with Aristotelian efficient causality. Rather, the logical 
linkage is expressed in terms of Stoic logic – antecedents and 
consequences. The verbs linking atoms to atoms are copula, not 
predicate. A particular induction, not a generalized induction, is 
necessary to specify the conjunctive relations between any two 
atoms, that is, single, double, triple, aromatic, etc. bonds. Thus, the 
reference system for molecular biological calculations is inferred 
directly from the signs from material objects, not the grammar of 
rhetorical language usage.3 
——————— 
3   Some of these arguments are present in Chandler 2009b. 
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Substantial work remains to be done on establishing other 
symbolic reference systems for biology and medicine. Effective 
human communication requires, minimally, that the symbols used in 
the expression-impression cycles of human relations be mutually 
understood. But effective scientific communication further requires 
that the symbols represent signs in such a way so as not to be mis-
understood. At present, ambiguity in the interdisciplinary commu-
nications among individual scientists is simply intolerable. My 
current view is that the logic of life is the inverse of the logic of 
physics is supported by semeiotic reasoning. But we desperately 
need better methods to communicate the facts of biosemiosis to both 
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Nagaoka University of Technology, Japan  
What I have suggested we call semiotic causality, i.e., bringing about 
things under guidance of interpretation in a local context. 1 
 
In the passage above, Jesper Hoffmeyer reconfirms the Peircean 
thesis that the determination of final causation lies at the root of 
everything possible in this world – yet this is the sort of remark that 
has long been stored deep inside the sealed Pandora’s box of the 
Western tradition of empirical and analytical thinking. Likewise, 
Sebeok’s motto that both semiosis and the phenomenon of life are 
coextensive, though synthetically plausible, remains not analytical 
enough for most mainstream scientists. The relevant question raised 
at this point is whether or not Hoffmeyer’s reminder above should 
still be seen as a red herring in science. That is what this contri-
bution will set out to explore. 
The action of a sign refers to the activity of something to the 
extent that it is standing in relation to something other than itself. 
Yet this relational activity is not an invention unique to semiotics. 
Rather, it is ubiquitous in the material world. Consider, for instance, 
the Boyle-Charles law of the ideal gas PV=RT framed in the scheme 
of thermodynamics – in which P is the pressure of the gas, V is the 
volume, T is the temperature, and R is the gas constant. The gas law 
is under-complete in the sense that the law by itself cannot 
determine the value of each of the three variables in a definitive 
manner. Instead, the determination of the values of these variables 
proceeds only indirectly: The pressure P of a local region of the gas 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 64.  
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can be determinable from the law only if the local region can 
identify both its volume and the temperature internally (Matsuno 
1989). The gas law is thus relational with respect to the determi-
nation of each value of the three variables.  
Implicit in the relational characteristic latent in the gas law is the 
capacity of measurement internal to the gas itself. Although the 
physicist can measure each value of the three variables externally 
with use of an apparatus designed specifically for the purpose, 
thermodynamics takes the material and natural capacity of relating 
one variable to the remaining two other variables for granted. The 
aboutness of something in relation to something else which semio-
tics legitimately recognizes is already implicit in thermodynamics.  
Another case of the relational characteristic revealed in the 
physical world is through Hugh Everett’s reformulation of quantum 
mechanics in terms of relative-state interpretation (Everett 1957). 
No one can dismiss the quantum-mechanical underpinning of the 
material world, and semioticians are no exception. Thus, a serious 
question arises with regard to how one can vindicate the relational 
stance in quantum mechanics. The relational stance requires the 
agency of internal measurement, as demonstrated in thermodyna-
mics. In other words, quantum mechanics would have to be at home 
with the act of measurement from the outset. What Everett notices 
in this regard is that any quantum state is relative to any other 
quantum state, and that the occurrence of a relative state is nothing 
other than the act of measurement proceeding internally (Matsuno 
1989). This relative-state interpretation is certainly in conformity 
with the Copenhagen interpretation as championed by Niels Bohr 
(1949), as far as the actual experiments to be done in the laboratory 
are concerned. The idea of the probability amplitude of the wave 
function, thanks to Max Born (1949), applies to both equally. 
However, the difference between the two would become most acute 
and serious, once one comes to address the origin of the measure-
ment apparatus. For while the Copenhagen interpretation takes it for 
granted that the physicist is responsible for preparing the measure-
ment apparatus, the relative-state interpretation conceives of the 
occurrence of any quantum state relative to any other to be a mea-
surement (Wheeler 1957).  
One undeniable advantage of the relative-state interpretation is a 
total naturalization of the act of relating something to something 
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else. The action of a sign is certainly a demonstrative instance of the 
act of relating something to something else. Nonetheless, there still 
remains a hard issue of how to vindicate the relational stance with-
out relying upon a relational stance – otherwise the relative-state 
interpretation would be entrapped by helpless infinite regression. In 
other words, it would be tolerable to say “You are relative to me”. 
But, if this tolerable statement is further accompanied by another 
one as saying “Don’t ask me to whom I am relative”, the relative-
state interpretation would come to be undermined in the end.  
In order to circumvent the likely stalemate, we would be asked to 
pay serious attention to such an exchange as “I am relative to you, 
but you are also relative to me” – and this has been a common 
symptom of the malaise suffered from the vice of self-reference. 
One likely first-aid for its rescue, however, would be the reappraisal 
of the notion of final causality that Hoffmeyer calls our attention 
to – for what is needed is a way to appraise the relational stance 
without invoking another relational stance.  
“Final causality” has earned a bad name because of a misplaced 
emphasis made by both its proponents and its detractors so far. Yet 
final causality obtains its legitimacy in the act of preserving the 
class identity of each participating material element, while re-
maining indifferent to preserving each individual identity of the 
element. Thus, although the atomic physicist can detect the indi-
vidual identity of each carbon atom, the biological cell keeps 
recognizing the class identity of each participating carbon atom even 
if it is replaced by another atom of the similar kind. Preserving such 
‘class identity’ serves as a final cause directed toward the partici-
pating individual atoms and molecules though it is not tenable to 
observe the act of final cause as preserving the individual identity of 
the participating elementary body, because of the involvement of 
self-referential complications. A typical example demonstrating 
such class identity is the preservation of the material support that 
processes constant material exchanges.  
In fact, a most primitive material support processing the ex-
change of materials is a meta-stable product – repeating its synthesis 
and partial decomposition, while eliminating the case of its total 
decomposition. Furthermore, the occurrence of those meta-stable 
products is experimentally demonstrative, even if the synthetic 
notion of life, whatever it may be, is not yet currently available. 
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Once such meta-stable product has been set in motion, the parti-
cipation of final causality would have become a natural course of 
events – just as Jesper Hoffmeyer has so aptly recognized.  
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VICTORIA N. ALEXANDER  
Dactyl Foundation, United States of America  
Louis Pasteur has been credited for coining the saying that ‘chance 
favors only the prepared mind’. In essence, this captures the idea being 
expressed here. Chance mutations are not selected because they are 
beneficial; they are beneficial because they happen to appear in a 
relational system, which was already well prepared for them. That blind 
selection should be the sole cause of evolution is one of the mightiest 
fictions of our times. Selection is never blind; it is always guided by 
prior formation of development and semiotic integration. 1 
 
We might never have come up with a concept of chance if we hadn't 
noticed that sometimes the outcomes of chance aren’t “fair”. If 
every sample of uncorrelated events had a nice random distribution, 
then there would be no patterns to get our attention. We wouldn't 
wonder if, or how, chance “caused” that streak of heads in a coin 
toss, or that fortuitous meeting at the crossroads.  
Ever since Laplace, we have understood that, in the absence of 
complete knowledge of material causes, we may guess at the 
probability of certain events occurring. Events are “caused by 
chance” – but not in the sense of by a causal force or agent, but 
instead in the sense that events are coincidences that are either likely 
or unlikely…or somewhere in between. Chance, then, causes 
everything – even though chance per se is not a cause at all. We 
might conclude, therefore, that chance, as a concept, is meaningless 
or, at the very least, confusing. Or maybe, even after millennia of 
debate (the start of which probably predates Epicurus’ clinamen), 
the meaning of chance still waits to be fully fleshed out. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 202. 
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In the quote above, which occurs in a discussion of genetic 
assimilation, Jesper Hoffmeyer defines chance as relational and part 
of semiotic processes. Following Peirce’s creation by differentiation 
idea in “Design and Chance” (1992: 215–224) and/or Bateson’s, 
“difference that makes a difference” (1972: 448–466), Hoffmeyer 
suggests that sometimes the dice of chance are loaded. Semiosis is 
the cause of this “unfair” chance. Wherever a new coincidental 
regularity appears, it may come to function in a meaningful way to 
an organic system.  
With this idea in mind, let’s consider Pasteur’s maxim more 
closely. The most prepared mind, to a biosemiotician, has the most 
semiotic freedom. Likewise, the most prepared cell has acquired, in 
its evolutionary past, a number of partial models of its environment 
(for example, lock-like receptors for keyed stuff it needs). We say 
that “chance favors” such a system – i.e., allows it to survive and 
reproduce – insomuch as the greater number of ways of interacting 
increases the odds of success. But this is just ‘chance’ in a 
probabilistic sense. In the passage above, Hoffmeyer is more 
interested in another sense of chance. For him, chance doesn't just 
favor the semiotic system after the fact of its existence: chance 
somehow is semiosis – and beneficial chance doesn’t exist except in 
relation to a semiotic system. Thus, when we say “chance favors” a 
semiotic system we mean: allows that system to adapt. And so how 
does a system discover new models; how does it learn? 
Although mutations (e.g., changes of any holon: gene, protein, 
cell, organ, etc.) may be random, this does not mean that every form 
is tried with equal probability. Mutations are said to be ‘random’ 
only with respect to the needs of the organism. They are generally 
physically similar to and/or contiguous with the original configu-
rations. Yet biosemioticians might agree that such relationships can 
tend, in and of themselves, to speak to the needs of organisms. If 
mutations usually result not in some random mix-up, but in a 
patterned group whose differences might interact and feedback, then 
some new type of regulatory switch might be produced and become 
useful to the organism in dealing with its environment. Think of 
Lovelock’s Daisyworld whose black and white daisies create stable 
temperatures. New organizational systems emerge prior to natural 
selection – which only helps them by clearing the field of less 
prepared competitors.  
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Now let’s look at Hoffmeyer's illustration of the role that 
semiotic chance plays in changes in the metabolic cycle of bacteria. 
When bacteria are starved of glucose, cAMP happens to accumulate 
and causes the cells to produce an enzyme that can metabolize 
lactose instead. Hoffmeyer notes that “since the shape of the cAMP 
molecule has many traits in common with the shape of the ATP 
molecule [which is necessary to metabolize glucose] […] cAMP 
might easily bind to a range of enzymes at the exact same positions 
where ATP would normally bind” (2008: 217). He goes on to 
observe the semiotic nature of the interaction insofar as “cAMP in 
bacteria […] may function as an icon for ATP (i.e., as a specific 
conformation that enzymes may take to be ATP)” (ibid). Note that 
cAMP first appears here as a side-effect of other processes – a side-
effect that is irrelevant to the needs of the bacteria. Yet its similarity 
in shape to ATP relates to the normal metabolic process in an 
effective, if different, way. Chance similarities lead to useful 
regularities – and to the ‘preparedness’ of the bacteria that can 
switch to an alternate resource in times of scarcity.  
With this adaptation, bacteria have used something like artistic 
genius, stumbling upon a solution. Selection is guided, but there is 
no intelligent designer here, no engineer with well a thought-out 
plan. This is spontaneous semiosis, unconscious of course, but 
which enables purposeful actions.  
In the past twenty years or so, the number of complexity scien-
tists naturalizing the concept of teleology as self-organization has 
grown. Some have recognized that semiotics is needed to explain 
how self-organization occurs, and a few have recognized the role 
that ‘chance’ plays in semiotics: any mutation can function as an 
accidental icon or index, and biological systems interpret every part 
of themselves and the resources flowing through them. Moreover, 
anything that is similar to a sign used previously can be read as 
such – and anything that happens to be contiguous with a process 
can reveal something significant about that process. 
 Chance, it turns out, is at the heart of semiotics, self-
organization and teleology. And to think that in his Physics (Bk II 
§5), Aristotle notes that some people naïvely confuse “chance” – in 
the sense of unfairly good coincidence – with final cause! I consider 
this one of the greatest philosophical near-misses in all of human 
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history. Coming to the question of chance and purpose with a 
prepared mind, Hoffmeyer is able to see the truer answer.  
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LUIS EMILIO BRUNI 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
For it is the nature of the code to point outside of its own mode of 
existence – from the continuous to the discontinuous message, from the 
physical and therefore law bound message to the more free message. 
And back again in an unending chain. 1 
 
It is not an easy task to pick one single idea or quote from Jesper 
Hoffmeyer in order to convey how much his writings have inspired, 
me and to convey my gratitude for his endless generosity – 
especially for a person who, like me, that had the privilege of being 
one of his Ph.D. students.  
I first “discovered” Jesper Hoffmeyer when I was searching to 
find out who in the academic world was carrying Gregory Bateson’s 
innovative epistemology further forward in the biological disciplines, 
and at the same time, who was maintaining an eye on the upholding 
the importance of ecological history. Jesper Hoffmeyer, I soon 
found, certainly did not stop at merely perpetuating Bateson’s 
revolutionary insights. Rather, he has been able to incorporate 
Bateson’s coherent approach to information, hierarchical contexts 
and analog/digital communication into a new, semiotically sound 
epistemology that is useful for biology and the life sciences. In a 
very elegant and compact manner, his notion of code-duality 
exemplifies this operation.  
Hoffmeyer started to think in terms of code-duality around 1987, 
and together with Claus Emmeche published, in 1991, the seminal 
article ‘Code-duality and the semiotics of nature’. There they argued 
that code-duality is definable as the ability of a system to represent 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2002. Code duality revisited. SEED 2(1): 98–117 (p. 99). 
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itself in two different codes, one digital – a code for memory – and 
one analog – a code for action. Life exhibits the semiotic interaction 
between the two states: i.e., the analog coded state of the organism 
itself and its re-description in the digital code of DNA (Hoffmeyer, 
Emmeche 1991). We could say that in their formulation, Hoffmeyer 
and Emmeche have set the ‘boundaries’ for code-duality as resting 
between the DNA-digital code and the organismic analog code. 
 But what happens in between these boundaries? Inspired by this 
question, it appeared clear to me that the next step was to ‘unpack’ 
the details of the semiotic processes that comprise the ontogenetic 
historical continuum, and that oscillates within these boundaries of 
the code-dual nature of organisms and ecosystems. How does the 
digital become analogical, and how does the analogical goes back to 
digital? Is the code-dual nature of digital-analogical information 
also present at different integration levels of the developmental 
continuum?  
With this in mind – and in light of current knowledge about 
genome architectures, cellular signaling networks, and regulatory 
systems – I worked on the idea of a dialectic process that could 
characterize the unfolding of hierarchical layers of coding and de-
coding based on the interplay of the digital and analogical modes of 
communication that mediate the integration of information in 
heterarchic triadic networks of causality. To continue in the 
Bateson-Hoffmeyer-Emmeche direction I coined the term “digital-
analogical consensus” to describe this process, in which analogical 
signs emerge by the aggregation of digitally coded signs – and, in 
turn, in which the newly emergent analogical compound sign may 
constitute a ‘quasi-digital’ piece of information to a higher level of 
coding, constituting a higher order ‘logical product’ (Bruni 2002; 
2007). In other words, in between the polar boundaries of code-
duality, there is an endless hierarchical digital-analog dialectic that 
takes place across the many layers of the ontogenetic continuum.  
As with any seminal concept, Hoffmeyer’s notion of code-
duality also has the quality of generating many new fruitful ques-
tions, and if it is truly seminal, it will generate more questions than 
answers. According to Hoffmeyer, self-reference is the fundament 
on which life evolves, and code-duality is the central feature 
allowing for self-reference, which in turn depends on some kind of 
re-description. In living systems, this description is made in the 
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digital code of DNA (or RNA) – what Hoffmeyer refers to the code 
for memory. Yet whereas it has also been stated by Hoffmeyer that 
this digital memory is only part of the description, it still remains 
ambiguous whether the digital description of DNA conveys 
anything more than amino-acid sequences for successful proteins, as 
for example, when it is claimed that: “What should be specified 
through the memorized description is not the material details of the 
system, but only its structural relations in space and time” and that 
“the realization in space and time of the structural relations specified 
in the digital code defines what kind of differences in the sur-
roundings the system will actually select and respond to” (Hoff-
meyer 2002: 103).  
These observations beg the question of how should such 
structural relations in space and time could become specified in the 
digital code. The ambiguity may lie in the fact that the necessary 
self-description for self-reference is always transmitted and in-
herited in both codes acting together simultaneously: therefore, the 
duality. In a sense, both codes are for action and for memory, since 
one cannot work without the other. According to Hoffmeyer “the 
fertilized egg cell […] must be able to decipher the DNA-code […] 
a sort of ‘tacit knowledge’ is present in the egg cell […] the exis-
tence of this tacit knowledge hidden in the cellular organization 
must be presupposed in the DNA description” (Hoffmeyer 2002: 
103).  
To avoid the misinterpretation of the digital description as a 
being a “total” description, however, it is necessary to try to specify 
in which sense “the tacit knowledge hidden in the cellular organi-
zation is presupposed in the DNA description”. What is presupposed 
in the DNA description cannot be the knowledge itself, but the 
existence of elements (e.g., protein domains) which can fit into 
systems of correspondence that are already present as analogs, for 
the development of codes that actually deal with the myriad of 
differences in the surroundings that the system will encounter. Such 
codes, I posit, are not at all static entities, but exist in a continuous 
dialectic conversion of digital and analogue messages or signs. In 
other words: a digital ‘synchronous state’ flows in a ‘diachronic 
process’, becoming thus analogical. Here it is important to em-
phasize that what is passed from generation to generation is the 
whole system of code-duality.  
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This brings us back precisely to what Jesper Hoffmeyer claimed 
in the origin of the concept: that it was, from the beginning, linked 
to the idea of life as a chain of codings and recodings. 
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ROBERT E. ULANOWICZ 
University of Florida/ University of Maryland,  
United States of America 
Semiotic scaffolding operates by assuring performance through semio-
tic interaction with cue elements that are characteristically present in 
dynamic situations.1 
 
It was Jesper Hoffmeyer who introduced me to the concept of se-
miotic scaffolding. As matters developed, this notion became highly 
instrumental in resolving a difficulty I was having with my own 
narrative of ecological dynamics. 
In my description of ecosystem behavior, the dynamics of auto-
catalysis, or indirect mutualism, is central to the creation of en-
during configurations of processes and their attendant structures 
(Ulanowicz 1997). Causal loops of material transfers abound in 
ecosystems, but the problem with such feedbacks is that the time of 
mass transit around these cycles was often quite long – on the order 
of days to months. Far too much time elapses between an action and 
its reward to reinforce a behavior effectively. 
As I wrestled with the problem, several physicist colleagues 
introduced me to the phenomenon of ‘coherence domains’ in con-
densed matter physics. For example, an aggregation of water mole-
cules is able to maintain its identity as a coherent group, because 
simultaneity is keyed by the very rapid propagation of information 
at the speed of the phase velocity in the quantum vacuum, which is 
very fast in comparison to the propagation of columbic forces 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2007. Semiotic scaffolding of living systems. In: 
Barbieri, Marcello (ed.), Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological 
Synthesis. Dordrecht: Springer, 149–166 (p. 154). 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
66 ROBERT E. ULANOWICZ 
 
(Brizhik et al. 2009). I have my doubts whether the quantum 
vacuum is relevant at the scale of an ecosystem, but the picture of 
the order of ecosystem processes being maintained by the rapid 
transmission of information certainly seemed plausible.  
Of course, the prime candidate for rapid communication is se-
miosis, which can occur virtually at the speed of light in many cases. 
It also stood to reason that signs could be objects of autocatalytic 
selection within the ecosystem. Whence, circuits of resource feed-
backs could progressively become supported by a scaffolding of 
semiotic signals. Rewards could propagate around the autocatalytic 
loop much faster than the actual exchange of material. The elements 
of semiotic scaffolding could thereby become locked into the role of 
anticipatory controls in the sense of Robert Rosen (1985).  
In conclusion, Jesper’s work on semiotic scaffolding, in conjunc-
tion with my own on indirect mutualisms, provides a very plausible 
scenario for the maintenance of order in ecosystems. 
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JOÃO QUEIROZ 
Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil 
The semiotic dimension of a system is always grounded in the orga-
nization of its constituent material components, and cannot exist with-
out this grounding, but evolution has tended to create more and more 
sophisticated semiotic interactions which were less and less constrained 
by the laws of the material world from which they were ultimately 
derived. 1 
 
There is virtually a consensus that complexity has increased in 
information living systems, giving rise to symbolicity, grammar, 
syntactic recursiveness, etc. However, the processes behind the 
complexification of semiosis and its relation to evolution are not 
well understood. Moreover, the evolution of ‘semiotic complexity’ 
can mean different things in different domains.  
 Concretely, many open questions can be asked: What is semiotic 
complexity? How can semiotic complexity growth be measured in 
natural living systems? What are the main hypotheses about se-
miotic complexity growth that can actually be tested? Are the 
principles of natural selection sufficient to explain the evolution of 
semiotic complexity in biological systems? How do semiotic sys-
tems emerge from reactive systems? How do high level processes 
(e.g., symbol-based communication) emerge from lower-level pro-
cesses (e.g., indexical)?  
 Jesper Hoffmeyer has proposed a conceptual criterion to describe 
the evolutionary tendency of semiotic complexification related to 
the material basis (perhaps including formal and structural organi-
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2006. Semiosis and living membranes. In: Farias, 
Priscila; Queiroz, João (eds.), Advanced Issues on Cognitive Science and 
Semiotics. Maastricht: Shaker, 19–35 (p. 21). 
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zation) of semiotic systems and processes. According to Hoffmeyer: 
“our universe has a built-in tendency to produce organized systems 
possessing increasingly more semiotic freedom in the case that the 
semiotic aspect of the system’s activity becomes more and more 
autonomous, relative to its material basis” (2006: 20).  
 This definition is very consistent with Peircean classification of 
fundamental semiotic processes. In cognitive ethology and zoo-
semiotics, several authors have suggested that a transition towards a 
complex semiotic process involves the audience modulation of the 
sign (see Pollick et al. 2005). This is also very much congruent with 
Peirce’s semiotic typology. Peirce’s fundamental typology exhibits 
a property capable of functioning as a conceptual (and ‘operational’) 
criterion to distinguish different kinds of signs: the relative depen-
dence of sign–object–interpretant (S–O–I) components in triadic 
relation.  
 A symbol is a S–O relationship logically dependent of I. A 
symbol is “a Sign (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly 
by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit 
is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which 
originally governed its selection” (CP 2.307). In a different way, an 
index is dependent of O. Constraints resulting from the space-time 
existence of the object represented by the index are irrelevant in 
symbolic processes. Icons, in turn, are deeply dependent on the 
material, form and structure that they are made of – “an Icon is a 
sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of 
characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether 
any such Object actually exists or not” (CP 2.247). 
 If semiosis exhibits a rich variety of morphological patterns, an 
interesting question is how the classification of this variety can 
provide a (conceptual and operational) criterion to distinguish 
different levels of semiotic complexity. In several papers, I have 
argued – against the idea that symbols are uniquely human – that 
alarm-calls such as those used by African vervet monkeys (Cerco-
pithecus aethiops) satisfy Peirce’s formal definition of symbols (see 
Queiroz, in press; Ribeiro et al. 2007; Queiroz, Ribeiro 2002).  
 I have, moreiver, suggested that a specific interpretative behavior 
indicates the emergence of symbols. The transition from a sensory 
scan behavior after the auditory perception alarm to an escape 
reaction motivated solely by the call corresponds to the transition 
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from indexical to symbolic semiosis. The object of the sign, in the 
latter case, is not an object but a class of objects, and therefore does 
not need to exist as a singular event. If there is a threshold index > 
symbol, then it should be possible to identify the behavioral 
transition from “object that is an event” to “object that is a class of 
events” – i.e., an object that does not need to be present as an 
external particular object. For Peirce, “a symbol cannot indicate any 
particular thing; it denotes a kind of thing” (CP 2.301).  
 The relevance of this topic is indisputable. The transition to 
symbol-based semiosis is a central theme for the evolution of 
language research, biosemiotics and philosophy of biology. A 
system which is capable of interpretation through symbols evolves 
in a manner which is determined by the fact that by using law-like 
regularities they are capable of obtaining and transmitting infor-
mation about the environment. But the processes behind the 
emergence of symbolic processes and its relation to evolution are 
not well understood. In my opinion, it is very quickly accepted that 
semiotic complexification is, following a logic of subsumption 
hierarchy, a ‘refinement’ of previously established processes (cf. 
Harnard, Deacon, Tomasello, and others). It is assumed that after 
the emergence of semiotic systems, it is possible that iconic, 
indexical, and symbolic systems appeared in a specific sequence. 
 But, if it is difficult to ascertain which process came before 
others, it is even harder to determine whether a precursor should be 
viewed as a prerequisite. Even though Peirce had established a 
rigorous distinction between different classes of sign processes as 
well as between semiotic behavior and brute reactive behavior, he 
did not describe the following: the dynamics responsible for the 
emergence of semiosis in an evolutionary scenario, the dynamics 
responsible for the transition from iconic and indexical semiotic 
systems to symbolic and meta-semiotic ones. Hoffmeyer’s proposal 
must be considered the first attempt to establish a criterion to 
consistently relate evolution and semiotic complexity. 
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University of Oregon, United States of America 
How did Nature come to mean something to someone? 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s innovative concept of a biological semiosphere 
has significant connections with at least one basic concept in bio-
logy and with several basic concepts and writings in other discip-
lines. In what follows, I give a brief indication of a foundational 
aspect of ‘meaning’, and then briefly itemize seven concepts that 
connect in seminal ways with Hoffmeyer’s innovative concept. 
These significant connections incidentally show that Hoffmeyer’s 
concept need not rely only on a Peirceian semiotic grid for its 
epistemological significance or theoretical validity. 
 Meaning, at all levels of life, is articulated in an intercorporeal 
dynamic – whether the bodies involved are molecular or cellular, or 
whether they are the interactive full-bodied bodies of ants, zebras, or 
humans, or the relational dynamics of such bodies to object bodies 
encountered in a surrounding world (e.g., stones, leaves, berries, 
twigs, puddles, swamps, dirt mounds, or simply the tactilely-felt 
ground of earth itself). Whatever the intercorporeal dynamics, they 
define in broad terms a relationship that is grounded foundationally 
in animation and in the dynamic interconnectedness of all aspects 
and forms of life. 
 (1) The basic concept in biology that has significant connections 
with Hoffmeyer’s semiosphere is that of responsivity. In her well-
known textbook Biology, Helena Curtis specifies responsivity as one 
of eight crucial aspects of life: “Living things respond to stimuli. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, H. 
J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press (p. viii). 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
72 MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE 
 
Plant seedlings bend toward light; mealworms congregate in damp-
ness; cats pound on small moving objects; even certain bacteria 
move toward or away from particular chemicals” (Curtis 1975: 28; 
see also Keeton, Gould 1986: 195, on the “energetic basis of life”). 
Clearly, forms of life find meaning in their surrounding world and 
those meanings are kinetically articulated in their moving bodies. As 
Hoffmeyer writes, “the body interprets our umwelt while generating 
a constant stream of consciousness” (1996: 120). We could equally 
say “[…] while generating a constant stream of movement or still-
ness”. In other words, animate forms of life respond to their sur-
rounding world, moving – or not moving – meaningfully within it. 
 (2) Charles Darwin gives a striking example of the dynamic 
interconnectedness of forms of life when he describes in detail the 
effect of the introduction of Scotch firs on a diversity of insects, 
birds, and even cattle. He is indeed at pains to emphasize “how 
plants and animals, most remote in the scale of nature, are bound 
together by a web of complex relations” (Darwin 1968: 124–125). 
To be so bound is descriptively akin to what Hoffmeyer describes as 
“our swarming body-brain” (1996: 122). In each instance, “a web of 
complex relations” is evident: at all levels of life, a dynamic 
interconnectedness obtains. 
 (3) In his experimental and clinical studies of the neuromuscular 
system in relation to the brain, neuropsychiatrist Edmund Jacobson 
specifies the dynamic interconnectedness of living bodies in terms 
of “an effort-brain circuit”. He shows why “Those who would do 
homage to the brain with its ten billion cell-amplifiers can well 
continue to do so”, but why they must also not overlook empirical 
evidence, namely, that “muscles and brain proceed together in one 
effort-circuit, active or relaxed” (Jacobson 1967: 36, 34, respec-
tively). Jacobson’s “circuit” is conceptually akin to what Hoffmeyer 
identifies as “the semiotic brain-body system as a whole” (1996: 
121). 
 (4) Socrates implicitly emphasizes the importance of recognizing 
the interconnectedness of life in the pursuit of knowledge when he 
admonishes those so interested to heed the importance of carving at 
the proper joints, and “not breaking any part as a bad carver might” 
(Phaedrus 265 E). Socrates’s injunction accords in strategic metho-
dological ways with Hoffmeyer’s emphasis on “complex systems” 
(Hoffmeyer 1996: 26), on “communication systems between 
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elements” (1996: 73), and on the recognition of “self-organizing 
chaos” as the modus operandi of living forms (1996: 94). Their em-
phasis is of particular moment in light of today’s near disembodied 
attention on the brain. 
 (5) In his study of “the appearance of animals”, biologist Adolf 
Portmann describes and exemplifies “inwardness” (Portmann 1967: 
183–201). He aptly pinpoints the dynamic interconnectedness of the 
outward behavior of animals with their inner life of feelings and 
awarenesses. Hoffmeyer’s concerns with “how the body can become 
‘minded’ and how the mind can become physical” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 
69), and how “it is not the brain that does the thinking in a human 
being, it is not even the body, but the natural history whose children 
we all are and in which we all have a part to play” (1996: 95) 
conceptually parallels Portmann’s descriptions and exemplifications. 
 (6) J. A. Scott Kelso’s extensive investigations of coordination 
dynamics in both neurological and behavioral terms, and his re-
cognition of an intrinsic dynamics in the first place, are in 
conceptual line with Hoffmeyer’s recognition of “the coordinative 
puzzle that every living creature is charged with solving every 
single second of its life” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 73). Kelso writes: “It is 
important to keep in mind…that the brain did not evolve merely to 
register representations of the world; rather, it evolved for adaptive 
action and behavior. Musculoskeletal structures coevolved with 
appropriate brain structures so that the entire unit functions 
together” (Kelso 1995: 268). He adds that G. Edelman arrived at a 
similar conclusion: “For him, like me it is the entire system of 
muscles, joints, and proprioceptive and kinesthetic functions plus 
appropriate parts of the brain that evolves and functions together in 
a unitary way” (ibid). 
 (7) My own work has focused on the dynamic interconnected-
ness of life in terms of our common creaturehood and common 
humanity, and on primal animation and an evolutionary semantics, 
both of which attest to a readiness toward meaning that is at the 
focal point of any creature’s survival (Sheets-Johnstone 2011 
[1999]). 
 Hoffmeyer’s rich concept of a biological semiosphere ties in not 
only with our common creaturehood and readiness toward meaning, 
but has itself significant connections to a range of studies by other 
researchers as shown above. That richness and those connections 
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STACEY E. AKE  
Drexel University, United States of America 
I would suggest therefore that we look upon consciousness as a purely 
semiotic relation: consciousness is the body’s spatial and narrative 
interpretation of its existential umwelt. 1 
  
What does Jesper Hoffmeyer mean by his use of the body as the 
physical interpreter of a series of discontinuous content events, such 
that this interpretation is called ‘consciousness’? I suspect I have 
never quite understood this suggestion, as it seems to me that doing 
so makes the body into a boundary between the individual (with its 
varied swarm intelligences) and an umwelt that is somehow exterior 
to that body. However, ‘consciousness’ is a strange kind of 
emergent phenomenon. For we are more conscious, more aware, of 
events external to our bodies than we are aware of events internal to 
them. For instance, I can consciously discern the color of a passing 
car, but I cannot so consciously discern the meaning of a stomach 
pain. In fact, to find out the meaning, the interpretation, of a 
stomach pain, I have to go to a specially trained semiotician: namely, 
a physician.  
Evolutionarily, we can say that events external to the individual 
were perhaps more important to that individual’s survival (and the 
passing on of his or her genes to the next generation) than internal 
events. But at what point in evolution was that dichotomy es-
tablished? For a prokaryote, the external and the internal seemingly 
have the same valence or significance. In this case, we can legiti-
mately say that the cell wall of a bacterium serves as a boundary – 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe, Trans. Barbara 
J. Haveland, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 122. 
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as a “not” statement – since it divides the world into two domains: 
i.e., bacterium and not-bacterium. But the importance of this 
distinction is minimal, since the cell wall does not serve to shield the 
genetic material of the prokaryote from being altered in the way that 
the body (or analog code) does in a eukaryote. Somewhere along the 
evolutionary pathway, it became important (or was selectively 
advantageous) to shield the genetic material so that information 
could be passed on to the next generation in a relatively unscathed 
form.  
Could this change have been the start of some kind of ‘con-
sciousness’ – or, at least, awareness? (‘Consciousness’ is a difficult 
word to use, since it is predisposed to be viewed in a human, or at 
least an anthropological, way). For with the arrival of the eukaryote 
comes the nucleus – the first internal moment of alienation. For now 
not only is there a not-amoeba domain on the outside (i.e., the 
environment), but there is a also kind of not-amoeba domain on the 
inside (i.e., the nucleus). Another way of looking at this is to see the 
relationship between the environment and the genetic material in a 
prokaryote as being a kind of stimulus-response relationship – 
wherein the hyphen represents the journey that the stimulus has to 
travel through the cell wall and the cytoplasm, before it reaches the 
genetic material. Thus, the relationship of environment to genetic 
material in a prokaryote bears a striking resemblance to a dyadic 
relationship. Or, at the very least, it resembles the linear progression: 
 
Stimulus   cell membrane + cytoplasm   genetic material 
 
In a eukaryote, on the other hand, there is an object that prevents 
the stimulus from directly reaching the genetic material: namely, the 
nuclear membrane. This object – this hindrance – is an instance of 
the “brute fact” of Secondness as described by C. S. Peirce (1997: 
§376). Thus, with the introduction of Secondness at the mere level 
of the eukaryotic cell, we have the beginnings of triadicity. This 
Secondness reflects what Hoffmeyer refers to as alienation for 
prokaryotic genetic material is not truly alienated from its 
environment the way that eukaryotic genetic material is.  
And what has this to do with ‘consciousness’, you ask? Consider 
the prokaryote-eukaryote example as an analogy to the ways in 
which non-human animals versus human animals relate among 
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themselves. Following Hoffmeyer, I posit that the great difference 
between the human and the non-human animal is the presence of 
language among human animals It is easy to see language as a 
unifier among humans, but it just as often functions as a barrier. It is 
a “brute fact” such that language functions as a mediator between 
humans. We do not communicate directly with one another. There is 
no chemical immediacy. We communicate through a Second, 
through language.  
But does this aspect of the “existential umwelt” really lend itself 
to being interpreted solely through the body? While I agree that 
consciousness is some kind of “semiotic relation”, I think there is 
more going on than what is delimited by the body – although I 
heartily agree that the limitations (or boundaries) of the body are 
probably what give us a sense of ego reality But how is it that the 
body is involved in interpreting another interpreting body? And why 
have the medium of language? I would like to posit an alternative to 
Hoffmeyer’s analysis in the quote above. I believe we are also 
interpreted by other bodies – and as humans, unlike animals, this 
information comes to us through the medium of language. Thus, we 
meet not only the Secondness of the Other; we also meet the 
Secondness of the Other’s language.  
Language is also the medium by which we tell our narratives to 
ourselves. In this way, language also functions as an internal 
Secondness, analogous to the nuclear membrane. Thus, a narrative 
view of consciousness precludes direct knowledge of ourselves. For 
example, we have no narrative about the state of our stomach; we 
simply and directly feel the pain. The person who has the general 
narrative about the stomach is the physician. Therefore, my argu-
ment would be that it is the language – and thus the consciousness – 
of others that makes us who we are, and that gives us our conscious-
ness.  
Our bodies separate us from the environment just like a proka-
ryote’s cell wall separates it from its environment. And language 
separates us from our fellow humans; it prevents us from accessing 
each other directly. It functions analogously to the nuclear 
membrane, and it introduces the element of Secondness, and thus 
triadicity, into human relationships. Yes, ‘consciousness’ is a 
“semiotic relation”, but where the fundamental nature of human 
consciousness is concerned, it is not a semiotic relationship within 
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the human body. Rather, it is a semiotic relationship between human 
beings. Thus, we can amplify upon Hoffmeyer’s notion that 
consciousness “is the body’s spatial and narrative interpretation of 
its existential umwelt” by saying that consciousness is also results 
from the interaction between and among different narrative inter-
pretations from different umwelten.  
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The […] technological principle behind the present cultural transfor-
mation is […] controlled semiosis […]. What is new is that we now […] 
have also learned how to implement […] signification in the world of 
machines and media. For […] the most pronounced feature of the new 
technologies is not just their capacity for the mechanization of infor-
mation processing but their usefulness as tools for semiotic activity of 
every sort. […] The kind of society we are now entering appears to be 
one that will derive its enabling power […] from the ability to produce 
the technological means for ever more sophisticated command over the 
semiotic dimension over the natural world. […] What we are now 
facing […] is the setting free […] of the semiotic dimension from its 
bindings in organic life. This is what I have called the development of 
biosemiotic technologies. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer is undoubtedly a classic scholar of semiotics. His 
masterpieces Signs of Meaning in the Universe (1996) and Bio-
semiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of 
Signs (2008), belong to the bedrock of contemporary biosemiotics, 
an area of research in which Sebeok and Hoffmeyer have been my 
main sources of information and inspiration since 1990, when we 
first met at the occasion of one of the legendary Glottertal Colloquia. 
Specifically, Hoffmeyer deserves a place of honour in the history of 
biosemiotics for his firm semiotic stance against a scientific milieu 
which, rooted in the dualistic ‘two-cultures’ paradigm, has too long 
insisted on separating the study of nature from the study of mind, 
“encouraging scientists to de-semiotize all the naturally communi-
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. (Favareau, Donald, ed.) Scranton: University of 
Scranton Press (pp. 343–344).  
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cative and fundamentally interactive processes of living systems” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008: xiv). 
Moreover, Hoffmeyer has dared to adopt Peirce’s theory of 
semiosis as an underpinning of research in molecular and evolutio-
nary biology although it may be “suitable for provoking all alarm 
bells to ring in the mind of a modern science reader” (2008: 63). It is 
his merit to have introduced Peirce’s provocative ideas of final 
causality, semiotic growth, and the law of mind into contemporary 
biology and to have defended them as indispensable research 
principles against such unfounded allegations as ‘vitalism’ (2008: 8). 
In the quotation that appears above, Hoffmeyer proposes an 
extension of evolutionary history from the origins of life to con-
temporary media technology. The argument is that we are facing a 
new era in which semiosis is set free “from its bindings in organic 
life”. This is certainly thought provoking but it remains somewhat 
isolated, as if the author were afraid of facing the implication that 
the predicted era might be one of postbiological semiosis (cf. 
Santaella 2003; Nöth 2008). The following considerations, deve-
loped more in depth elsewhere (e.g. Nöth 2002; 2009), attempt to 
pursue such implications in light of Peirce’s theory of semiosis. 
Lack of space requires a restriction to three related theses on post-
biological semiosis, whose presentation must remain very sketchy. 
Thesis I: Semiosis has a dynamics irreducible to biology or 
psychology. Although signs need an organism to become efficient 
and to live on, their agency cannot be reduced to the efficient cau-
sality of specific biological and mental processes. A sign operates 
by final causality, and its reality is one of virtual reality. Even 
thoughts, or mental representations, are signs, according to Peirce, 
but to consider their semiotic essence it is necessary “to clear the 
sign of its mental associations […] since nothing but feeling is 
exclusively mental” (CP 5.473, ca.1906). The virtual reality of a 
sign consists in the continuity of its life irrespective of any particular 
embodiment, for:  
“Before the sign was uttered, it already was virtually present to the 
consciousness of the utterer, in the form of thought. But […] a thought 
is itself a sign, and should itself have an utterer […] to whose con-
sciousness it must have been already virtually present, and so back. 
Likewise, after a sign has been interpreted, it will virtually remain in the 
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consciousness of its interpreter […] and in its turn, have an interpreter, 
and so on forward” (EP2: 403, 1907; emphasis added). 
Thesis II: Signs are not merely the instruments of living agents, as 
Hoffmeyer’s scenario of our growing “command over semiotic pro-
cesses” suggests, but they have an agency of their own. Peirce’s 
semiotics is not an instrumental sign theory, according to which 
signs serve the interest of “sign users”, however powerful they may 
be. Instead, a sign has also a purpose of its own, which “is that it 
shall be interpreted in another sign” (CP 8.191, ca. 1904). Although 
we need signs to think and to communicate, we are not omnipotent 
masters of our messages since our signs “might turn round and say: 
‘You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so 
far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought’. In 
fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other” (CP 
5.313, 1868).. Hence: 
Thesis III. Signs cannot be fully controlled since they evince a 
capacity for self-control, which consists in their resistance against 
representations ignoring “that truth and justice are the greatest 
powers in this world”. Although these powers need “defenders to 
uphold it” they are also able to create their own “defenders and 
gives them strength”. After all, “there is efficient causation and 
there is final, or ideal, causation. If either of them is to be set down 
as a metaphor, it is rather the former” (CP 8.272, 1897). 
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EMI MORITA and DON FAVAREAU 
National University of Singapore, Singapore 
When we became human beings, language ran its hyphae far into the 
nervous system, allowing, today, no hope of extinction – not even in 
theory. Language does not think through us, but has become a part of 
us. And yet language is common property and hence, extraneous to us. 
And this fact – that the spoken word is common property, that it is a 
tool with which to share a world – is perhaps the real reason for its 
emergence. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer, who as many of his close associates know, is a 
great fan of all things language related – puns, jokes, double 
entendres, translations, and the etymology and regional variants of 
words – once told us that he “follows his nose” when thinking 
through complex ideas, in order to find his way to the heart of where 
he intuits some conceptual problem lies. 
A biochemist by training (and a natural philosopher by avo-
cation, notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary), Jesper 
nonetheless exhibits a sophisticated understand of the nature of 
language in his brief rumination on the topic above. Like his role 
model (to the extent that Jesper can be said to have a role model!), 
Gregory Bateson, however, Jesper often presents his readers with 
such diamonds in the rough – leaving the reader to work with and 
develop the insights further, should he or she be so inclined. 
In this brief submission, we want to consider the apparent para-
dox in the adjoining claims that “language does not think through 
us, but has become a part of us” and that “language is common 
property and hence, extraneous to us” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 112). How 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press (p. 112). 
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can what is extraneous to us be a part of us? Has Jesper’s nose led 
him into contradiction here – or is there a deeper logic at play that 
can reconcile these two seemingly contradictory ideas? 
As so often is the case in Jesper’s writings, the deeper logic 
reveals itself when one considers his biosemiotic Weltanschauung 
as a whole. For unlike many traditional linguists, who consider 
words and sentences as the ultimate object of their inquiry (just as 
many geneticist consider nucleotides and genes), Jesper sees words 
and sentences (as well as nucleotides and genes) as derivative mani-
festations of a more primary unit of analysis, which is, of course, the 
sign. 
And the sign, as Jesper (invoking both Peirce and John Deely) 
reminds us, when acting as a sign, always has one foot each in of 
two worlds simultaneously – one in the world of mind-dependant 
reality and one in the world of mind-independant reality – and a 
third that consists entirely of the mediating relation between the two 
(Hoffmeyer 2008: 266–269). Thus, the apparent paradox of inter-
nalism versus externalism is resolved with this fuller understanding 
of the nature of the sign, of which language is just one more by-
product.  
Understanding this relation, though, leads us to re-examine – in a 
way that Jesper, already moving on, has not – the validity of the 
claim in the qoute above that “language does not think through us” 
(Hoffmeyer 1996:112). 
Having no independant material reality of its own, language, we 
want to argue, is a sign system that very much does “think” 
(meaning: become a site of cognitive capability) sole through the 
actions of the agents in the world that are communally using it as 
such. Rather than language running its hyphae into us, it is the 
interactive community of meaning-making human practice that runs 
the hyphae its own ever-evolving and end-directed sign use back 
into the nucleus (or spitzenkörper, to continue with Jesper’s fungal 
analogy) of language growth and development. 
In this recursive – and eminently biosemiotic – sense, language 
does indeed think through us, just as all sign systems in the 
biological world become invested with their meanings through, and 
only through, the actions of those agents that are using them upon 
the world, and the recursive effects of doing so in that world upon 
those agents. 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
  Conversations 85 
 
It is through such semiotic recursion, writes ethnomethodologist 
John Heritage, “that a known in common world is incorrigibly 
assured as, simultaneously, the process, presupposition and product 
of the reasoning practices involved […] It is, moreover, produced as 
an incorrigible product, as an objective world which could not have 
been otherwise [... and] through these means, the intersubjective 
availability of real world events is produced and reproduced as the 
indubitably given, stable features of real world events which, for its 
producers, it has always been” (Heritage 1984: 216). 
Like all signs systems, then, language, is not just “a tool to share 
the world”, but to create a world that issuitable for its users to live 
in. For humans, this world is what Jesper refers to at the end of his 
discussion on the evolution of language as “a mystically produced 
common dwelling place […] one large common umwelt” (Hoff-
meyer 1996: 112). That he has done so much to make that world so 
much more understandable to us is a testament to Jesper Hoff-
meyer’s genius … and, perhaps, to his nose. 
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VINICIUS ROMANINI 
University of São Paulo, Brazil 
Biosemiotics suggest that living systems should be studied as semiotic 
systems in their own right. This idea is based on the belief that the 
poverty of the information discourse in biological sciences results from 
the reductive neglect of the interpretative aspect of biological infor-
mation. By introducing the concept of the sign as developed by the 
American chemist and philosopher Charles Peirce (1839–1914) as a 
substitute for information it will be assured that the interpretative side 
of information is not neglected. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer summarizes here the fertility of adopting Peirce’s 
semeiotic to understand biological phenomena in contraposition to a 
reductionist informational approach that grew among biologists 
since Shannon formulated the statistical conception of information 
in the late 1940s. As we know, Peirce’s definition of sign is based 
on a non-reductive triadic and dynamic relation among something 
that might assume the role of a sign (actually, any conceivable 
thing), the object (again, any conceivable thing) that might be repre-
sented in any possible way by the sign, and an interpretant, which is 
any conceivable effect produced by the relation between sign and its 
object.  
Note that these three elements are called correlates because they 
can be defined only in relation to one another. Nothing is a sign, an 
object or an interpretant a priori, but only as part of this very same 
triadic process. That’s why the emphasis of semeiotic studies should 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 189). 
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be put on semeiosis,2 understood as the continuous action of the sign, 
involving the three mentioned correlates, to produce phenomena. 
Meaning is the collective result, usually a habit (either mental or a 
simple disposition to act accordingly), generated by the interpretant 
aspect of the triadic sign correlation.  
As Hoffmeyer points out above, “the poverty of the information 
discourse in biological sciences results from the reductive neglect of 
the interpretative aspect of biological information.” In fact, Shan-
non’s mathematical theory of information leaves no room for 
meaning because it does not comprehend purposeful aspects of 
information. Nevertheless, living systems – as the gerund of the verb 
declaims – are perfect examples of semeiosis because they are 
interpretive-oriented in a continuous purposeful process that con-
nects onto and phylogenesis. There are many levels of general pur-
poses in biological semeiosis, the most basic one being systemic 
permanence of individuals pertaining to species, usually defined as 
metabolism (at the individual level) and reproduction (at the species 
level).  
Hoffmeyer says that we might profit by substituting the concept 
of information with Peirce’s concept of sign. Actually, we might 
keep both if we substitute, instead, Shannon´s information with 
Peirce´s own definition of information. This is a fundamental step. 
Few biosemioticians know that Peirce had a theory of infor-
mation which, not surprisingly, is a correlate quantity of a triadic 
relation which includes extension (all objects that can be indicated 
by a sign, that is, its indexical component) and comprehension (all 
general predicates involved in the definition of a sign, that is, its 
symbolic component). An increase of information is the growth of 
either extension or comprehension without the diminishing of the 
other. Pragmatically, it can be understood both as the growth of 
knowledge in a community of interpreters or of adaptability of a 
species, as it refines its representation of its environment (i.e., its 
umwelt) through development of new general characters (the effects 
or interpretive responses to the signs coming from the environment). 
Both phenomena are semeiotically identical. That’s why Peirce 
——————— 
2   I use Peirce’s spelling of this term here and throughout, to emphasize, with 
John Deely, that “Peirce’s semeiotic refers to the action of signs, not to the 
behavior of animals when using signs” (Deely 2008: 3). 
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explains that: “Analogous to increase of information in us, there is a 
phenomenon of nature – development – by which a multitude of 
things come to have a multitude of characters, which have been 
involved in few characters in few things” (CP 2.419).  
Hoffmeyer goes just to the point, then, when he criticizes the 
statistical paradigm of information and states that “living systems 
should be studied as semiotic systems in their own right” (Hoff-
meyer 2010: 189). Signs grow and develop in semeiosis, just as 
living systems do. Biology and semiotics are naturally coextensive, 
as Jesper Hoffmeyer has been so tirelessly and pioneeringly 
teaching us for the last decades.  
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CULTURE 
MARCEL DANESI 
University of Toronto, Canada 
Cultural sign processes must be regarded as special instances of a more 
general and extensive biosemiosis that continuously unfolds and acts in 
the biosphere.1 
 
The study of the relationship between semiosis in nature and in 
culture – that is, between biology and mind – is at the core of the 
biosemiotic movement. Understanding how the two forms of sign-
making are linked started with Uexküll, moved through the Tartu 
School, and ended up on the research agenda of current biosemioti-
cians, among whom Jesper Hoffmeyer stands out as an influential 
leader.  
In his works, Hoffmeyer sees a synergy between the various 
forms of semiosis, suggesting that culture and biology are intrin-
sically intertwined in a kind of “dance of life,” figuratively spea-
king. As he has cogently argued, the semiosphere, like the bio-
sphere, regulates human behavior and shapes evolution. The former 
demonstrates intentionality, however, while the latter does not. 
Thus, although humans can do little about their biological paradigm, 
they have the ability to reshape their worlds any time they want. 
They are “world-makers”.  
Cultures are thus both restrictive and liberating. They are 
restrictive because they impose upon individuals born into them an 
already-fixed system of signification, and thereby condition how 
people come to understand the world around them – in terms of the 
language, music, myths, rituals, technological systems, and other 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 4. 
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codes that they learn in context. But cultures are also liberating 
because they allow for the same codes to be used creatively. The 
artistic, religious, scientific, and philosophical texts to which indivi-
duals are exposed in social contexts, moreover, open up the mind, 
stimulate creativity, and engender freedom of thought.  
As a result, human beings tend to become restless for new mea-
nings, new inventions. For this reason, the codes of mind, unlike the 
codes of nature, provide humans with the possibility of literally 
changing the world, as do new generations of artists, scientists, 
philosophers, and others, and to meet new demands, new ideas, and 
new challenges. As the work on autopoesis within biosemiotics is 
starting to show, this seems to be a law of human nature – and as the 
philosopher of science Jacob Bronowski remarked, it is the defining 
feature of the human, making humans unique among all species:  
The images play out for us events which are not present to our senses, 
and thereby guard the past and create the future–a future that does not 
yet exist, and may never come to exist in that form. By contrast, the 
lack of symbolic ideas, or their rudimentary poverty, cuts off an animal 
from the past and the future alike, and imprisons it in the present. Of all 
the distinctions between man and animal, the characteristic gift which 
makes us human is the power to work with symbolic images (Bro-
nowski 1977: 25). 
Hoffmeyer’s work has been highly influential in showing how the 
human mind (Innenwelt) stands out as a force in evolutionary pro-
cesses (Umwelt). Like Uexküll and the late Thomas Sebeok, Hoff-
meyer sees a point of contact between the mainstream scientific 
approach to the study of organisms – biology – and that of the 
strictly semiotic tradition. He has astutely argued that the study of 
cultural phenomena is a study of the symptomatology between body, 
mind, and environment. In effect, one cannot separate semiotics 
from biology, and vice versa. 
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 DOMINQUE LESTEL 
Ecole Normale Supérieure, France 
A dog is a message for another dog. 1 
 
The above idea by Jesper Hoffmeyer has immediately attracted my 
attention. However, I don’t wish to analyze that idea within the 
context of the zoosemiotics of the dog, but to reverse its perspective 
and to test its meaning within the context of the new technologies of 
cognition and information, by asking: In which way could a mes-
sage be a dog for another message? 
Put in such an abrupt way, the question evidently appears a little 
bit absurd. In this paper, I shall suggest that this is far of being the 
case, and that such a proposition could even open up an untrod 
space of research that one could call zootechnosemiotics – zoo-
semiotics within highly technologized ecosystems.2  
To give sense to my above question, one has to take into account 
the new technologies of cognition and information, especially those 
of the Persistent Virtual Worlds (henceforth: PVW), of which 
Second Life still is the most well known. These exclusively digital 
spaces are true potential ecosystems – yet that are not subject to the 
usual laws of physics! They thus raise very interesting theoretical 
problems, some of which are of special interest for the zoo-
semiotician, such as: What does it mean for an agent to act and to 
behave in an apparently completely matterless world, where the 
distinction between what is living and what is not has become so 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 46. 
2   The pioneer of technozoosemiotics could said to be the French artist Louis 
Bec, who described his own works in such a way. 
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problematic? Because, depending on how you look at it, either 
nothing is living there (e.g., there is no metabolism in a PVW) or, on 
the contrary, because everything is living there (in that everything 
exhibits the symptoms of life).  
‘Artificial Life’ is a project that has been developing since the 
middle of the 80’s by pioneers such as Chris Langton (1988), and 
has been showing us that digital artifacts can exhibit behaviors that 
can be assimilated to the behaviors of living beings through self-
modification, reproduction, etc. “Are these artifacts really alive?” is 
the question that is always being asked – but, for me, is not the most 
interesting one. Instead, another perspective, a more zoosemiotic 
one, seems to me to be much more promising (even if it has up to 
now not been seriously discussed), i.e.: In which way could one 
interact with these digital creatures as if they were real animals?  
Our very long cohabitation with other animals has biologically 
and culturally modeled our cognitive capabilities. It would be extre-
mely useful to mobilize these capabilities towards these partially 
autonomous new artifacts and to interact with these artifacts as if 
they were animals in order to better communicate with them – and it 
is here that the “message-as-dog” reversal-idea that I have proposed 
above could reveal its full potential and meaning.  
Because artifacts are purely digital in PVW, it means that they 
are only information. They are then only messages and these mes-
sages take the form of animals that would be easier than anything 
else to be manipulated by humans, in order to interact with other 
messages. Messages are therefore messages that are animals for 
other messages – and even humans being themselves only appear 
there as avatars, i.e. still messages.  
Note, too, that the notion of the functionality of an artifact itself 
must be deeply thought about differently in such non-material 
digital universes. Here, I have not room enough to give a long 
theoretical discussion on that matter, and will instead give only one 
example. If I substitute all that data in my computerized storage 
places with such digital animals, what do I obtain? Information that 
used to be ‘sleeping’ within such regular storage places now could 
be constantly activated within the course of multiple syntheses that 
come from the animalized storage places interacting with other 
animalized storage places.  
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
  Data 95 
 
Through “breeding” with “conspecifics”, these animalized 
storage places could generate supplementary (i.e., new) information 
relevant to those already existing in all the individual animalized 
storage places involved. To have access to these animalized storage 
places (essentially, a livestock) allows me an active storage space 
for my data that I can then both use and manipulate through bodily, 
behavioral or speech complex interactions with them. 
In this scenario, untold functions for artifacts could emerge. 
Because the constraints within a PVW are very different from those 
within the gravitational and material world, one would be allowed to 
invent animals that could very different of those we already know – 
for example animals without any spatial continuity (animals that 
exist more or less within different locations) or any temporal conti-
nuity (animals that exist more or less within different moments) – 
and to elaborate ad hoc very rich semiotic approaches for the inter-
action with (and between) such animals.  
The point at stake is that we could ‘animalize’ information, and 
learn to handle such informational artifacts in a fruitful and em-
bodied way, by mobilizing the available semiotic resources that 
humans have acquired through their own specific history with 
animals. “Negotiable technologies with biographical development” 
would probably be the most rigorous words one could use to 
characterize these artifacts, but “to see them like kinds of animals” 
is both more useful and quicker.  
Following that (very brief) discussion, one could understand why 
the reversal of Hoffmeyer’s idea into “a message could be a dog for 
another message” – a reversal that would be absurd at first sight – 
could finally be a fruitful one. One could say that these animals still 
are messages in PVW, which will be true, but they would not be 
handled as messages, but as animals, or more accurately – ani-
malized messages. A very peculiar form of zoosemiotics could 
emerges here, one more tuned to the future of animality, perhaps, 
than to its past. We certainly are still in the realm of fiction here, as 
of the time of this writing. But the question is: for how long? 
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PHILLIP GUDDEMI 
Bateson Idea Group, United States of America  
[Bateson’s] famous conceptualization of information as rooted in 
‘differences that make a difference’ comes so close to a genuine triadic 
Peircean sign as to be nearly indistinguishable. 1 
 
In 2005, Jesper Hoffmeyer helped organize the Copenhagen Bateson 
Symposium, which produced the edited volume A Legacy for Living 
Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiotics. Jesper 
Hoffmeyer’s own contribution to this conference was a paper 
entitled “From Thing to Relation: On Bateson’s Bioanthropology”, 
and near the end of this paper Hoffmeyer makes the above intri-
guing remark. 
The question that should always be in the back of our mind when 
conceiving “the difference that makes a difference”, however, is: 
“for whom or for what?” Without that question in mind, it would be 
possible to interpret Bateson, erroneously, as referring to a simple 
version of Shannon information – a concept that has now been 
appropriated by physicists and turned into a ‘quantity’ (one which 
exists presumably with ‘objective’ reference to the proverbial Eye of 
God, whether God exists or not).  
Hoffmeyer, of course, falls into no such error, but to clarify the 
matter even further, I propose here, on the shoulders of Hoffmeyer, 
that the answer to the question of: “For whom or what does the 
difference make a difference?” is necessarily, in Peircean terms: 
“The interpretant”. This is a slightly different answer from a 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. From thing to relation: Gregory Bateson’s bio-
anthropology. In: Hoffmeyer, Jesper (ed.), A Legacy for Living Systems: Gre-
gory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiotics. Dordrecht: Springer, 27–44 (p. 42).  
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standard second-order cybernetic critique that would want the “for 
whom” to relate to “an observer”. For as Hoffmeyer points out 
(2008b: 22), the “interpretant” of a sign is not synonymous with an 
“interpreter” of a sign. The latter is usually a human being or similar 
entity, e.g., a “person” – but in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce both 
referred to “a person” in his definition of a sign’s interpretant, and 
simultaneously expressed that this is not quite right, but that he 
despaired of getting his idea across to the majority of his readers 
otherwise (ibid). I will illustrate the nature of the ‘non-personal 
interpretant’ below, by drawing upon biosemiotic examples from 
both Bateson and Hoffmeyer. 
Bateson introduced the “difference that makes a difference” 
almost simultaneously in two different papers later collected in 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind. The more well known paper is “Form, 
Substance, and Difference,” in which Bateson first sets out his 
differentiation between pleroma, the world of forces and impacts, 
and creatura, the world of ‘mind’ in Bateson’s sense. “Difference” 
is key to the action of creatura. But for Bateson, creatura (or 
“mind” in his extended sense) is not the unique possession of 
linguistic or conscious human beings. Rather, it is a phenomenon 
that extends throughout the world of living things. 2 
A key to how this plays out, and why it relates to Peirce’s 
interpretant, can be found in one of Bateson’’s much more obscure 
papers, also reprinted in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, though 
originally written for the Journal of Genetics. This paper, which was 
written at about the same time as “Form, substance, and difference”, 
is entitled “A re-examination of Bateson’s rule” – the Bateson of 
“Bateson’s rule” being Gregory Bateson’s father, William Bateson, 
the geneticist. In his “Re-examination”, Gregory Bateson attempts 
to apply the principles of cybernetics to the examination of 
biological development, as illustrated in the limbs of beetles. In one 
of his earliest formulations of this idea, Bateson fils defines infor-
mation as “any difference that makes a difference in some later 
event” (Bateson 1972: 381) – a definition which, taken by itself and 
outside of a cybernetic context, might be misinterpreted in a 
——————— 
2   Intriguingly enough, Hoffmeyer notes that pleroma relates in Peircean 
terms to firstness, in some ways, and to secondness in other ways; while 
creatura corresponds well to Peirce’s thirdness (Hoffmeyer 2008a: 31). 
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physicalistic, billiard-ball causation way. But as his argument 
develops, his concern is shown to be the way in which each previous 
state of the animal limb in development constrains, in a cybernetic 
sense, the development of each subsequent state.  
This is so, he informs us, even when the “difference” that 
triggers further development comes from outside the system. In 
another favorite Bateson example, that of the frog’s egg, either the 
entrance of a spermatozoon, or a pin prick from a researcher, will 
cause a particular meridian to form which then becomes a plane of 
symmetry for the ongoing development of the embryo. In the case 
of the beetles’ reduplicated limbs, the upshot of Bateson’s argument 
is that they reduplicate in the absence of specific information which 
would prevent them from doing so. There is thus a progression of 
‘types of symmetry’ in the direction towards asymmetry, and at each 
step there is information – a difference that makes a difference – 
which has to be encountered, lest the embryo maintain the previous 
symmetry. 
Such phenomena reflect a layered biosemiotics. Similarly, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer has introduced us to the concept of a layered bio-
semiotics by examining the case of a slap. Considered at the macro-
scopic level of human interaction, we might consider the inter-
pretant of the slap to be the conscious experience of the person 
slapped. But at a different layer of semiosis: 
“Figure 2.2c shows semiosis in one of the skin’s sensory cells, whose 
entire architecture and biochemistry create sensitivity to the applica-
tions of pressure […] Here, with the application of pressure, there 
emerges an interpretant in the form of a context-dependent sequence of 
action potentials that create a kind of cellular echo of the disturbance. 
This interpretant, the echo, now becomes part of a more complex sign 
[as represented] in Figure 2.2d.” (Hoffmeyer 2008b: 23) 
Likewise in Bateson’s examples, the dynamic state of the embryo at 
the time when it encounters “information” could be seen as the 
interpretant of the “sign” that information represents – if (and only if) 
that “information” actually makes a difference, going forward, to the 
development of that embryo. 
Inspired by these biosemiotic examples from both Hoffmeyer 
and Bateson, my own version of a Peircean reading of Bateson’s 
“difference” that makes a difference is as follows: The experienced 
“information” or news, the sensed perturbation that makes a 
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difference, is (or produces) the primary sign, the sign vehicle. The 
difference that is made, is the object of the sign. The interpretant, is 
that to whom or to what the difference is made. It is interesting to 
me that this Peircean reading immunizes Bateson’s difference from 
non-cybernetic applications. Further, it suggests that a Batesonian 
‘mind’ may be no more and no less than: that which is capable of 
having differences of such kind, make a difference to it.  
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ANTON MARKOŠ 
Charles University, Czech Republic 
We shall suggest here that the central feature of living systems allowing 
for self-reference, and thus the ability to select and respond to diffe-
rences in their surroundings, is code-duality, i.e. the ability of a system 
to represent itself in two different codes, one digital and one analog. 1 
 
I have struggled with the paper written by Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 
that is quoted above many times since I first discovered it in the late 
1990s; and for many years, I could not understand what I find 
disappointing about the idea. My answer today (Markoš et al. 2009, 
Markoš, Faltýnek 2011) is that nothing in this word can exist in a 
purely digital form: ‘digitality’ resides only in the virtual world of 
‘objective’ reality that is exclusively of our making (Deely 2009) – 
it is only there that we find numbers, alphabets, syllogisms and 
terms, clare et distincte. Only there can the coding and the copying 
be absolute, invariant, and error-proof. No internally existing se-
miosis is required in this idealized, non-physical world of ‘objec-
tive’ entities. 
Conversely, in the real world, it takes lot of effort to cut things 
out of the surroundings and sharpen the gaze (or other sensory 
receptors) to the extent that they then appear quasi-digital, allowing 
one to forget about their naturally fuzzy contours. Such a “shar-
pening of gaze” is a true semiotic achievement, and one which is 
accessible only to living beings. Hence, the quasi-digitality of any 
given phenomenon – e.g., of DNA, written texts, spoken language, 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Emmeche, Claus 2005 [1991]. Code-duality and the 
semiotics of nature. Journal of Biosemiotics 1(1): 27–64 (p. 48).  
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etc. – is conditional, and the result of long-ongoing historical pro-
cesses and their situated relevant understandings.  
Such a state of ossified ‘habit’ can, again as we have learned 
from Peirce, become undermined by further development, at which 
point a more open-ended interpretative process will resume. The 
human-designed world of ‘objective’ entities and genuine ‘digita-
lity’ is, of course, also the result of such habit-formation and evolu-
tion – but it is ‘immaculate’ to such an extent that semiosis cannot 
gain a foothold in it? 
I therefore fully agree with Hoffmeyer and Emmeche’s statement 
that “nothing digital in the world can function by itself” (Hoffmeyer; 
Emmeche 2005: 68). Digitality is a mode of understanding that has 
been created by human beings, and exists only embedded within the 
virtual world of ‘objective’ reality. In contast, quasi-digitality is the 
phenomenon belonging to the surrounding natural world, and has 
been kept up by never-ending efforts of living systems. As to the 
functions of such quasi-digitality: it enables all of life’s inscribing, 
bookkeeping, proliferating and storing of information that is itself 
non-living.  
“Life is artifact-making”, writes Marcello Barbieri (2008) – 
which I understand as saying: Life is, apart from many other 
phenomena, the stream of semiotic processes leading to quasi-digital 
records that enable living beings to save some living experiences in 
a form that allows their easy storage and retrieval. 
I thank you, Jesper and Claus, for this inspiration. And I hope we 
shall be able to discuss the topic deeper – in the near future. 
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University of Copenhagen, Denmark  
The will to reason is ultimately a question of morals. We can defy 
reason – for instance, if we don’t believe it to be the deepest truth about 
a subject matter – but if we avoid listening to reason, we will end up 
corrupted. In this sense, thoughts are an eternal source of doubt that we 
are morally obliged to keep flowing. […] Unfortunately, the scientific 
community has moved towards an arrogant claim of its own reason as 
being downright identical to reason as such. In sharp contrast to what 
has been held to be a core strength of research – systematic doubt – 
quietly “agreement” and “consensus” have become positive words in 
science, most clearly seen in the discussion about global climate. […]  
To a large extent, however, it has been scientific disagreement that 
has secured the soundness of scientific progress. Researchers are not 
braver than other people, and it takes courage to go up against a 
consensus between the powerful politicians in one’s field. And the more 
the politicians invest all their money on so-called strong research 
groups, the less space is left for doubt, and the more difficult it becomes 
for outsiders to survive in the system, let alone pursue a career. There 
are grounds for fearing that doubt and disagreement may be neglected 
or directly suppressed in the modern system of research.1 
 
It has hardly escaped notice that the seminal contributions to 
biosemiotics by Jesper Hoffmeyer are embedded in his wider critical 
appraisals of the modern scientific worldview and its troubled 
relations to enlightenment, metaphysics and other forms of human 
experience. As a follower of Hoffmeyer’s extensive work through-
out most of his career – I read his first book on scientific 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2009. Argumentets moral. [The moral of argument.] In: 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper, Tro på Tvivl: Kritik af religiøs og videnskabelug ufornuft. 
[Believe in Doubt: Critique of Religious and Scientific Unreason.] Charlotten-
lund: Ries, p. 15–16 (trans. by C. E.).  
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reductionism (1975) while still at high school – I have benefited 
from his constant emphasis on the critical aspects of science, and his 
insistence that exactly the promise of a truly scientific world view 
has not yet been fully achieved, and cannot be so, as long as science 
clings to an outdated dualist metaphysics.  
Most biologists raised in the paradigms of contemporary 
evolutionary or molecular biology are epistemically socialized into 
the belief that the already established theoretical frameworks will 
prove sufficient to explain (eventually, in a more distant future) the 
whole realm of life – including the mental life of human beings, our 
actions, thinking, communication, perception, cognition, and 
qualitative experience. Only a few philosophers dared to declare the 
problem of consciousness – of how to account for the emergence of 
phenomenal experience in a purely physical and chemical world – to 
be not only hitherto unsolved, but ‘hard’ in principle, as it could 
seemingly only be posed either as a hopeless search for reduction of 
complex meaningful behavior or cognition into genes, proteins and 
other physical components of living cells, or as a futile search for 
bridges between worlds that from the very beginning were 
conceived of as separate realities: i.e., that of the body and that of 
the soul.  
In a spirit of profound doubt about the traditional way of posing 
the problem of grounding human mind and social reality in a 
scientific understanding of nature, biosemiotics constitutes a 
principled dissent to the received dualist and materialist views. And 
far from claiming to have completed an alternative account, as a 
field it has articulated our doubts about established paradigms – 
indeed, we have even learned to cultivate and cherish internal 
disagreements, as displayed in writings and conferences, about 
exactly how to use semiotic concepts to build a better foundation for 
our understandings of life and mind.  
Through his work in communicating new science to a wider 
public in Denmark, Jesper Hoffmeyer has contributed in important 
ways not only to open up science and to make its findings relevant 
to the lived experience of people, but also to provide a profound 
perspective for seeing new connecting patterns between life, the 
universe and (almost) everything. As hinted at in the quotation 
above, Hoffmeyer has never been blind to the ‘mafiosic’ aspects of 
established science – and this has made his own career track slightly 
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more non-linear, and perhaps ultimately forced it to be ground-
breakingly creative.  
It serves greatly to his credit to have had the courage to speak up 
against the prevailing dogmas of both his own field of science, and 
of the popular understanding of science as providing a world picture 
deprived of human meaning and significance. Here, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic analyses are far-ranging, implying more 
than just another scientific specialty. They amount, instead, to a 
radical new and relational understanding of human nature and the 
possibility of using the ‘common sense’ (or sensus communis) of 
human reason in its full scope, as an instrument not only of fallible 
measurement, but also of a deeper understanding of the relations 
between subjectivity and objectivity … not so little a contribution to 
the furtherance of all sciences in their totality.  
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MOGENS KILSTRUP 
Technical University of Denmark, Denmark 
The invention of ‘digitality’, I suggest, was the step which some 4 
billion years ago allowed certain swarms of communicating closed 
membrane systems floating in the prebiotic mud to escape the in-
difference of the mere moment and to enter a temporal world of genuine 
selfhood. 1 
 
In the poetic citation above, Jesper Hoffmeyer has created a 
semiotic genesis fable – one which singles out the creation of an 
inheritable memory storage system, free from the constraints of 
physical laws, as the most important invention in the creation of life. 
In this view, the innovation of “digitality” facilitated the first 
equilibrium between the primordial membrane systems – which had 
previously communicated exclusively by analog codes – and started 
the endless evolution of punctuated equilibria. Now, 4 billion years 
later, in all living cells, we witness the outcome of this fortunate 
accident in its modern semiotic system of interconnected, but 
functionally separated, Digital and Analog codes. 
 As Hoffmeyer points out on many occasions, this code duality is 
a prerequisite for the evolution of living organisms – but he also 
states more philosophically that the “two equally necessary forms of 
referential activity arise like twins in the individuation of the logic 
that we call life” (Hoffmeyer 2001: 128). Life as we know it thus 
created – and at the same time requires – the presence of two comp-
lementary semiotic systems, acting at different logical levels. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2001. Life and reference. Biosystems 60(1/3): 123–130  
(p. 126). 
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But did code duality arise when hereditary memory systems were 
introduced into life? The RNA-as-origin-of-life believers, who now 
form a large congregation, postulate that life in the primordial soup 
was solely based upon RNA molecules, and that these macro-
molecules functioned as biological catalysts like enzymes in current 
life forms, as well as hereditary molecules like present day DNA 
(Benner et al. 1989: 7054). In this creation scenario, the code 
duality was not firmly established from the start, even though the 
perquisites for it were present. But because a direct copy of some 
part of the genetic storage molecule was used as catalyst, a complete 
separation of the digital storage system and the analogue cell factory 
was not possible.  
The invention of double stranded DNA as a long term storage 
molecule, however, removed the hereditary molecule from the 
functional (i.e., analogue) domain, because its helical structure does 
not reflect the DNA sequence. The only place where the DNA 
sequence information is reflected on the helical surface is in the 
major groove that runs around the helix, where specific DNA 
binding proteins may interact with the paired bases and recognize 
small specific sequences. The rewriting of the RNA code into DNA 
sequences at first only offered DNA a bookkeeper function in the 
cell, however.  
The breakthrough organism postulated by Benner et al. (1989: 
7054) – i.e., the last organism to use RNA as sole genetically 
encoded catalyst – can be inferred to have had a complex 
metabolism, but may have used DNA for storage of hereditary 
material. Thus, already this hypothetical organism had a semiotic 
system that was based upon code duality. A total separation of the 
digital and analogue system was ensured, with no reversion possible, 
when the RNA catalysts (ribozymes), after millions of years, 
invented a new type of more diverse and efficient catalytic 
macromolecules, the proteins, based upon a peptide backbone with a 
large variety of functional groups. The synthesis of proteins was 
then coupled to an ingenious representation system, where each 
different functional group in the protein was represented by a triplet 
of RNA bases. This innovation was the second great semiotic 
hallmark in evolution. 
One may speculate about why the code duality is such a 
powerful trait that it can select for the invention of protein-based 
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catalysis, and an effective genetic coding system, through chance 
mutation and recombination events. In chapter 7.2 of Jesper Hoff-
meyer’s Biosemiotics (2008), he briefly introduces my proposed 
linear representation of the triadic sign model (Hoffmeyer 2008: 258) 
that was invented by Charles Sanders Peirce. Here I wish to show 
briefly how one may formalize semiotic representation functions in 
the digital and analogue systems using this linear formalism.  
First, let us consider the analogue representation functions, 
formalizing the induction of gene expression in a unicellular orga-
nism, where square parentheses indicate concentrations ([mRNAA] 
in the concentration of mRNA from gene A): 
 
Inducer:-- [mRNAA]:-- [EnzymeA]:-- Reaction rateA:--  
Metabolic rate:-- growth rate 
  
We may here say that the growth rate is representing the metabolic 
rate, which is again representing the enzyme reaction, etc. One 
semiotic triad can be constructed, which contains the three sign 
elements: [mRNAA]:-- [EnzymeA]:-- Reaction rateA. The elements 
form a genuine triad, because the inherited memory of the cell has 
produced a protein synthesis machinery and a protein folding pattern 
that links mRNA levels, enzyme levels, and enzyme reaction rates. 
This is close to what Hoffmeyer hinted at in his sentence: “The 
analogically coded messages correspond to a kind of tacit know-
ledge hidden in macromolecular structure and shape” (Hoffmeyer 
2001: 123). Similar arguments can be put forward for any other triad 
involving the sign elements above.  
In the digital domain, we may write a different chain of repre-
sentation, formalizing the evolution of proteinA by mutational events: 
 





Here it is clear that the digital sign triads are of a different nature 
than the analogue triads, and that there is no way an altered protein 
sequence can be tested within the digital domain. A DNA sequence 
could be tested directly if the organism had a desired output 
sequence to compare with, but in evolution, based upon the fitness 
of whole organisms, the fitness gain from a new protein sequence 
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can only be tested in the analog domain. But by including the 
representational relation:  
 






we can bridge the gap between the analogue and digital semiotic 
systems, where the protein function belongs to the analog domain. 
For the evolved cells (version i+1) and the parental cells (version i), 
respectively, the following chain of representations are operative:  
 














Metabolic ratei:-- growth ratei 
 
We have here shown a simple semiotic analysis that transcends the 
apparent paradox of code duality, and formalizes how changes in the 
digital domain can be tested by their effect on cell growth in the 
analogue domain. We have, however, not yet shown why such code 
duality per se has such a large selective advantage, so this question 
must be dealt with at a later point. 
But for the moment: Happy Birthday to Jesper, who pioneered 
the concept of code duality! 
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Every organism on Earth is tossed at birth into this semiosphere [… 
but still] we tend to overlook the fact that all plants and animals 
[…] live, first and foremost, in a world of signification. Everything 
an organism sense signifies something to it.1 
 
I began the task of selecting a passage by re-reading Signs of 
Meaning in the Universe (1996), with the intention of moving on to 
other writings by Professor Hoffmeyer. By the third paragraph of 
the Preface, I encountered a worthy candidate. 
For fear of being dismissed as a champion of the obvious, I 
marked the above sentences only as possibilities and continued my 
search, stumbling rather quickly upon another claim of fundamental 
importance. “Like Peirce I prefer,” Professor Hoffmeyer confesses, 
“a philosophy which enables one to comprehend the world as a 
place where spontaneity is not rejected out of hand and where one 
can therefore entertain the thought that something radically new – 
i.e., essentially unpredictable – might be generated” (1996: 27). It is 
indeed always heartening to me to see a scientist break a lance in 
defense of tychism (the Peircean doctrine of absolute chance). At the 
end of the chapter in which we encounter this revelation, however, 
we encounter another one, no less forcefully articulated: “I am,” 
Jesper divulges, “somewhat skeptical of this worship of the God of 
Mathematics,” he writes, immediately adding, “I have a suspicion 
that deep down, Galileo’s credo [that the book of Nature is written 
in the language of mathematics] is an expression of human reason’s 
wish that the world should always resemble reason itself” (ibid., 38). 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, p. vii. 
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But Human Reason has in some quarters given way to human 
intelligence and simply animal ingenuity. Such intelligence is, at 
bottom, the capacity to learn from experience, i.e., the ability to 
derive information and even insight from our errors (cf. Peirce, 
Collected Papers, 2.227). “The tendency to make mistakes lies at 
the root of all true development in this world” writes Hoffmeyer 
(1996: 144; cf. 145). Similarly, the propensity for things to go awry 
underlies any development – often proving over the course of time 
to be advantageous for some species, community, or individual. 
This is true at all levels, as Jesper notes: “If no errors had ever arisen 
in the DNA molecules, life would never have progressed beyond the 
amoeba stage.” (ibid., 144–145; cf. Peirce, Collected Papers, 6.86; 
also 1.9). 
In assembling these passages, I was struck in several instances 
by the prominence of “I” (“I prefer …”; “I am somewhat skeptical 
…”). No misstep here. “At some point the neo-Darwinists are going 
to have to lift their heads and face the fact that the problem of 
subjectivity cannot be spirited away” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 57). A 
philosophical desideratum is, at least for those not brow-beaten by 
eliminativists of various stripes (and Jesper is not one to be brow-
beaten by these or any other militants), a theory of the human orga-
nism that is inclusive of an account of our ineliminable subjectivity. 
Later, yet another passage locked me in its embrace: “Humanity 
does not have its roots in responsibility, but human beings are 
responsible for their roots” (ibid., 137–138). This point potentially 
deepens our understanding of subjectivity precisely as a task. 
Whatever else the I is, s/he is a being who must hold itself 
responsible for its origins, at least its roots. 
If we count not the individual sentences but the distinct clusters 
of them, we have six passages (the first bearing on the semiosphere, 
the second on tychism, the third on the idolatry of mathematics, the 
fourth on fallibility, and the fifth on subjectivity) – and we hardly 
find an authorial voice other than Jesper Hoffmeyer’s own. Each 
one of these claims might, for rhetorical purposes, be personified; 
that is, each one might be cast as characters in an ongoing 
intellectual drama (e.g., the biosemiotician, the anti-formalist or 
pragmaticist, the tychist, the fallibilist, the defender of subjectivity 
[though not a personage to be confused with the subjectivist!], the 
humanist, and by implication of course the ecologist). But space 
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does not allow me to do much more than introduce these characters 
to you. So, I am inclined to say that all I have managed to do is 
assemble: Six Characters in Search of an Author! 
To complicate matters still more, allow me to introduce an 
historical figure (who was in his own right a real character!). What 
Charles Darwin realized even before the publication of Origin of 
Species in 1859 is even today not fully appreciated. In an entry in 
one of his notebooks, Darwin wrote: “To study Metaphysics, as they 
[sic.] have been studied[,] appears to me to be like puzzling at 
astronomy without mechanics. – Experience shows the problem of 
mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself – the mind is 
function of body – we must bring some stable foundation to argue 
from” (Notebook N 5, October 3, 1838). Rather than attacking the 
mind itself, let us situate mindful organisms in the actual world in 
which they incessantly carry out their semiotic transactions (in brief, 
let us see organisms as agents in the semiosphere). 
If we are today closer to an adequate appreciation of this epochal 
insight, however, it is in no small measure due to the singular genius 
and indefatigable effort of Jesper Hoffmeyer. What Peirce appears 
to have discovered while still a youth – the centrality and ubiquity 
of signs not only in our lives, but also in the life of the cosmos itself 
(see, e.g., Lee Smolin’s 1997 book of that title) – still is even among 
most of our contemporaries overlooked or dismissed. Here, too, the 
genius and labors of Jesper have been invaluable in winning a fuller 
and fairer hearing for such Peircean insights in their full sweep and 
unmeasured depth. The signs of life are nowhere more dramatically 
present than in the life of signs, from the sunflower turning toward 
the sun (Peirce, Essential Peirce, volume 2, p. 273) to the trained 
experimentalist opening the dusty folios of the medieval schoolmen 
– or another trained scientist opening the seemingly esoteric texts of 
a “philosophical crank” and discerning therein a philosophical 
genius whose own intellectual labors not only opened a vast field of 
heuristic adventure, but also nothing less than an emancipatory 
perspective. For Hoffmeyer’s perspective frees us from the 
debilitating forms of scientific reductionism so deeply entrenched in 
certain circles of the contemporary world, without returning us to 
vitalism or any other untenable position. 
While this perspective frees us from the myriad forms of 
theoretical reductionism, it frees us to take up the phenomeno-
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logical, normative, and metaphysical (including cosmological) tasks 
so vital for a robust renewal of the philosophical enterprise, at least 
in its Peircean sense. Far beyond the single work on which I have 
drawn, virtually all of the writings of Jesper Hoffmeyer prove not 
only the possibility of such an approach – but also the value of 
envisioning our task in this manner. The possibility of flight is most 
dramatically proven by the ability birds and other organisms 
actually to bear themselves aloft, while the advantages, exhilaration, 
and perils of flight are most deeply ascertained only by creatures 
who exercise their remarkable power of such unfettered ascent. For 
humans, this means as much as anything bearing ourselves aloft on 
the wings of imagination. “Imagination,” as Jesper so sharply 
observes (and he should by all means have the last word), “is the 
creative exploitation of error” (p. 145; cf. Peirce, CP 1.46–48). 
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A stable integration of a self-referential digitally coded system into an 
other-referential analogically coded system, may perhaps be seen as a 
definition of life. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work has been fundamental in establishing 
biosemiotics as a cross-disciplinary field, providing scientific 
grounds for the existence of meaningful systems in the natural world. 
Hoffmeyer’s collaborator, Donald Favareau (2009), explains that 
biosemiotics is about finding the relation between biological 
organization and mental experiences. Thus, biosemiotics locates the 
production of meaning at the level of living processes, not just in the 
human mind as producer of sign relations.  
This position, originating in Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatism, 
contemplates scientific theories (ideas represented by sign systems) 
as dynamic working hypotheses, so that the notion of explanation 
becomes fundamentally sociological and purposive, enhancing the 
importance of relationships, either between organisms and their 
surroundings (context) or between organisms and other organisms 
(intersubjectivity). At the micro-biological level, this approach 
means that genes and chemical molecules carry ‘potential’ infor-
mation, which only becomes ‘realized’ through acts of interpretation 
or ‘aboutness’, in Hoffmeyer’s terms, in the acquisition of biological 
meaning. In turn, this implies the need for entities which are 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 194). 
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dynamically dependent on the outside world, so that membranes 
(whether cellular or cultural) are understood as interfaces con-
necting inside and outside (signal transduction), an idea also present 
in contemporary representations of cultural systems (see for instance 
work by Juri Lotman or John Deely).  
My own research has focused on the study of artistic represen-
tations as meta-cognitive, staging processes of ambiguity, grounded 
on changing patterns for the support and transfer of information. 
Interdisciplinary analyses show that changes in the use of techno-
logical tools (from the telescope to the computer screen) affect 
human communication with the world, and also human cognition. 
Contemporary research on intermedial semiotics, applied in 
particular to digital environments, points to the fact that tools that 
enable communication at a distance create a separation of infor-
mation from its original context of production. In this scenario, the 
metaphor of ‘membranes’ or ‘borders’ between organisms or 
systems becomes less important, and emphasis is shifted from 
considerations of ‘space’ to aspects of relationship grounded on 
dynamic systems and processes, a complicated loop, since the 
human mind tends to conceptualize in terms of space/position 
(Bouchardon, López-Varela Azcárate 2011). 
The perilous question is whether there exists the possibility of 
linking social and cultural behaviour, and developments in neuro-
sciences. In other words, if higher-level patterns can be established 
through a situated exchange of signs between sub-components, what 
Hoffmeyer terms ‘biosemiotic emergence’. This would imply a 
connection between semiotic emergence, including, at the macro-
level the development of human capacity for making inferences 
drawing from perception, previous conscious knowledge, emotions 
(some unconscious), balancing considerations against each other – 
that is, involving value systems (Churchland 2001), and downward 
causation to lower levels operating through indexical sign relations.  
Contemporary research is rapidly providing evidence for the 
possibility formulated above. My own studies have been seeking a 
revision of the ontology of perception and of the emergence of 
human communicative potential by relating neuro-scientific 
research and socio-constructivist understandings of human physical 
development, and integrating these findings with the evolving nature 
of the technical media that social beings use to communicate at a 
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distance. Thus, I have revised contemporary research on mirror 
neurons structures that relate stimuli from limited portions of space, 
perceived through our senses as proto-objects by means of index 
assignment. Properties and relative locations of a small number of 
objects can be retained in working memory from just one 
unconscious fixation to another (in the case of visual perception, for 
instance). Indexes operate as deictic pointers (like demonstratives in 
language) such that they provide a link between visual objects and 
mental objects (signs) without requiring that either be labeled or 
categorized.  
Working memory only makes dynamic use of deictic variables 
so that proto-objects are indexed as future targets for motor com-
mands (task-oriented to rapid changes in the environment) including 
the command to direct conscious gaze to the object. In other words, 
objects are detected without being conceptualized (that is, without 
encoding any sensory properties). This sort of binding is available as 
long as an indexed object remains in view and perhaps for a short 
time thereafter. What this means is that orientation is first directed 
towards the temporal, rather than the spatial aspects (that involve 
marks, tags and categorization). Focal (spatial) attention is em-
ployed subsequently to individualize items (see, for example, Zlatev 
et al. 2008). 
Let us now return to Hoffmeyer’s quotation at the start of this 
contribution, the fact that organic life may be contemplated as “the 
integration of a self-referential digitally coded system into an other-
referential analogically coded system”. Such an assertion not only 
captures the difficulties of translating (machine/artificial) mathema-
tical binary code, made up of unambiguous units, which build into 
larger unambiguous structures by means of internal index-repli-
cation, into the ambiguities of human communication, open to 
outside-other (natural) languages. It also points to the fact that micro 
and macro levels, just as digital and analogue systems, may operate 
differently, even when following similar replicative mechanisms. 
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It is through empathy that we become human. 1 
 
Like Jesper Hoffmeyer, who introduced me to the world of 
biosemiotics, I share the idea of the evolutionary connectedness of 
all natural beings. However, I differ from him in stressing in my 
own work the need to theoretically include every self-organising 
system within the realm of sign producers. I would like to para-
phrase Jesper by saying that the universe is perfused with all kinds 
of agents – all of which are capable of generating and using signs 
according to the stage they happened to reach so far in the course of 
evolution. Such agents might be material systems that organise 
themselves, or living material systems, or human living systems. 
Humans, of course, are special. Through their capacity for 
empathising with other life-forms, they have managed to split the 
symbolic and collective mind from the material and biological 
body – a split that Hoffmeyer holds largely responsible for our many 
false beliefs. However sympathetic I am to Hoffmeyer’s criticisms 
of those false beliefs – and however supportive I am of his idea that 
empathy is a unique feature of humans that has to be put in 
biosemiotic and evolutionary perspective if we are to master the 
accumulated crises that humanity is facing today – I feel a need not 
only for relating empathy to those precursors on nonhuman levels 
(including those of prebiotic agents), but also a need for relating 
empathy to different semiotic functionalities at the same evolutio-
nary level: that is, to cognitive, communicative and co-operative 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 133. 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
120 WOLFGANG HOFKIRCHNER 
 
abilities according to my so-called triple-C Model (Hofkirchner 
2002). 
Regarding nonhuman precursors, there is evidence that some 
species may have the ability of perspective-taking – not only apes, 
but also monkeys, dogs, and birds are said to show that at least, 
under specified circumstances (see the literature cited in the notes to 
pages 99 and 100 in de Waal 2009: 243). Generally speaking, what 
living systems, starting with the unicellular organisms, are able to 
do is to anticipate what a conspecific is going to do (see Table 1: 
line 2, cell 2). But taking a conspecific’s point of view involves a 
certain amount of disentanglement between one’s own self and 
another self. Such entanglement could certainly be hypothesised as 
the material precursor of empathy in primitive, physical self-
organising systems (see Table 1: line 2, cell 1). Perspective-taking, 
then, seems to be an advanced form developed from unconscious 
bodily connections that account for the emotional part of empathy. 
For de Waal “volunteering of information is not entirely absent in 
apes” – however, he admits “that they are less inclined than humans 
to engage in such behavior” (Waal 2009: 252). So empathy as a 
systematic feature pertains properly to humans (see Table 1: line 2, 
cell 3). 
This leads to the second issue, which concerns the relation of 
empathy to different semiotic functionalities at the same evolutio-
nary level. Rakoczy and Tomasello (2008) concede second-order 
intentionality to chimpanzees – intentionality being here defined as 
the understanding of others as perceiving and acting agents, in the 
context of social manipulation and competition. Ontogenetically, 
humans go even beyond that state in their interactions with one 
another, and enter into a kind of third-order intentionality: so-called 
shared or collective intentionality. In that respect, I propose to make 
a creative use of Charles Sanders Peirce’s idea of firstness, 
secondness and thirdness (Peirce 2000).  
The level of thirdness is reached when humans co-operate – that 
is, when they share a common goal, and communicate and cognise 
accordingly. Tomasello and Rakoczy (2009) estimate that by around 
four years old, most children are able to utter intentional propo-
sitions – that is, propositions made up of a meta-level proposition 
containing psychological verbs like “believe, think, know” and an 
object level proposition that complements the former (Tomasello, 
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Rakoczy 2009: 721–724). This is the function of shared intentio-
nality (see Table 1: line 3, cell 3).  
The level of secondness, human communication, is shaped by 
shared intentionality. It is laid down in the pre-linguistic capability 
of infants to carry out proto-imperative and proto-declarative 
gestural communicative acts (Rakoczy, Tomasello 2008). This is the 
level of empathy as a necessary condition for shared intentionality 
(see Table 1, line 2, cell 3).  
The level of firstness, human cognition, is, eventually, shaped by 
empathy. I call this capability reflexivity (see Table 1: line 1, cell 3). 
Human reflexion enables humans to reflect upon themselves, and to 
reflect themselves as part of a bigger picture – i.e., from the 
immediate social system all the way up to society itself. The actions 
of members towards other members of society are mediated by this 
“third”: the structure of society. 
The other cells in the table given here are filled with terms that 
signify several other categories of semiotic functionalities and 
capabilities deriving from the framework, but not to be discussed 
here, because of limitations of space. 
 
 






in living systems in human systems 
cognition responsiveness affectivity reflexivity 
communication entanglement anticipation empathy 






Let me conclude. To my mind, empathy is a necessary step for the 
healing of civilisation, just as it is in Hoffmeyer’s sense. But 
empathy needs complementation by a certain instance of shared 
intentionality to actually ensure a humane life in sustainable 
connections with all the other agents populating the world that is our 
homeland. By saying that, empathy is not belittled, but rather, put in 
a context that makes it still more important. I am very much 
indebted to Jesper, as he originally made me feel how decisive it is 
to deal with empathy.  
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[...] I have argued that it is therefore the same two parameters – the 
magnitude of the flow of energy and the semiotic controls guiding the 
utilization of that energy – that have constituted the pivotal points in 
both the historical project of civilization, and in the evolution of life on 
earth. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer proposes that the optimized environment and 
organism relationship that has developed via evolutionary mecha-
nisms might be called semiotic fitness, and expresses the fitness 
ratio with a formula S/E=I (where S is the efficiency of the semiotic 
control of life processes and E the magnitude of energy flow 
canalized through the system). Applying the formula to modern 
times, he finds that the possibilities for extracting ever growing 
magnitudes of energy that the industrial revolution opened up have 
not been accompanied by the development of corresponding control 
mechanisms for directing the energy flows. The latter (lack of) 
development can thus be seen as one of the major sources of the 
current environmental crisis.  
Weighing the human state of affairs in energetic terms has 
cropped up now and then in history, but this is not to say that all 
those lines of thought have carried the same agenda. The following 
sketch will give just a slight hint of this by comparing Hoffmeyer’s 
formula with the ideas of two 20th century authors from the fields of 
anthropology and economics. 
In the 1940s and 1950s the American anthropologist Leslie A. 
White (1900–1975) revived the tradition of evolutionary 
anthropology with his ideas about the progression of human culture 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 345. 
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through a number of developmental stages, recalling thereby his 
anthropological predecessor Edward B. Tylor in the 1880s. 
However, time had passed and White was intrigued by ideas 
concerning living systems as energy-capturing systems (Alfred 
Lotka) as well as more specifically the thermodynamic principles in 
the development of life and life as a negentropic system (Erwin 
Schrödinger). While picking up those threads, White also cast the 
development of culture into energetic terms, as Wilhelm Ostwald 
and Joseph Henry had done before him. 
White claimed that the major difference between humans and 
animals lies in their significantly different ways of capturing energy. 
Although the human employs the organs of his/her body in the 
process of control over his/her environment, as do other animals, 
s/he also possesses a powerful extrasomatic mechanism – culture 
(White 1959). White took culture for a material and thus also for a 
thermodynamic system: “Culture is an organisation of things in 
motion, a process of energy transformations [...]. It is an organi-
zation of energy transformations that is dependent upon symboling” 
(White 1959: 38). 
According to White, cultures developed by increasing their 
control of energy sources: from fire to animal power, to coal, to oil, 
to electricity, to thermonuclear power (cf. Sutton, Anderson 2004: 
19). With each successive stage, the magnitude of extracted energy 
had been growing. White summed up the development of cultures 
with a formula C = E x T, where C correspnds to culture, E to 
energy and T to technology. He also phrased it in the form of a law 
of cultural development: “Culture advances as the amount of energy 
harnessed per capita per year increases, or as the efficiency or 
economy of the means of controlling energy is increased, or both” 
(White 1959: 56). Those ideas of Leslie White were written in a 
fully modernist context, whereby the amount of extracted energy 
contributed to the development of higher levels and forms of culture, 
to a praiseworthy progression without any foreseeable end.  
A couple of decades later, in the 1970s, the Romanian economist 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1906–1994) blurred the bright outlook 
of the human exosomatic extraction of energy with a dark hue. 
Georgescu-Roegen is known for having coined the term bio-
economics for a new approach in economics: “The term is intended 
to make us bear in mind continuously the biological origin of the 
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economic process and thus spotlight the problem of mankind’s 
existence with a limited store of accessible resources, unevenly 
located and unequally appropriated” (Georgescu-Roegen 2011 
[1978]: 103). He adopted the terminology of exosomatic organs 
from Alfred Lotka to refer to the “detachable limbs” humans have 
invented to extend the range and scope of their activity (Messner, 
Gowdy 1998).  
Contrary to White, for whom culture as an extrasomatic device 
contributed to the continuous progress of mankind, Georgescu-
Roegen found that the sources of social inequality and stratification 
as well as environmental problems lie precisely in the limitless 
exosomatic evolution and the human addiction to the products of 
pleasure generated in this process. He warned that as far as those 
products depend on finite stocks of available energy and matter, our 
obsession with consumption collides with the unavoidable bio-
physical limits (cf. Messner, Gowdy 1998). 
Although the concerns for the limits of energy extraction are 
echoed in the above mentioned ideas of Hoffmeyer, the solutions 
offered diverge from those of Georgescu-Roegen. Whereas 
Georgescu-Roegen calls for the taming of human greed that does 
not halt before the limits of availability, Hoffmeyer rather suggests 
the improvement of technologies in a manner that would encompass 
and correspond to the biosemiotic control principles found in living 
systems. Whether one or the other should be a starting point for 
tackling the environmental problems at hand, is still an issue of 
debate. But as long as the two serve as mutual impetuses for 
developing each other’s arguments, the eradication of either of them 
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ENKINAESTHESIA 
SUSAN A. J. STUART 
University of Glasgow, Scotland  
The semiosphere is a sphere like the atmosphere, hydrosphere, or 
biosphere. It permeates these spheres from the innermost to outermost 
reaches and consists of communication: sound, scent movement, colors, 
forms, electrical fields, various waves, chemical signals, touch, and so 
forth – in short, the signs of life. 1 
 
There is something gloriously life-giving about the writing of 
someone who has observed the world closely, thought carefully, and 
yet writes so freely about profound matters. This is my experience 
of reading Hoffmeyer’s work and, although I quote only one 
passage above, it is reading it in the context of some of his later 
writing (i.e., “Surfaces within surfaces”, the second chapter of 
Hoffmeyer’s 2008 Biosemiotics volume), that has brought about an 
epiphany in my thinking about consciousness and sensuous co-
agency.  
Hoffmeyer’s expression of the profusion of ways in which things, 
agents, elements, quarks, cats and chemicals are interacting 
awakened in me the reality and beauty of Kant’s Third Analogy of 
Experience (Kant 1929: 233–238). It is a passage in which Kant 
claims that all things exist in relations of community and reciprocity, 
and it is a passage over which there has been a great deal of, 
sometimes important, speculation. What was so striking in reading 
Hoffmeyer’s passage was that Kant’s claims could now be grounded 
in physical science; that philosophical analysis was fine, but if we 
were going to understand the implications of Kant’s claim, then an 
examination of the ways in which organisms, cells, and so on, 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer 2008: 5 (also in Hoffmeyer 1997).  
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communicate – through “sound, scent, movement, colours, forms, 
electrical fields, various waves, chemical signals, touch, and so 
forth” – would be invaluable.  
So, here were the essential triggers: (i) the mention of touch, 
because I’d been considering the absence of affect in cognitive 
models of consciousness, and ‘touch’ is a word characterised by its 
nuance; (ii) the mention of communication that is deemed to have 
meaning for the life in the midst of it; and relatedly, (iii) the 
extension of the semiosphere throughout the atmosphere, the 
hydrosphere and the biosphere – in fact, throughout a universe that 
in all of its being, from the quantum to the cosmological, matters to 
the life that constitutes and configures it, in their relations of 
community and reciprocity. For too long, cognitive models and 
theories of the mind had concentrated on individuals as self-
contained agents, as Cartesian egos, with clearly defined mental and 
physical boundaries. And this is where Chapter 2 of Biosemiotics, 
An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs (2008: 
17–38) is so important.  
In it, Hoffmeyer writes about the skin, with its surfaces within 
surfaces which belie our natural assumption to see the boundary of 
the body as the limit of our experiential world. Rather, he reminds 
us, there are the biological membranes of stratum corneum, 
epidermis, dermis and subcutaneous tissue, and our sense receptors 
and nerves; then there are the hairs that respond to temperature, 
which can stand erect if we are suddenly fearful, and which can be 
brushed by a sleeve or touched gently by a breeze; and then there 
are the non-biological membranes of clothes with their textures and 
degrees of translucency, and our personal and social boundaries 
which vary in relation to our moods and emotions: our confidence, 
our company, our feeling of well-being and health, and so on. It is 
precisely this, the semi-permeable nature of our skin, which 
provides us with the possibility of experience in the first place. 
Being overrun with an abundance of receptors – sixty kilometres of 
nerve fibres, fifteen kilometres of veins, with millions of sense 
receptors for pain, temperature, pressure and touch – it both opens 
us up to the world and discloses it through our inescapable 
engagement with it.  
And touch, Hoffmeyer reminds us, is only the beginning: our 
engagement is richly pleni-sentient, fully ‘switched on’ proprio-
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ceptively, kinaesthetically, visually, aurally, and tactilely; to the 
proximal and the distal, from the innermost to outermost reaches of 
our experiential entanglement with those things which have 
meaning for us, and about which we are concerned – whether we are 
horse, cat, beetle or human being. We are both observers and 
observed, both the subjects of experience and the objects of other’s 
experience, living within a modally and socially complex horizon of 
dynamic affective enkinaesthetic relations; affecting other feeling 
sensing bodies and being affected by other agents and things. We 
routinely spill over into each other’s experiential life, for that is how 
communication is most effective; it affects us and matters for us, 
and that can only happen if we live within a semiosphere that is co-
extensive with the biosphere and consistent with an ethiosphere – 
the sphere of our concernful-engagement. 
In closing I would like to say that there was nothing routine, in 
the sense of commonplace, about Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work spilling 
over into my experiential life; in truth it has been a most extra-
ordinary piece of good fortune and a most effective communication 
of ideas within our living and breathing semiosphere. 
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EPISTEMIZATION 
HOWARD PATTEE 
Binghamton University, United States of America 
Epistemizing the inherent holism of the subject-object relationship was 
a maneuver […] that protected physics from the troublesome subjecti-
vization of nature that would have brought it into conflict with the ideal 
of science. 1 
 
I am indebted to Jesper Hoffmeyer for his references to my early 
ideas on codes and scientific epistemology. His paper with Claus 
Emmeche (1991) on code duality was responsible for stimulating 
my interest in biosemiotics, a field I did not know existed. My first 
impression was that we were in general agreement. However in his 
recent book, Biosemiotics, Hoffmeyer (2008: 92–96) questions both 
my dual modes of description, as well as the epistemic cut that 
physicists regard as inescapable. Instead of seeing the cut as a 
requirement for empirical tests of theories, Hoffmeyer sees the 
epistemic cut itself as a “paradox” that he hopes to “transcend” by a 
Peircean cosmology.  
 As noted above, Hoffmeyer claims that “epistemizing the 
inherent holism of the subject-object relationship” was a “maneu-
ver” used by von Neumann and Pattee (and quantum theorists) that 
“protected physics from the troublesome subjectivization of nature 
that would have brought it into conflict with the ideal of science” 
(2008: 318). I would say that the ideal of science is empiricism – 
conforming theory to experiment – and that this implies a necessary 
epistemic cut. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 318. 
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 Why is this so? The condition for the objectivity, or universality, 
of laws is that they appear to be the same for all conceivable 
systems and to all conceivable observers. Consequently, an indi-
vidual system cannot be distinguished by objective laws alone. Any 
experimental test requires a subjective agent, or an observer, to 
choose an individual system for examination. This choice is largely 
arbitrary, but it must be made explicit if the concept of experiment is 
to have any functional meaning. This choice is the epistemic cut. Of 
course, Hoffmeyer (like everyone) may choose where to make the 
cut. He chooses to see the subject-object relation as an ‘inherent 
holism,” but to call it science, he must also choose a subjective test 
of such purported holism.  
 Instead of such “epistemizing,” however, Hoffmeyer believes 
that: “By positioning the sign process (semiosis) as an irreducible 
ontological category in our universe, biosemiotics (standing on the 
shoulders of Peircean cosmology) has definitely put itself beyond 
this methodologically justified limitation of the scientific under-
standing of the world” (2008: 318). I would simply say, instead, that 
Peircean ontology puts us beyond any scientific model of the world. 
Of course, there is nothing wrong with non-scientific models. In fact, 
humans live mostly by religious and cultural models. What is wrong 
is calling them scientific, when there is no empirical test.  
 When it comes to empirically decidable models, physicists have 
strong evidence that the universe began at such a high temperature 
that nothing like life, sign vehicles, or even atoms could have 
existed. Sign vehicles could not “come out” of this universe until it 
was cool enough to form stable material structures like molecules. 
Now, if your metaphysical principle simply asserts that the Big 
Bang included high-temperature signs, or what Peirce calls a “chaos 
of unpersonalized feeling” that does not address this empirical 
evidence; nor does it address the origin of life problem – or why 
these signs that Peirce says are “acting always and everywhere” 
have only rarely and locally produced life.  
 Physicists can understand why specific organizations of 
molecules can function as symbols that instruct replication. But from 
our theories of physics, it is not possible to even imagine how 
symbols can become molecules. In other words, unless Hoffmeyer 
can explain how signs can act as matter before there is even matter 
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to act as signs, his “irreducible ontological category of signs” 
returns us to Descartes’ ontological dualism.  
 I agree with Hoffmeyer that modern science, and physics in 
particular, is severely limited in what it can say about life, language, 
and human behavior. Physical laws were never created to explain 
life, and as I have argued at length (e.g., Pattee 2007), they cannot 
do so. However, that insufficiency is not an adequate reason to 
reject the entire metaphysics of scientific objectivity that requires an 
epistemic cut. From the scientific point of view, this cut is not a 
paradox. It is necessary, rather, in order to distinguish initial 
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EVOLUTION 
ELISEO FERNÁNDEZ 
Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology,  
United States of America 
First, the bird must anticipate that the fox will chase it if it moves 
awkwardly. This anticipation may be based on learning, in which case 
it would come close to ‘interpretation’ as the word is used in the human 
context. Or the apparent anticipation is in fact just an instinctive 
behavior pattern – in which case we are still justified in saying that the 
evolutionary process has somehow made an anticipation, in the sense 
that it has managed to genetically instantiate a general rule concerning 
the chasing behavior of predators in the bird – a rule based on the 
outcome of myriad individual cases. But to make a general rule out of 
single cases logically seems to come close to what interpretation 
actually means. Accordingly, I suggest the term evolutionary interpre-
tation to cover such cases.1 
 
It is hard to conceive of a better homage to a thinker than offering a 
reflection that takes his thought seriously, and as a springboard to 
further thinking. Those who render such homage in these pages will 
probably address some of the pivotal ideas that Jesper Hoffmeyer 
has bestowed on biosemiotics, e.g. code duality, semiotic freedom, 
semiotic scaffolding, etc. Yet I find myself incapable of engaging 
any of such ponderous topics in just a few lines. I will instead try to 
tackle a short, undeveloped remark in the epigraph’s quotation: But 
to make a general rule out of single cases logically seems to come 
close to what interpretation actually means. This provides fodder 
for some Peircean musings. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. A biosemiotic approach to the question of 
meaning. Zygon 45(2): 367–390 (p. 372). 
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In previous work, Jesper’s story of a bird that fakes injury to 
save her nest served to introduce the idea of “semethic interaction” 
(Hoffmeyer 2008: 189). Here he uses it to bring together two basic 
semiotic conceptions: interpretation and generalization. I will 
attempt to further articulate their togetherness.  
Interpretation: In biosemiotics – in contrast to anthropo-
semiotics – the term ‘interpretation’, in my opinion, should not refer 
to an agent’s subjective action. Instead, it should refer to the 
exertion of that peculiar kind of action (semiosis) that the sign itself 
performs to generate an interpretant. This interpretant usually 
becomes embodied as the first link of a chain of ordinary physical 
actions. For instance, a signaling molecule binds to a receptor in a 
bacterium’s membrane and thereby activates the transcription of a 
gene. The interpretation is determined by a form (here, a conditional 
disposition to act in a certain general way) that the sign transmits 
from its object to the interpretant. 
Generalization: Following Peirce’s intimations, we can think of 
‘generalization’ as mediating the world of signs and the world of 
physical processes. Just as logical inference may be seen as an 
analogue of physical causation, conceptual and theoretical generali-
zation may be regarded as analogues of cosmic and biological 
evolution. Generalization can be seen as the growth of signs, and 
biological evolution as the generalization of living forms. Both 
generalization and evolution compel the emergence of novel laws 
and structures that continuously grow in variety, as well as in both 
the number and the complexity of their unifying relations. Both, too, 
retain previous novelties as special, limit cases of their more 
developed forms. 
Interpretation as generalization: From this perspective, Jesper’s 
evolutionary interpretation names a primitive, inchoate form of 
generalization, latent in the formation of any interpretant. Most 
signs are proto-symbols, which are rudimentary concepts. Concepts 
are incipient propositions, and these in turn are underdeveloped 
argumentations. Aided by models and experiments, argumentations 
may mature into full-fledged theories. All this has its earliest root in 
the translation of the immediate object of a sign into an interpretant 
that instantiates an inherited behavior pattern. 
Indeed, this very text is an example of such logic. And while 
Jesper may or may not agree with this ‘generalization’ of his remark, 
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There is more to the world than matter and energy. There are also sur-
faces and signs.1 
 
One of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s tasks in the making of our exhibition 
Signs of Life, held at the Esbjerg Museum of Art in Denmark in 
2011, was to make five brief statements that summed up five core 
elements in his theories of biosemiotics.  
The exhibition was going to take place in a museum of modern 
art, and it was our intention to make the museum into an artwork in 
itself. We did not so much want to “illustrate the ideas” for the 
audience, but to make a sort of open image or code that could be 
interpreted by the audience from their own points of view, and 
hopefully to inspire the spectator think about science, biology and 
art in new ways.  
So the task for Jesper was not just to make an explanation of his 
theoretical ideas, but, in a few words, to paint a mental picture 
which in the museum would work as an artwork in itself. This was 
probably the one element in our whole project I was most anxious 
about. But, of course, Jesper showed his mastership of language and 
his perfect overview of the subject matter, and produced five 
absolutely clear, condensed and poetic texts. 
——————— 
1  Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2011. The depths of the surface. In: Skriver, Morten; 
Kjeldgaard, Inge Merete (eds.), Livstegn. Kunst + biologi. Morten Skriver og 
Jesper Hoffmeyer. (Katalog.) Esbjerg: Esbjerg Kunstmuseum, p. 81. 
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Figure 1. The Depth of the Surface: Installation view, Morten Skriver/ 
Jesper Hoffmeyer 2011. 
 
 
My favorite of these texts is called The Depth of the Surface. Maybe 
this is because this concept was so new to me when Jesper presented 
it during our planning, but more probably because it also relates so 
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very much to my own work with art, and to life in general. There is 
something profoundly revealing and true that comes into view when 
you look at life’s central elements as “surfaces” that, on all levels of 
existence, both divide and unite. In fact, Jesper starts this particular 
text by stating that: “The most wonderfully strange aspect of life 
may be that it has an interior part that exists because it is defined 
through its contrast to the exterior”.  
Moreover, I believe that this section of the exhibition was the 
most successful, because it attained a complete coherence 
between content and form, as a video installation where the different 
images were projected onto semitransparent surfaces that where 
hanging free in the space. It was a room where you did not have to 
understand anything with your mind, but could sense the message 
with your whole body. Precisely the way that Jesper (and most 
artists) understand that we are perceiving the world most of the 
time, anyway. 
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BENT SØRENSEN  
Independent scholar, Denmark 
TORKILD THELLEFSEN 
The Royal School of Library and Information Science, Denmark 
Like Peirce, I prefer a philosophy which enables one to comprehend the 
world as a place where spontaneity is not rejected out of hand and 
where one can therefore entertain the thought that something radically 
new – i.e., essentially unpredictable – might be generated. A philosophy 
that has not already barricaded itself against the path to insight 
embodied by the question, why on Earth should they have been here all 
the time?1 
Science is to mean for us a mode of Life whose single animating pur-
pose is to find out the real truth (Charles S. Peirce; c. 1902, CP 7.54). 
 
In the 1970s, Jesper Hoffmeyer did experimental research within the 
field of biochemistry. Later, he gradually turned to theoretical 
biology (Cobley, Deely, Kull, Petrilli 2011: 509). Concerning the 
latter, we find the above quote in Hoffmeyer’s excellent monograph 
Signs of Meaning in the Universe (1996: 27).  
The philosophy, or rather the scientific metaphysics, of C. S. 
Peirce (1839–1914) plays an important part in the framework of 
Hoffmeyer’s great and groundbreaking thinking concerning ques-
tions of theoretical biology. Peirce was arguing against necessita-
rianism, or mechanical philosophy (CP 6.38), according to which 
everything in the universe is determined by law (CP 6.36). Peirce, 
among other things, analyzed the logic of scientific reasoning – e.g., 
the justification of valid induction – and looked upon the facts of 
scientific practice from the laboratories and the fieldwork (e.g. the 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 27. 
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making of observations and measurements). Yet there he could not 
find the slightest evidence for the postulate of determinism.  
Instead, Peirce developed his doctrine of tychism (from the 
Greek tyché, meaning ‘chance’), insisting on a real and irreducible 
element of pure chance in the universe, a spontaneous deviation 
from the laws of nature. Peirce saw the imperfect observance of law 
(CP: 6.46) and the variety of forms which exist in the universe as 
important evidence for the chance-hypothesis (CP: 6.53). However, 
according to Peirce, all variations and diversifications are united 
ontologically, since there is also a tendency toward order in the 
universe, a ‘becoming instinct’ tending toward general habits (and 
later, general ideas) – and this a key principle of his synechism 
(Fisch 1986: 5).  
Revealingly, Peirce wrote the following in the article ‘Pragmatic 
and Pragmatism’, again from Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy 
and Psychology (1902):  
“Synechism […] is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the 
becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming 
instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process 
of the growth of reasonableness.” (CP: 5.4) 
Hence, Peirce believed that the universe shows a real tendency to 
become more law-like and progressively more knowable. Thus, in 
the evolution of the universe two real tendencies can be observed: a 
habit-taking tendency, but also an increase of variety. Peirce 
regarded evolution as being growth, and more specifically a growth 
in both the number of uniformities and the number of varieties. This 
is the law of ‘laws’, claims, Peirce, no more and no less (CP: 6.91).  
Inspired by the above-mentioned points concerning Peirce’s 
doctrine of tychism, Hoffmeyer writes the following in his lucid 
article ‘Order out of indeterminacy’: “Only by claiming that 
indeterminacy is primary will it be possible to explain the 
‘diversification of nature’, because anybody can see without any 
algebraic apparatus that mechanical law out of like antecedents can 
only produce like consequents” (Hoffmeyer 1999: 326). However, if 
reality itself is marked by an increase of both variety and chance, or 
if spontaneity is really effective in the universe, what would the 
experimental biologist Hoffmeyer say are the consequences for 
biology as a science?  
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Let us try and make a guess. He would probably say that these 
consequences must be manifold. And maybe he would mention at 
least the following: In biology, we should find an insistence on the 
inherent fallibilism of the inquiry; the process of biological inquiry 
will always be ongoing, since the inquirer and the community of 
which he is a member are fallible. As Peirce wrote in an untitled 
manuscript (c.1897): “[…] fallibilism is the doctrine that our 
knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a 
continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy” (CP 1.171).  
Maybe Hoffmeyer as a Peircean-inspired theorist would also 
point to the limitations of the cognitive apparatus of the biologist: he 
or she has no infallible intuition; and, furthermore, the weakness of 
his or her cognitive methods – concerning error in measurements, 
uncertainty introduced by inductive reasoning; and, finally, not to 
forget, the limitations in the content of his or her knowledge – 
exactly points to the fact of indeterminism and spontaneity.  
Peirce advocated a thoroughgoing evolutionism; hence, the 
entire universe is permeated with evolution and its processes, and 
everything in the universe should be understood as an evolutionary 
product. In this perspective, biology as a science, Hoffmeyer would 
probably say, is shooting at a target that is always moving; he 
himself being – as was Peirce – a fallibilist in the search of truth.  
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FITNESS 
TIMO MARAN 
University of Tartu, Estonia 
The evolutionarily relevant fitness concept, semiotic fitness, should 
ideally measure the semiotic competence or success of natural systems 
in managing the genotype-envirotype translation processes. 1 
 
The concept of fitness as it is used in evolutionary biology carries 
with it a strong flavour of sociomorphic modelling. Every facet and 
quality of an organism is transposed to one absolute and quantitative 
measure of success: the number of viable offspring. Jesper Hoff-
meyer makes an attempt to domesticate the fitness concept in 
semiotics by introducing the term semiotic fitness, which is defined 
as the measure of success of an organism in interpreting information, 
using its biological inheritance for doing so, and in relation to the 
given ecological context. With this new perspective, the center of 
activity has clearly shifted – for while in classical evolutionary 
biology, an organism remains the passive object of selection pres-
sures, in Hoffmeyer’s interpretation, ‘life’ becomes the centre of 
active interpretation and translation. This shift makes the concept of 
semiotic fitness harbour a certain affinity with James Mark Bald-
win’s (1896) concept of organic selection or F. John Odling-Smee’s 
(1998) concept of niche construction.  
Perhaps the most puzzling and intriguing aspect in the citation 
above, however, is the use of the word translation in this particular 
context. Hoffmeyer develops this line of thought further in his essay 
‘Origin of species by natural translation’ where he specifies the 
concept of natural translation as referring to “any process whereby a 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1997. Biosemiotics: Towards a new synthesis in biology. 
European Journal for Semiotic Studies 9(2): 355–376 (p. 370). 
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potential message is made accessible to a natural system that would 
not otherwise be capable of making sense of this message” (Hoff-
meyer 2003: 335). In more traditional usage, however, ‘translation’ 
is considered to take place between two languages, codes or 
repertoires. Thus, the blending of genetic and environmental infor-
mation in the translation concept that Hoffmeyer offers may lead 
one to wonder: “What exactly is translated into what?” Is it the 
organism’s genetic information that is translated into the code of the 
environmental context? Is the organism’s phenotype a result of this 
translation? Perhaps we can receive some help from the ideas of Juri 
M. Lotman, who has noted, in the context of cultural semiotics, that 
when two different semiotic systems start communicating, they tend 
to establish a common semiotic ‘personality’ and emergent new 
dynamics on a higher structural level of the system (Lotman 1992: 
114–115).  
In the biological realm, this ‘new level’ could be described as the 
lived expression of an organism in its environment, manifested in 
meaningful adaptations and correspondences, communicative inter-
actions and behaviours (this would include, for instance, colourful 
mimicry adaptations, interspecific alarm calls, and many other 
examples belonging to the category of semethic interactions in 
Hoffmeyer’s (2008: 189) terminology). Consequently, ‘semiotic fit-
ness’ could be expressed as the significance of the organism’s lived 
expressions in the ecosystem, as its success in triggering new 
semiotic activities and processes, or at least its potential to do so. 
Paradoxically, if ‘semiotic fitness’ is understood to describe 
semiotic processes as interpretations or translations whose outcomes 
influence the survival of individuals and species, then semiotic 
fitness could hardly become a measure comparable to the biological 
fitness concept. This is so because semiotic processes are essentially 
qualitative, open to future semioses and interpretations, and their 
significance or value cannot be determined in any given moment. 
Similar to Peirce’s final interpretant, that can be expressed as the 
sum of all possible outcomes of the sign (CP 8.184, 8.314), 
‘semiotic fitness’ would be expressed in all future semiotic pro-
cesses that spring from a particular activity of an organism. If there 
is anything to be measured, then, it is not the success of this activity, 
but its failure – and therefore, perhaps, semiotic unfitness could be a 
more appropriate concept for semiotics. 
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Hoffmeyer, too, takes note of such restrictive aspects of the 
concept, when he reminds us that: “[I]f the semiotic fitness of a 
natural system, in the sense of a semiotically integrated dynamic 
unit, is low, other such semiotically integrated units will tend to 
capture a share of their flows of matter and energy, and ultimately 
such units would tend to disappear” (Hoffmeyer 2003: 343). 
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FREEDOM 
SØREN BRIER 
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
The most pronounced feature of organic evolution is not the creation of 
a multiplicity of amazing morphological structures, but the general 
expansion of ‘semiotic freedom’, that is to say the increase in richness 
or 'depth' of meaning that can be communicated. 1 
 
Biosemiotics studies the signification, communication, and habit for-
mation of living processes. The change of perspective that distin-
guishes it from mainstream biology lies in its consideration of life not 
just from the standpoint of physics, chemistry and information theory, 
but also from the standpoint of semiotics, as dynamic meaningful sign 
processes and structures. As such, it attempts a more unified semiotic 
perspective on the processes and patterns that connect the central 
material phenomena of the living world – from the ribosome, genes, 
proteins, cells, nervous systems, perception and motor organ’s 
stimulus-driven reflex behavior, to the conscious and experiential 
world of human beings and higher mammals.  
The materialistic view of evolution is a view that attempts to 
encompass the beginnings of life in the universe, to its diversity of 
forms and its adaptation to material ecological aspects of reality – until 
central nervous systems makes the concepts of motivation, experience 
and consciousness unavoidable. To understand animal behaviour in a 
biological and scientific way, Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen and 
Karl von Frisch developed the paradigm of ethology in the last half of 
the 20th century. Ethology is the comparative study of animal behavior, 
and it studies the biological roots and meanings of animal actions – 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 61. 
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which is the closest modern scientific biology has ever come to a bio-
semiotic understanding of cognition, communication and behaviour.  
Much like Thomas Sebeok and Jesper Hoffmeyer were, in their 
development of biosemiotics, Konrad Lorenz was inspired by Jakob 
von Uexküll’s idea of a species-specific umwelt for every animal 
species. The umwelt is build out of those aspects of the world, which 
are working as sign stimuli for the animal’s battery of evolved 
instinctive behaviours – also called its ethogram. But neither Jakob 
von Uexküll nor Konrad Lorenz had the triadic sign concepts from C. 
S. Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics to draw on, and only such a semiotic 
view is able to deal with the reality of such signification spheres as the 
centre of the dynamics of meaning leading into culture and language.  
Inserting materialistic biology into Peirce’s semiotics, Sebeok’s 
and Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics looks at the semiotics of nature, such as 
the grounding of sign processes in the fundamental processes of the 
development of our universe. In so doing, it revises the metaphysics of 
Darwinism so as to be able to describe the emergence of cell inter-
pretants in biotic evolution (through the emergence of swarm-intelli-
gence in the inner organisation of bodies) as well as to examine how 
the semiotic interpenetrations of the nervous, hormonal and immune 
systems interact so as to produce a biological self – and to describe 
how this whole adapts to the changing structures and processes of the 
surrounding ecological system.  
Mainstream mechanistic biology has only probability theory and 
the mathematical model of self-organization to aid it in its inquiries 
into how to map the dialectic process between evolution and life. 
Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics, instead, is an attempt to marry concepts 
from Gregory Bateson and Jakob von Uexküll with Peircean semiotics 
in order to answer questions about the biological and evolutionary 
emergence of qualia, perception, meaning, and intentionality as the 
basis of cognition, communication and the organization of living 
systems communities and cultures. The focus is thus on sign-functions 
in physical, biological and virtual universes such as the semiotics of 
anticipatory systems.  
One of Hoffmeyer’s most fruitful contributions to the development 
of resolving this problem of the emergence of life and meaning in the 
material world is his profound paradigmatic statement that it is the 
sign, rather than the molecule, that is the basic unit for life. By so 
positing, Hoffmeyer goes beyond a monistic materialism as the 
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foundation for the life sciences, without embarking on the ship of 
vitalism in a dualistic framework. The success of this move is the shift 
to the paradigmatic framework of the audacious triadic semiotic 
philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce.  
The modern synthesis of evolution – based on molecular biology, 
combined with a cybernetic and systems view of ecology, plus the 
arrow of time from thermodynamics’ Second Law of entropy – 
refrains from giving evolution any direction other than the growing 
possibility of creating and sustaining more and more complex, 
dissipative, self-organizing structures, which then become stabilized 
by auto-catalytic functions. But Hoffmeyer’s introduction of the sign 
function and its production of meaning into this picture of nature and 
its living systems is one of his greatest achievements, and he uses it to 
advance a theory of “semiotic freedom”: a theory of non-divine/ non-
spiritual meaning as the driving force in evolution. Yet Hoffmeyer 
does not equate this idea to Peirce’s foundational concept of “evolutio-
nary love”, nor to Peirce’s idea of the universe becoming more rational 
and well-ordered, because of living and human systems’ intervention 
into the evolution of the universe.  
Having known Jesper Hoffmeyer and his work for almost 35 years, 
it is my interpretation that his conceptualization is rather motivated by 
a paradigm of “freedom” that is inspired, rather, by Marx. I therefore 
choose this quote as one of his most important in shaping his particular 
brand of biosemiotics by using Peirce’s paradigm to interpret the 
results from modern natural and social sciences through a lens of 
Darwinian and Marxist pragmatic paradigms, which have been super-
imposed unto Peirce’s huge pragmaticist semiotic process philosophy. 
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HIERARCHY 
STANLEY N. SALTHE 
Binghamton University, United States of America  
It should be noted that the term [‘semiotic freedom’] refers to any 
activity that is indeed free in the sense of being underdetermined by the 
constraints of natural lawfulness.1 
 
While I’m a great fan of showing how almost any activity in biology 
or culture is strongly influenced by physical-chemical constraints, I 
have recently (Salthe, forthcoming) called myself to account on this 
penchant in connection with my work on compositional hierarchy 
theory, after considering an interesting point in the work of Andree 
Ehresmann and Jean-Paul Vanbremeersch (2001) on the hierarchical 
organization of brain activities, and one which relates directly to 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s notion of semiotic freedom.  
It is a standard posit, one which I have not specifically until now 
interrogated in my own work, that a higher level (larger scale) 
module will constrain, regulate, or interpret a number of lower level 
entities included under its span. The default interpretation of this is 
that these lower level entities are fixed in the organization of the 
system, and this mechanistic view is generally how I tend to 
visualize this organization.  
Ehresmann and Vanbremeersch have proposed, however, that a 
brain module will regulate a varying set of lower level entities under 
different conditions, leaving the composition of this set open to 
context. The aspect of hierarchy theory involved here is signaled by 
the term ‘heterarchy’, which is sometimes used pejoratively to 
denigrate the hierarchy approach. However, the removal of this 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 187. 
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idealistic simplifying constraint on subsystem membership does not 
alter any of the principles of compositional hierarchies. The simpler 
view that I had held faut de mieux is not an actual principle of this 
system, but merely a diagramming convenience that had found a 
cozy place in my mind.  
 In semiotics, recently I have been suggesting that semiosis is 
most generally the situation where a system’s response to an object 
is modifiable according to context (Salthe, forthcoming). That is, 
that the context functions as sign. The Ehresmann and Vanbre-
meersch concept mentioned above can be seen to be a neat example 
of this in the world of neurons. The module selecting its components, 
as above, will be responding to its own dendritic survey of brain 
context, which would detect signals received from yet higher-level 
modules which constrain its own behavior. These will be affected, in 
turn, by signs mediating the system’s encounter with its outside 
environment (Herrmann-Pillath, Salthe 2011).  
 All of this is top-down, as opposed to the usual (but really not 
necessary) physicochemical bottom-up image of system activities. 
As I noted in 1985, however, compositional hierarchies are 
functionally both bottom-up and top-down simultaneously. So here 
we have an interesting example of Jesper’s ‘semiotic freedom’ – 
which can be expected to become evident when trying to use 
necessarily simplified models to interpret natural systems. 
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MARIA ISABEL ALDINHAS FERREIRA 
 Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal 
The outline that we have given in this chapter of life’s beginnings […] 
describes a process of individuation, especially if the word is under-
stood in its broader philosophical meaning as a process through which 
an individual form of existence develops itself from the basis of the 
general continuum. 1 
 
The work of Jesper Hoffmeyer contributes significantly to the defi-
nition of a common theoretical grounding capable of encompassing 
and explaining the distinct forms of semiosis, as instantiated by 
different types of cognition. In this common essential epistemo-
logical framework, the concept of individuation plays a fundamental 
role. 
A life form and its environment constitute a unit – a microcosm 
grounded on a privileged dialectic relationship. Jakob von Uexküll, 
in Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (1909: 41) refers to this unit as a 
closed purposive organisation. According to him, every animal 
carries its surrounding world with it during its entire lifetime, like an 
impenetrable shell. This dialectic relationship is not only responsible 
for the process through which an individual form of existence 
develops itself from the basis of the general continuum, but also for 
the definition of a particular view of the world. In this specific 
‘world model’ – i.e., the organism’s umwelt – particular environ-
mental features are individuated and consequently assigned specific 
meanings. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 37. 
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As I have posited in my own work (Ferreira 2010, 2011), 
meaning is always a value-structured entity, independent of the type 
of cognition or the level of semiotic complexity involved. Such 
value is assigned by the cognitive agent to an individuated environ-
mental feature (or to a cluster of features) that, because of the 
agent’s physical nature, emerge in the environment as salient. Gib-
son (1986:127), calls these environmental features “affordances” – 
the potentialities present in the surrounding environment to satisfy 
an organism’s specific needs. For instance, the presence of a certain 
flower affords a small insect the possibility to rest, and to drink 
some of its nectar, while the same flower affords a bird the chance 
to satisfy its hunger by eating insects. It is thus the organism’s 
sensitivity to specific features that allows for their individuation and 
consequent recognition in the surrounding environment.  
As Cassirer (1996: 83) points out, such “seeability” is neither a 
predicate attributed to things as such (as ‘absolute’ things) – nor 
does it consist in the simple passive possession of certain sense-data, 
optical sensations or perceptions. It is, in fact, and just as Hoffmeyer 
has consistently asserted, the result of an active process of 
interpretation that is undertaken by an entity endowed by evolution 
with a specific physical architecture. 
The capacity to individuate and to identify specific environ-
mental features arises naturally whenever the organism interacts 
with its environment, and is defined by species-specific semiotic 
relations. This disposition seems to rest upon a significant degree of 
innate “knowledge” – a “know how”, which all organisms possess – 
and which is the result of the experience of their biological prede-
cessors, and a consequence of their adaptive efforts to adequately 
respond to environmental conditions and changes. Based on the 
recurring properties of previous encounters, these architectures 
embody vital information concerning the typical environmental 
patterns the organism will have to face, guaranteeing this way the 
“know how” that guides all its actual interactions.  
Human cognition incorporates not just an organisms’ capacity to 
cope with specific physical environments, however, but also its 
capacity to evolve in dynamically differentiated social, cultural and 
linguistic contexts, constructing specific world views. These ‘world 
views’ are the result of the kind of complex semiosis that characte-
rises human cognition. It is this complex semiosis that is responsible 
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for the production of all systems of perfectly individuated values 
that, in turn, give body to specific social and cultural frameworks. 
Here individuation, salience and meaningfulness are defined 
according to particular historical, cultural and linguistic back-
grounds, and are consolidated or redefined by recurrent individual 
and collective interactions. 
The incorporation of these systems of values allows the indi-
vidual to elaborate a model of his environment and to situate himself 
in it. Simultaneously, this progressive incorporation contributes to 
the definition of the Self, shaping the individual’s identity by 
defining his role and place in the community.  
Though acknowledging that the social, cognitive and emotional 
processes of humanity cannot simply be understood as individual 
manifestations of biological phenomena, Hoffmeyer goes a step 
further: highlighting the existence of a common reality that binds 
‘the natural’ and ‘the human’ – in his words, “a causally efficacious 
matrix of biological interaction, the utterly natural product of 
organism’s interaction: the semiosphere” (2008: 8). In short, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer’s work on biosemiotics alerts us to the complexity and 
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TERRENCE DEACON 
University of California Berkeley, United States of America 
That an age which is exceedingly preoccupied with handling of the 
informational aspects of the world should reinterpret nature in 
informational terms is of course hardly a surprising thesis. But when it 
becomes understood that information without subjects is a fiction, this 
thesis will change the whole of science. 1 
 
I would argue that the development of science in the last decades of 
the 20th century was shaped more by the concept of “information” 
than by any other technical concept or discovery. And yet the 
version of this concept that has played this central organizing role, 
as Jesper Hoffmeyer has long been arguing, is curiously hollow, 
eviscerated of the functional role it pretends to play. Indeed, it is 
nearly unrecognizable in comparison to both the colloquial version 
of this concept and its historical antecedents. But even more curious 
is the fact that its centrality to so many fields of inquiry – and its 
attractiveness for uses in fields as diverse as biology, cognitive 
science, and even quantum physics – derives from feigning to 
provide this excluded conceptual content. As a result, the term 
“information” has become a Trojan horse, enabling a radical form of 
eliminative materialism to become the presumed established dogma 
in science, while pretending to offer a false consilience between the 
physical and the semiotic realms of inquiry.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1993. The Changing Concept of Information in the 
Study of Life. Paper Prepared for the Symposium Nature and Culture in the 
Development of Knowledge. A Quest for Missing Links Uppsala, 8–11 Sep-
tember 1993. (http://www.molbio.ku.dk/MolBioPages/abk/PersonalPages/Jesper/ 
History.html) 
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 The now dominant technical conception of “information” can be 
traced to a widely heralded technical report by the Bell Labs 
scientist Claude Shannon that was originally released in 1948 and 
titled “The Mathematical Theory of Communication” (Shannon, 
Weaver 1948). Though at the time overshadowed by the discovery 
of the transistor, this theoretical paper has changed the sciences as 
much as that electronic innovation has changed the world of 
computation. Most refer to this paper as the founding document of 
the field often described as Information Theory. But Shannon's use 
of the term “communication” in the title, rather than “information”, 
was no accident. Attending to this apparently subtle difference in 
word choice offers an important clue to the critical shortcomings 
hinted at in the quotation from Hoffmeyer that is cited above.  
 This is because “information” in this narrow, technical sense has 
almost nothing to do with informing. It is defined instead as a 
property of a sign medium, irrespective of what its message is about, 
or whether its ‘content’ is significant. Thus, the information bearing 
capacity of a given medium (e.g. a collection of alphanumeric 
characters) is measured in terms of its potential combinatorial 
variety (which Shannon called its entropy – and which is calculated 
analogously to thermodynamic entropy), and the information con-
veyed by a given signal or message is measured in terms of the 
quantity of uncertainty removed, compared to what could have been 
received. 
 It’s not that this conceptualization is an outright error – indeed, it 
was necessary for its use in measuring such things as data storage 
capacity or the bandwidth of internet connections. Yet, it provides a 
false sense that a more problematic challenge has also been met. As 
Hoffmeyer has repeatedly stressed, living processes are intrinsically 
semiotic – i.e. they are organized in such a way that they interpret 
certain molecular relationships as being about other attributes of the 
world and about other cellular molecular relationships. For this 
reason, a conception of information that fails to address this refe-
rential relationship is inadequate for biology, much less cognitive 
science. A theory of information that explains neither its ‘aboutness’ 
nor what constitutes an interpreter (i.e. a “subject”) ignores what is 
most in need of explanation. 
 Early in the 1940s the brilliant quantum physicists Erwin 
Schrödinger delivered a series of lectures that formed the basis for a 
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book entitled What is Life (Schrödinger 1944) that offered two 
fundamentally linked insights: first, that living organisms must 
somehow persistently work against the spontaneous increase in 
entropy; and second, that critical to this, they must maintain and 
transmit information stored in molecular form (hypothesizing a 
molecule which he presciently described as an aperiodic crystal). 
Although both insights went on to characterize work at the forefront 
of biophysics and molecular genetics, respectively, in the more than 
half century that has followed, little effort has been dedicated to the 
obvious interdependence between these two unprecedented features 
of life.  
 Both attributes have nevertheless played a role in the develop-
ment of complexity theories and dynamical systems theories during 
this epoch. And yet these theories also assume a conception of 
information that is essentially equivalent to the content-less con-
ception originally described by Shannon. In fact, although most 
researchers who promote a dynamical systems theory of brain 
function and cognition are critical of computational theories of mind, 
they also treat the concept of mental representation as a fiction (e.g., 
Freeman, Skarda 1992; Garzón 2008). This is ultimately an anti-
semiotic vision, though often this fundamental incompatibility is 
ignored. In this respect, such thinking tacitly reifies the Cartesian 
incompatibility between mind and mechanism, and presumes that 
the former is illusory. 
 Biosemiotics, as Jesper Hoffmeyer has developed it throughout 
his career, takes as its most fundamental assumption the view that 
life is at base a representation-using process – indeed, the ultimate 
ground of all such processes. In this respect, the origin of life is the 
origin of semiosis. From this perspective, until we develop a 
concept of organism that is not merely a dynamical system – but 
also constitutes a representation-creating subject – biology will 
remain eviscerated of its defining attribute.  
 Organisms are – as Stuart Kauffman has described them – 
autonomous agents able to act on their own behalf (Kauffman 2000). 
Their being able to do so, however, depends on the capability of 
their dynamical constitution to both embody information about their 
fundamental constitutive properties, and to utilize features of their 
environment as information about its suitability to support or disturb 
this self-constitution process. Organism self and conscious subjec-
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tive self are thus internally constituted, and in this respect are self-
referential as well (Deacon 2012). So when referentiality (aboutness) 
and subjectivity (selfness) are treated as fictions, the distinctions 
between life and lifeless and between mind and mechanism dissolve.  
 As Schrödinger intuited (even if he didn’t explicitly claim it), the 
dynamical and informational features of life must ultimately be two 
aspects of the same dynamic. So it is this apparent “incompatibility” 
that must be the fiction. As Hoffmeyer predicts, only when the 
merely quantitative conception of information is shown to be the 
real fiction, and a semiotic conception of information takes its place, 
will the sciences be capable of explaining the nature of a universe 
that includes living subjects. Otherwise, science will remain trapped 
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Nature is, briefly, a word to be dealt with cautiously. Yes, nature is a 
word. Words come from the mouth, and the mouth is in the head. Hereby, 
we have the title and topic of the current book: How did nature enter the 
head? And how do we get it out of the head, when we talk and write? 1 
 
This paragraph appears on the opening page of what was my first 
encounter with Jesper. On the title page, I find the signature of an 
undergraduate student, bearing my name; underneath, he has written 
the year, 1989. …1989. Like 1789, a revolutionary, catastrophic 
year. Nothing suggested that the year would become anything 
special, but in hindsight, there is a before and an after. It is a 
singular point in time, at least to a European. It was the year where I 
discovered – in my own body, world and mind – that the reality we 
live in is historical; that it may change rapidly in completely un-
foreseen ways; and that maybe ‘life’, in the general, always adapts, 
somehow; but that life, in the personal, in a very concrete way, is 
about getting one’s bearings under change: not only adapting, but 
also shaping that reality and those relations that one is embedded in. 
 Also, within the trajectory of Jesper’s writings, this book falls 
right on a watershed. Before: a series of books in Danish that places 
biology in a societal perspective: Dancing around the Golden Grain: 
A Book on Biology and Society (1975), Ecological Means of Pro-
duction (1977), Evolution, Ecology, History (1980), and The 
Natural History of Society (1982). After: monographs, all translated 
into English, that investigate, and indeed establish, biosemiotics: 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1984. Naturen i Hovedet, Om Biologisk Videnskab. 
København: Rosinante, p. 9 (translation mine, A. R.). 
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Signs of Meaning in the Universe (1994), too many journal articles 
to count, and Biosemiotics: an Examination into the Signs of Life 
and the Life of Signs (2008).  
 Naturen i Hovedet, almost prophetically, contained elements of both 
periods. It begins with a story of the murder of J.R. Ewing in the 
television series Dallas – and it ends on a very early version of Code 
Duality. Reading it, in 1989, was a transforming event, critical in 
nudging that path, which became my life and career, in a novel 
direction. It was also a confusing experience, and I think I may now see 
why. The book rides two horses, almost simultaneously. In the opening 
paragraph above, it places nature in us, and us in nature, and all of that 
in time, following up on the earlier writings. It ends with some 
disturbing considerations on chickens and eggs, on codes, the analogue 
and the digital, and on how, somehow, ‘meaning’ emerges. These last 
observations point directly to Hoffmeyer the biosemiotician.  
 Rereading the book, in 2012, is not a smooth ride, and finding a 
suitable quote not easy. Each sentence seems either fraught with 
uncertainty, or with too much certainty on positions that seem 
difficult to uphold today. However, it was this fragile, daring, poetic, 
imaginative, and very insistent attempt at doing the impossible that 
made the book a revolutionary, transforming reading to a perplexed, 
confused undergraduate.  
 Perhaps this tension between the semiotical and the societal – 
evident in Naturen I Hovedet and still fundamentally unsolved – is 
worth revisiting; also, or maybe in particular, for those who mainly 
think of Jesper as a biosemiotician.  
 Today I will just say: Thank you Jesper, for all those fragile, 
daring, poetic, imaginative and insisting thoughts!  
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The most salient characteristic of organic evolution is not the formation 
of an enormous diversity of morphological structures, but the general 
growth in ‘semiotic freedom’, that is the increase in richness or ‘depth’ 
of that which can be communicated. 1 
 
The book of nature, according to Jesper Hoffmeyer, can be read in 
more or less the same way as we read a poem, a play or a literary 
novel. If art is defined through its redundancy of meaning, then 
nature is doubtless a work of art. It conveys far more information 
than anyone can assimilate or make meaningful use of. This is why 
we still write poetry, but it is also the reason why evolution is open-
ended and never ending. 
In his rich and diverse work, Hoffmeyer rarely makes use of 
examples from culture and society. He might well have done so. In 
fact, one of his most important contributions to knowledge consists 
in showing that the rules and laws, inclinations and volitions that 
make a difference to a crayfish or a sabre-tooth tiger are of the same 
kind as the underlying principles of human existence. Unlike many 
natural scientists, Hoffmeyer works from the assumption that 
significance is everywhere and that signification is the main activity 
of all organisms. While the anthropologist Clifford Geertz sees 
culture as ‘a web of significance’ spun by human beings, Hoffmeyer 
sees nature as a network of networks upheld by significance spun, 
consciously or not, by every participating organism. There is 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1993. En snegl på vejen: Betydningens naturhistorie. [A 
snail on the path: The natural history of significance.] Copenhagen: Rosinante, 
p. 23. 
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grandeur, as Darwin said, in this view of life; but Hoffmeyer also 
offers a key for transcending unfruitful dualisms and epistemo-
logical dead ends. The world is between, not within; it is becoming 
rather than being. The present is merely a hinge connecting a deep 
past to an open future.  
Hoffmeyer walks his talk. Like the organisms he describes, his 
intellectual power unfolds in ongoing dialogue with a broad range of 
other thinkers, ranging from Victorians like Darwin and Peirce to 
close predecessors like Bateson and Maturana and contemporary 
chums such as the leading Danish intellectuals Fredrik Stjernfelt and 
Tor Nørretranders. Just as nature unfolds, and each species or orga-
nism comes into its own, through reciprocal signification with 
others, so does the uniqueness of Hoffmeyer’s work and vision 
come across most brilliantly through his sympathetic discussions 
and disagreements with others. His is an ecological approach to 
everything which transcends dualisms and academic boundaries, a 
vision for the coming century. 
In this world, we human beings have special responsibilities, and 
this is not just because we possess, and make use of, not only 
weapons of mass destruction but also weapons of mass enlighten-
ment and confusion, from satellite television to the mobile telephone, 
but because of our superior semiotic freedom. While the semiotic 
freedom of a snake is limited by its sensory apparatus – it stops 
chasing a mouse when it can no longer sense it – a dog will be 
aware of the mouse’s existence even when the mouse is hiding in a 
heap of rotten leaves. A human, furthermore, will not only know of 
the mouse, but will also be capable of predicting the future growth 
of rodent populations. The difference is one of degree, but it makes 
a hell of a lot of difference. If evolution consists in the growth in 
semiotic freedom (a stimulating way of talking about complexity), 
then we, Homo sapiens, for the time being placed at the pinnacle of 
this process, are the only species capable of reducing the amount of 
semiotic freedom in the world, and we are well on our way to doing 
so. Only we can counteract the loss of flexibility created by 
ourselves, and biosemiotics can help us to see both the problems and 
the solutions more clearly. 
 
 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
SARA CANNIZZARO  
London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 
Biosemiotics is the name of an interdisciplinary scientific project that is 
based on the recognition that life is fundamentally grounded in semiotic 
processes. 1 
 
In the following passages, I intend to make a few annotations on the 
nature of the interdisciplinarity character that is claimed for bio-
semiotics in the above quote from Jesper Hoffmeyer. Inter-
disciplinary scholar J. T. Klein (1990: 43) explains that inter-
disciplinarity refers to integration, or the practice of borrowing from 
other disciplines. Following this definition, Hoffmeyer’s remark on 
the interdisciplinarity of biosemiotics appears to refer to the way in 
which this type of biology borrows concepts from semiotics. But 
there are two problems with this conception: (1) it does not specify 
which ‘version’ of semiotics is being borrowed, (2) it fails to 
recognize that biosemiotics also borrows from cybernetics and 
systems thinking. 
 As John Deely has shown, the community of semioticians that 
formed in 20th century owes its birth to Ferdinand de Saussure’ 
semiology. However, the coinage of the term semiotics, the term 
used in biosemiotics today, does not derive from the work of 
Saussure, but from the work of Tartu semiotician Juri Lotman 
(Deely 2010: 17). Lotman was inspired by Saussure’s idea of 
synchrony, yet “departed from Saussure in his choice of name for 
the new science [semiotics instead of semiology] by reason of a 
more informed historicity” (Deely 2010: 17). In fact, it is Lotman’s 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: an Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: Scranton University Press, p. 3. 
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historical model of culture, i.e., the semiosphere (1967), that has 
been borrowed from semiotics and integrated in biosemiotics 
through Hoffmeyer (1996: 59), Kull (1998) and Brier (2007: 392), 
among others, and not Saussure’s ahistorical view of language. Thus, 
to tackle problem (1): biosemiotics can be said to borrow mainly 
from Tartu semiotics rather than from Saussurean semiology. To 
tackle problem (2): it is important to underline the influences of 
Lotman’s work, in that these constitute also the ‘interdisciplinary’ 
influences of biosemiotics. These consist in his conceptualisation of 
both history and transdisciplinarity.  
 The historical character of Lotman’s semiosphere has a double 
derivation: Russian poetics and systems thinking. Russian scholars 
Jakobson and Tynjanov (1929) declared that “pure synchronism 
[systemicity] is an illusion. Every system has past and future as 
structural elements of the system” (2003 [1929]: 79). In other words, 
they claimed that a sound understanding of ‘systems’ (poetic 
systems in their case) requires both a synchronic and a diachronic 
level. It is fair to note that Lotman drew his historical conception of 
systems not just from Russian poetics but also from systems 
thinking, as elicited in the work on irreversible thermodynamics by 
Prigogine and Stengers (Winner 2002: 426). Lotman underlines how 
“[Prigogine and Stenger’s] work shed light on the general theory of 
dynamic processes and can fruitfully be applied to the study of 
history” (Lotman 2001: 232). In fact, Prigogine’s work contains the 
passage “from a geometrical view of the universe […] to a narrative 
expression of the universe […] from being to becoming” (Prigogine 
2000: 833). Arguably inspired by irreversible thermodynamics’ 
concept of history, Lotman conceives the semiosphere as system 
continuously organised through dialogue (Lotman 2001: 142) – and 
thus as a system inevitably described through the arrow of time. 
Thus, by admitting both synchrony (systemicity) and diachrony 
(historicity) as legitimate, intertwining parameters of systems 
analysis, Lotman caused a break from the a-historical structural 
tradition in semiology (which is instead characterised by a ‘pure’ 
synchronic conception of systems analysis). Synchrony plus 
diachrony, or Lotman’s ‘historical’ understanding of systems, has 
been extensively and productively borrowed by biosemiotics: 
evidence can be found in Hoffmeyer’s work on code duality (2008); 
in Sebeok’s work on the phylogeny of communications (1988), and 
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in Anderson and Merrell’s modelling of micro and macro evolution 
of living systems (1991). 
 An equally important feature that has been imported into 
biosemiotics through Lotman’s work is that of transdisciplinarity. 
This specific character, which pertains to the Tartu–Moscow school 
as a whole (see Randviir 2007), can be argued to derive from early 
work in cybernetics. 1940s Soviet academia, the environment in 
which Lotman pursued his studies in Russian literature, was 
strongly theory-oriented and was irritated by “the state's and the 
Party's infringements on the personal and corporate autonomy of 
academics” (Waldstein 2008: 17). Because of its closeness to the 
mathematical sciences, cybernetics appealed to Soviet scholars as an 
‘ideology-free’ language and as a successful model of applicability 
or trans-disciplinarity – a character that was assimilated into the 
‘Soviet Semiotics’ project (as in Lucid 1977) and ‘imported’ to 
Tartu through Lotman. Cybernetics was, in fact, conceived by 
Wiener (1951) as a meta-language capable of encompassing 
properties common to animal and machine – a view that has endured 
through the work of Ashby (1956), Bertalanffy (1968), Pask (1961), 
Beer (1959), Lovelock (1979), and to a certain extent (mainly 
through the concept of feedback), Bateson (1972), Maturana and 
Varela (1980), and Luhmann (1991). Therefore, in light of its 
versatility or ‘universality’, cybernetics is said to have favoured in 
Soviet academia the birth of semiotics as a science aimed at the 
study of “any sign system in human society” (Ivanov 1962: 3 cited 
in Waldstein 2008: 20). This recognition is important because: (a) it 
shows how cybernetics is, to an extent, the precursor of that version 
of semiotics that is currently, though largely implicitly, operative in 
biosemiotics, (b) it constitutes the basis of biosemiotics’ potential 
for transdisciplinarity: e.g., its impetus towards the study of bio-
logical systems in terms of semiotics, or the study of cultural 
systems in terms of biology. 
 Hence, it should now be clear how the nature of biosemiotics’ 
interdisciplinarity consists in more than just the integration of 
biology with an unspecified version of semiotics. The biosemiotic 
project, in fact, borrows at least as much from the transdisciplinary 
project of Tartu-Moscow semiotics (through Lotman) and from 
those enterprises that influenced it, such as Russian poetics, systems 
thinking/irreversible thermodynamics, and early cybernetics. This 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
172 SARA CANNIZZARO 
 
means that, going back to Hoffmeyer’s quote, biosemiotics can be 
considered as an interdisciplinary project, yet in light of its 
variegated ancestry it can also be considered as a project with great 
potential for transdisciplinarity – a recognition is anticipated, but not 
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INTERPRETANTS 
JOHN COLLIER  
University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa  
In the biological world, certainly, signs incite the generation of inter-
pretants in the form of actions which are future-oriented, inasmuch as 
living beings always seek signs for survival and for reproduction. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work is so rich, it is difficult to comment on bits 
in isolation. I believe, however, that I have a few words that might 
help to illuminate the quote above. Hoffmeyer (2008) takes a dis-
tinctly Peircean approach to semiotics both for exosemiotics and 
endosemiotics, so one must assume that he feels that the basic prin-
ciples are much the same. Indeed, he points out that the distinction 
between exo- and endo- in biology is not clear-cut (2008: 213ff). 
His view is in contrast to well-known arguments by Marcello 
Barbieri (e.g., 2008, 2009) that the two differ significantly, with 
endosemiotics being fully satisfied by codes, while exosemiotics 
requires interpretation. Codes do not have, in any obvious way, a 
requirement for a Peircean interpretant (Collier 2008a: 778ff). I 
therefore believe that Hoffmeyer has it right. 
However, I think the differences between Hoffmeyer’s and Bar-
bieri’s views can become obscured when we look primarily at the 
details of individual signs and sign systems. Peirce’s semiotics, 
however, allows for systems of signs in which one sign can serve as 
an icon for another sign, which then gives a further interpretant. In 
principle, this allows for a hierarchical network of signs, with inter-
pretation becoming more general as we move upwards.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 65. 
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To be more specific: a Peircean sign is an indecomposable triad 
of icon, object and interpretant. The icon is the “bare feel”, or pre-
sentation; the object is selected indexically, and the interpretant 
brings them together in a unified context. This triad can then form 
the presentation for a further triad that is more general, if not more 
abstract. There is no reason why several signs together cannot 
provide the presentation for a more general sign. It does seem, 
however, that this regress (or perhaps “recursion” would be a better 
term) must come to an end somewhere in some most general sign, 
with its interpretant being ultimate. 
This raises the question of ‘ultimate interpretants’ in biology – 
and I will try to illustrate with a couple of simple examples how 
looking at biological signs in this hierarchical way can illuminate 
the opening quote. Suppose we have smell A (icon) of something 
dangerous (interpretant), then it is incumbent to avoid (object). For 
good biological reasons, this sort of interpretation for immediate 
action uses very short chains, while chains related to long-term 
survival are typically longer. Here, then, is a slightly longer chain: 
Suppose we have smell B (icon) that indicates food (interpretant) 
that can be eaten (object). This itself is a sign (icon) that falls under 
survival (interpretant) indicating it should be accepted (object). 
Typically there will be longer chains both for the interpretant and, 
often, the icon. In particular, there will be many molecular and 
cellular processes in the two cases described that I have suppressed 
in these examples. These processes will also have semiotic proper-
ties, and these, too, can be integrated into the respective chains. 
Is survival just an accidental property of these cases, or is there 
something more general going on? I think the latter. Biological 
organisms are autonomous, and their functional components are 
functional just because they contribute to that autonomy (Collier 
2008b). The autonomy of organisms is exactly what constitutes their 
survival. Inasmuch as biosemiotic conditions are functional, and I 
think that they must be, then they will also contribute to survival 
(and reproduction). I suppose that there could be biosemiotic condi-
tions that don’t contribute to survival, but they are very likely to be 
weeded out by evolution, so they would be rare and temporary at 
best. 
I think, then, that it is safe to say that biological interpretants are 
functional, that functionality ultimately implies survival, and that 
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survival is the ‘ultimate interpretant’ for biological signs. ‘Future 
orientation’ itself is just a necessary part of functionality – and this, 
in turns, justifies the validity of Jesper’s opening quote. 
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 (…) even the fully developed linguistic universe of expressive sounds 
remains internally connected to those pre-linguistic expressive forms 
(…)  
Worded, vocal communication must have yielded an advantage 
upon our remote ancestors that body language could not possibly have 
mimed, and I tend to concur with Terry Deacon’s suggestion that this 
advantage has to do with the unique capacity of language to carry 
symbolic reference. 1 
 
The merit of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s pointing out the insufficiency of 
physico-chemical explanation for living systems and their origin is 
hard to overestimate. He points out that this insufficiency manifests 
itself even in the face of recent, very important, developments in 
physical theory that concern the phenomena of self-organization and 
emergence. As Hoffmeyer writes: “How‘it’s can possibly become 
‘I’s is the puzzle that must be explained – and not even dynamical 
systems theory does yet offer a solution to this puzzle. What is 
missing, I would argue, is the admission of a semiotic dimension of 
explanation” (2008:179). 
How very true. Only a living agent can uphold a continuous, 
adaptive relation with its environment, by increasing transmittable 
complexity. Yet it seems that there is one aspect in the semiotic 
function of living organisms that is underemphasized in Hoff-
meyer’s work. The lack of attention to this aspect is especially 
evident in the chapters on natural language: for “semiotic dimen-
sions of explanation” concern not only the behavior of an individual 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 274. 
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in the environment, but – just as importantly – the coordination of 
the same species of organisms in their joint relation to the environ-
ment.  
The ability of relatively independent individuals to form func-
tional systems is evident in countless living forms, and the semiotic 
processes that allow for such functional coordination span a wide 
range of complexity. My argument here is that human language, too, 
must be seen as one such process and system. A very special one, to 
be sure, but preserving continuity with other modes of purposeful 
coordination – and this is the fact that paves the way to its naturali-
zation. Such continuity is seen not only in the evolutionary succes-
sion of types of coordination systems, but also in the presence of the 
more basic forms, in coordination within the linguistic one.  
Hoffmeyer, agreeing with Sheets-Johnstone, traces the origin of 
language to a “diversity of corporeal forms of expressions and im-
pressions” and acknowledges the primacy of movement in its 
evolution and development (Hoffmeyer 2008: 275, 303–305). But 
one should note that in the case of our social species, the primacy of 
movement means the primacy of movement coordinated with others. 
One’s first experiences are not just moving and touching, but 
moving and touching in coordination with the movement of others. 
Archetypal corporeal-kinetic forms should thus be also understood 
as being social, as for the realization of many goals early in life, 
joint functionality is what matters.  
In Biosemiotics, this “primacy of we” in linguistic coordination 
is difficult to see, as language is mostly treated as a “tool for ex-
pression and reflection” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 274). Following Deacon 
(1997), the main revolution language brings is posited in terms of 
individual cognition: it enables a new way of referring – i.e., 
symbolic reference, rooted in iconic and indexical semiosis. How-
ever, it seems that the ‘meaningfulness’ of a semiotic relation cannot 
be reduced merely to referentiality: it concerns, instead, a coupling 
between the self and the environment, comprising other organisms – 
and in language, this temporal, synergetic symmetry relation is 
especially evident.  
Reference provision, obviously, is important – but it might be 
secondary to the coordinative role of language, for the synergy 
might be functional, might assume the form of action on the 
environment, but does not need to (as in phatic communication). 
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Rather, language allows us to engage in a participatory sense-
making process (De Jaegher, Di Paolo 2007; Cowley 2004; 
Favareau 2008) in which the role of referentiality is far from 
obvious (Rączaszek-Leonardi, Cowley 2011). How, if at all, the 
‘aboutness’ of coordination translates into symbolic reference 
remains a challenging question – and one that, just as Jesper 




Cowley, Stephen J. 2004. Contextualizing bodies: How human responsi-
veness constrains distributed cognition. Language Sciences 26: 565–
591.  
De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel 2007. Participatory Sense-Making: 
An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 6(4): 485–507. 
Deacon, Terrence 1997. The Symbolic Species. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Favareau, Donald 2008. Collapsing the wave function of meaning. In: 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper (ed.), A Legacy of Living Systems: Gregory Bateson 
as a Precursor to Biosemiotics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Rączaszek-Leonardi, Joanna; Cowley, Stephen J. (in preparation). 
Controlled collectivity.  
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PRISCA AUGUSTYN 
Florida Atlantic University, United States of America 
Scholarship is worth no more than the foundation on which it is built, 
and anyone who does not pay some heed, at regular intervals, to the 
foundations of their scholarship, is not much of a scholar. 1 
 
The above quote from Jesper Hoffmeyer’s Signs of Meaning in the 
Universe (1996) sets high standards that very few academics can 
live up to. To question the foundations of biology, Hoffmeyer first 
turned to philosophy – and then energized the ‘biosemiotic move-
ment’ to the benefit of those who are willing to test the foundations 
of their own disciplines for a better understanding of life as semiosis.  
Hoffmeyer has just enough irreverence for what his colleague 
Emmeche once called disciplinary promiscuity – but he also has the 
integrity to turn such polymathism into solid arguments. Moreover, 
he always writes with elegance and confidence, but also with hu-
mility. And only Jesper Hoffmeyer can illustrate concepts like 
semiotic causation, semiotic emergence, and semiotic scaffolding in 
evolution with the movement of an Escherichia coli cell, a repro-
ductive disorder in amphibians, and the development of the word 
‘spam’ in English, respectively. 
It was this perfect balance of irreverence for disciplinary boun-
daries and scholarly integrity that made the musings about language 
by a molecular biologist attractive to a linguist who sees her 
expertise in linguistics as just one domain of semiotics among many. 
Hoffmeyer tears down, again and again, the illusion of a distinction 
between nature and culture, the constructs of the scientific and 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 131.  
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humanistic perspectives, and the boundaries between the institutio-
nalized disciplines we have to live in. And, like biology, linguistics 
suffers from the same oppressive structures that reward the gene-
ration of academic capital, rather than addressing the big questions 
that have been unanswered since the 17th century and even earlier.  
At a time when linguists are calling out for substantial inter-
disciplinary cooperation, however, Hoffmeyer’s scholarship has 
regrettably bypassed biolinguistics, another movement looking for 
an alternative to “many currently popular models and metaphors for 
understanding genes, brain and language [that] need to be aban-
doned if [we] hope to make any substantial progress” (Fitch 2009: 
286). 
It is interesting that Hoffmeyer rejects Chomsky and prefers 
Bruner on the issue of language development. (Hoffmeyer 2008: 
272) As one of the biosemiotic movement’s most prolific and 
formidable articulators, it is an enormous loss that he rejects an 
intellectual movement that shares such deep foundational philo-
sophical parallels, and whose progress depends on much of the same 
issues and challenges as do his own efforts in biology and bio-
semiotics. (cf. Augustyn 2009) 
For what distinguishes Bruner from Chomsky is the fact that 
Bruner conducted empirical research on mother-infant communi-
cation in order to gain a better understanding of language acqui-
sition, while Chomsky has been promoting, for over half a century, 
the three factors that constitute the human language faculty as being: 
(1) the genetic endowment, (2) organism-environment interaction 
(i.e., our species-specific umwelt) and (3) the abstract principles that 
are not specific to the faculty of language. (e.g., Chomsky 2005) To 
say that Bruner has the better theory of language development, 
simply because he chose to study mothers and infants in their homes, 
is like accusing Chomsky of not focusing on what he deliberately 
chose not to focus on. 
Moreover, while the empirical studies of mother-infant inter-
action in the homes of North American families in the early 1980s 
are bound to have outcomes that are relevant only for urban middle-
class families in the West, the abstract principles of human language 
studied by biolinguists are not subject to any cultural bias because 
they belong to a research agenda that remains on the level of 
comparative psychology. To refuse to engage with what Chomsky 
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has focused on, because of what he has chosen not to focus on (even 
though he never disputed its importance) is like criticizing a pianist 
for never playing the violin. 
Linguists attending the biosemiotic Gatherings conferences 
always run the risk of being perceived as naïve or uninformed about 
the many layers of language and communication that the inadequate 
abstractions in the field of linguistics cannot address. But good 
pianists can appreciate the violin even if they choose not to play it 
themselves! 
Hoffmeyer should therefore be foremost among the: “linguists 
and biologists, along with researchers in the relevant branches of 
psychology and anthropology, [who] can move beyond unproduc-
tive theoretical debate to a more collaborative, empirically focused 
and comparative research program aimed at uncovering both shared 
(homologous or analogous) and unique components of the faculty of 
language” (Hauser et al. 2002: 298). 
Each field needs critics like Hoffmeyer in order to evolve – 
while mainstream academics simply do what benefits their careers 
and funds their research projects by perpetuating the dominant theo-
retical paradigms, power structures, and methods without ques-
tioning them. Imagine the possibilities should Jesper Hoffmeyer turn 
his attention again to the big questions about language by exploring 
the foundations of biolinguistics (e.g. Jenkins 2000). 
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THIERRY BARDINI  
Université de Montréal, Canada 
Biology is immature biosemiotics. 1 
 
First, let me start by saying that I am very happy to participate in 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s tombeau. I draw this word from the French 
musical lexicon, where it refers to a composition made to pay 
homage to an illustrious person, colleague, master or friend, alive or 
dead (and often alive, in fact). I am very happy to participate 
because I like Jesper Hoffmeyer quite a lot. In fact, he figures inside 
my pantheon of preferred biologists, along with Kalevi Kull, Lynn 
Margulis, Barbara McClintock, Roy Britten, and some other daring 
theorists. One particular reason why I like him so much is that he is 
not afraid of metaphors. Very early, he and Claus Emmeche even 
introduced Biosemiotics as a metaphor and famously stated that 
“metaphors may be of considerable value, not only heuristically, but 
in order to comprehend the irreducible nature of living organisms” 
(Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991: 1). No dismissive talk of “mere meta-
phor” for this biologist then; I even suspect him to adhere to the 
wisdom inherent in a great pun from one of his keenest influences: 
“A man’s reach should exceed his grasp, or what’s a meta for?” 2 
And like Hoffmeyer, I happen to like Gregory Bateson a lot, as 
well. In fact, it was my inspiration by Bateson that led me to travel 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2009. Biology is immature biosemiotics. In: Deely, John; 
Sbrocchi, Leonard G. (eds.), Semiotics 2008: Specialization, Semiosis, Semio-
tics. Ottawa: Legas, 927–942. 
2   Although Bateson does not claim the paternity of this statement, but rather 
refers to it as “the misquotation [of Robert Browning's ‘Grammarian's Funeral’] 
that is going the rounds today” (Bateson 1991: 224). 
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to Copenhagen in May of 2001 for the first Gatherings in Bio-
semiotics, which Jesper so wonderfully, modestly and humanly, 
hosted. For modest in person, that he is – but wonderful too, since 
his reach seems to attempt to grasp some of the most mindboggling 
issues that standard biological theory (under the guise of the mole-
cular evolutionary synthesis) has left us with; i.e. (and due to lack of 
space, let me brutal): genetic information as a metaphor, the central 
dogma as...well, just that: a dogma. In the face of such under-theo-
rized assumptions, the question of information – as well as the re-
lated questions of function, teleology and “natural intentionality” – 
seem to have been organizing themes, and even recurring obsessions, 
in Hoffmeyer’s work. And so too is the question of semiotic 
freedom.  
 In 1996, Hoffmeyer had already written that: “the most pro-
nounced feature of organic evolution is [...] the general expansion of 
semiotic freedom, that is to say the increase in richness or ‘depth’ of 
meaning that can be communicated” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 61) adding 
an end-note that refers to a paper of his that had already made the 
same prescient point (Hoffmeyer 1992). He further wrote that to call 
this increase in richness or depth “freedom” was a difficult choice, 
since “freedom is [...] rather an ambiguous word” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 
62). Yet in his more recent publications, this notion returns regularly, 
and has been progressively developed and strengthened.  
 In 2008, in a section entitled “A minded nature”, Hoffmeyer 
describes the progressive evolution of semiotic freedom as its 
propensity towards individuation: “In invertebrates quite generally, I 
assume [s]emiotic freedom is still very limited and should not be 
seen as property of single individuals but rather as a property of the 
species or the evolutionary lineage [...] at later stages of evolution, 
semiotic freedom becomes increasingly individualized” (Hoffmeyer 
2008: 40). In other words, the individuation of semiotic freedom 
seems to lead to its individualization, once it has passed an evolu-
tionary threshold, probably somewhere near “the much celebrated 
transition from a reptilian world to a mammalian and avian world” 
(ibid.). 
 In an even more recent contribution, Hoffmeyer again discusses 
semiotic freedom, this time in the more Peircean sense of “an in-
creased capacity for responding to a variety of signs through the 
formation of (locally) ‘meaningful’ interpretants” (Hoffmeyer 2010: 
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190). The re-apparition of inverted commas around the word 
“meaningful”, however, might signify the return of the metaphor – 
and this impression is even further reinforced by a note stating that 
when he wrote previously that “when a bacterial cell finds itself in a 
gradient of nutrients and swims right instead of left, the cell is 
making a choice” he was “using teleological language. The idea is 
not, of course, that the bacterium makes a conscious choice” 
(Hoffmeyer 2010: 194). “Of course”, it seems, because according to 
Hoffmeyer, the individuation of semiotic freedom cannot possibly 
have yet reached the individualizing threshold in bacteria, and can 
thus be spoken of only metaphorically. And it is exactly here where 
I must part ways with him, in asking: Why not? 3  
 If biology can indeed be considered “immature”, it might be 
because it appears quite often unable to control its own metaphors – 
which characterize probably the highest degree semiotic freedom 
has reached since life has started evolving on Earth. Biosemiotics, 
as Jesper Hoffmeyer has demonstrated, offers a further possible step 
in this evolution ... to the extent that it will discuss, improve and 
eventually get rid of its own metaphors, and transform them into 
theory and/or established facts.  
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NATHAN HOUSER 
Indiana University at Indianapolis, United States of America 
Peirce [...] claimed that the law of mind amounted to the tendency of 
nature to form habits. By viewing this fundamental semiosis – for a 
habit is the general form of an interpretant – as the innermost property 
of the universe, he worked out a cosmology in which the individual life 
and the individual consciousness appeared as evolutionary concreti-
zations of a more general propensity of the universe. [...] Thus, the 
realization of Peircean cosmology in the form of modern biosemiotics 
becomes a lever for the repositioning of the human being as a part of 
nature. [...] Human mind is not, then, an alien element in the universe – 
but rather, an instantiation of evolutionary trends that penetrate the life 
sphere and that (I suspect) is deeply rooted in the general dynamics of 
the universe. 1 
 
The Peircean solution to the puzzle of the origin of individual life 
and consciousness in the primordial cauldron that brought forth, by 
evolutionary development, the universe in its entirety (including its 
laws), provides what might be said to be the metaphysical context 
for Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics – a naturalistic context that situates 
semiosis and life squarely in the natural world we inhabit. This is a 
compelling stance, which I applaud, and Hoffmeyer has devoted his 
distinguished career to developing this biosemiotic naturalism. He 
does not profess to be a cosmologist, nor, for that matter, a Peirce 
scholar, but at least since 1993, with the appearance of his En snegl 
påvejen: Om betydningens naturhistorie,2 he has championed a Peir-
cean cosmology as an alternative to that advanced by the prevailing 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 320. 
2   Published in English translation as Signs of Meaning in the Universe 
(1996).  
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deterministic science, which dismisses out of hand the idea of 
semiotic (i.e., final) causation, and smothers all aspirations to free-
dom under a blanket of unyielding natural law. 
 I believe the rough Peircean outline Hoffmeyer gives of the em-
beddedness of life and consciousness in nature is correct – and that, 
just as he maintains, there is a crucial link between biological life 
and the tendency of nature to form habits, just as there is a link 
between human freedom and the indeterminacy of the original chaos. 
But as Hoffmeyer himself points out, Peirce’s cosmology is not 
well-understood (1996: 39–40), in part because it runs against the 
grain of the dominant scientific paradigm, but probably also because 
Peirce himself never reached a finished account. The most inte-
resting problem from the standpoint of biosemiotics, at least as I see 
it, is the question of the emergence of semiosis – but there are other 
challenges as well. I do not suppose that a critical look at some un-
settled questions about Peirce’s cosmology would have any un-
settling consequences for Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics, but it might 
bring some of both men’s views into sharper focus. 
 According to Peirce, natural laws are products of an ongoing 
evolution and their emergence results from the tendency of nature to 
form habits. In the quotation above, Hoffmeyer identifies this natu-
ral tendency to form habits with a fundamental semiosis because, he 
says, “a habit is the general form of an interpretant” (2008: 302). 
This is an attractive idea, which is supported by Peirce’s conception 
of mind as fundamentally semiotic, in conjunction with his objective 
idealism, the doctrine that matter is effete mind. It must be noted, 
too, that Peirce understood “the law of mind” to be “the law of habit 
taking” (Peirce 1898: 241) just as Hoffmeyer does. But, to be clear, 
taken together these views equate the origination of semiosis (sign 
action) with the origination of habit and, therefore, would seem to 
imply that every law is a semiotic outcome, and thus a law of mind.  
 How can this be reconciled with the key distinction Peirce makes 
between physical and mental laws – namely, that physical (at least 
what he calls mechanical) laws demand rigid obedience, while 
mental laws necessarily do not? Is the answer simply that mind 
evolves into matter – i.e, that mental (semiotic) law grows (or 
ossifies) into physical law as the underlying regularities (habits) 
become more and more fixed (which is to say: evolved)? Yet how 
could ‘mind’ function prior to the emergence of matter, which is 
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necessary for efficient causation, since, as Peirce pointed out: “law, 
without force to carry it out, would be a court without a sheriff; and 
all its dicta would be vaporings” (Peirce 1902: 92, para. 212). As a 
further complication, note that some biosemioticians, perhaps 
beginning with Thomas Sebeok, regard the emergence of semiosis 
to be virtually synonymous with the emergence of life. This would 
seem to imply that every evolved natural law is not only a law of 
mind, but is also a biological law – and that the distinction between 
physical-chemical habits and biological habits is moot. 
 Finally, can something more be said about “habit formation” 
beyond the claim that it is an original tendency in nature? Of course 
Hoffmeyer’s research has contributed a great deal to our under-
standing of the role of habits (and forgetfulness!) in biology, but 
what I have in mind is the underlying cosmological context for the 
grounding of biosemiotics. Frankly, I don’t have a satisfactory 
answer for my own question, but I am inclined to view Peirce’s 
neglected agapasm, which he sometimes described as evolution by 
force of habit or as evolution governed by the law of love (Peirce 
1892), as a possible key to understanding his account of what Hoff-
meyer calls in the quote above “the general dynamics of the 
universe”. Peirce’s law of love is based on a principle of attraction 
or sympathy that might well be fundamental for habit formation – at 
least at the level of cultural evolution, but perhaps also in the 
biological realm. 
 I do not raise these concerns or make these observations as 
objections to Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics; I admire his work and 
recognize how influential he has been in bringing Peircean semiotic 
theory to bear on biology. But as Peirce’s still-disputed cosmology 
comes to be better understood,3 I would not be surprised if, through 
it, we learn more that is of importance for biosemiotics. Never-
theless, I am confident that the inspiration Hoffmeyer has found in 
Peirce has led him to a sound and profound understanding of the 
continuity that runs throughout nature – a continuity well expressed 
in the conclusion to the opening quotation: “Human mind is not, 
then, an alien element in the universe – but rather, an instantiation of 
evolutionary trends that penetrate the life sphere and that (I suspect) 
——————— 
3   For two recent contributions to the ongoing debate about Peirce’s 
cosmology, see Short (2010) and Forster (2011: Ch. 9, 10). 
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MYRDENE ANDERSON  
Purdue University, United States of America 
OMverden: tidsskrift for liv og kultur 1 
 
Once upon a time, in a distant Queendom called Flatland – also 
known as Sign of Danes since the Fe Era – there lived a Gentle-
person from the fen where Mendelayev overlaps with Mendel, and 
slides into the quicksand of Darwin. The Fe Era also manifested in 
the Fe Space of the Flat Periodic Table. Consequently, it was all but 
Ordained that this Gentleperson of Flatland, abetted by a Swarm of 
Conspecifics, should produce a Periodical – fat rather than flat – at 
the onset of the year 1990 CE.  
Braiding together the Semiotic issues distinguishing, fusing, and 
confusing the hypothetical Two Cultures, this Periodical privileged 
the Tongue of Flatland, but otherwise indiscriminately drew on the 
Significant Ideas fueling the revolution of the Globe itself. Fresh 
names and genres marinated with those from the never-fully-
digested Past, all arguments between Push and Pull tilting synergis-
tically to promises of Futures. With an ear to the fens, one can still 
pick up the wails from those days when said Periodical succumbed 
to unknown causes at the end of the year 1991 CE. 
The Periodical, of course, is OMverden, and the Gentleperson, 
delightfully still with us, could be none other than Shape-Shifter 
Jesper Hoffmeyer. In fact, the kaleidoscopic OMverden itself shifted 
shape between newspaper, magazine, and journal, even as it kept to 
——————— 
1   OMverden: tidsskrift for liv og kultur. [The World Around Us: A Magazine 
for Life and Culture]. 1990–1991. (8 numbers in two volumes, commencing 
with April 1990 and concluding with December 1991.) Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
Editor. Copenhagen: Rosinante/Munksgaard. 
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its quarterly step. Then, even more transformations danced through 
the syntheses drawn from the juxtaposition of the Two-plus-or-
minus-seven Cultures and even more Translated Tongues poking 
through the pages of OMverden. It is fair to claim that Shape-Shifter 
Hoffmeyer’s touch turned inside-out and up-side-down, and then 
Oxidized, conventional notions of Art, Craft, and Science – to 
become forever Semioticized Rust, OM. 
How appropriate that the prepositions probed by Viggo Brøndal 
for the Tongue of Flatland should include /om/, slipping from “in, 
around, about ...” all the way to “a sound of itself” in the Tongue of 
Sanskrit. And /verden/ by itself means “world”, but /omverden/ 
ratchets up to signify not just “around/about the world”, but more 
specifically “environment” – as the “Umwelt” in another not-distant 
tribal language. 
Collective distress at OMverden's demise was made more acute 
recalling other too-brief adventures in publishing: The Sciences 
(1961–2001), organ of the New York Academy of Sciences; 
CoEvolution Quarterly (1974–1985), blossoming from Stewart 
Brand's Whole Earth Catalogue (1968–1972); and later the Whole 
Earth Review (1985–1997). Gentleperson Shape-Shifter Oxidant 
Hoffmeyer's OMverden, like other semiotic Distillations, now 
sweeter through nostalgia, whets rather than sates the Itching Thirst 
inspiring them. The Gentleperson Hoffmeyer’s Itch continues to 
virally spiral, rippling from Flatland to the OuterSphere, addicting 
All to Scratch and Sniff at the ever-emerging Sign of OM. 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
PANPSYCHISM 
JOHN PICKERING 
Warwick University, United Kingdom 
[...] I don't like the idea that consciousness should be present in atoms 
[...] I like to see semiosis as an emergent phenomenon, where the 
increase in semiotic freedom is indeed the one most conspicuous fact we 
have about organic evolution. 1 
[...] we follow Sebeok (1979) in defining the emergence of life as the 
threshold for the semiosphere. 2 
 
Here it will be proposed that in the quotations above, there is 
implied a discontinuity that does not exist, and a contradiction that 
can be resolved by adopting a form of panpsychism – and that doing 
so will extend the inspiring work of Jesper Hoffmeyer that has 
helped make biosemiotics a major scientific and philosophical 
project. 
The contradiction is revealed by the phrase ‘emergent pheno-
menon’. Emergence is an idea that divides opinion. For some, it 
represents a light at the end of a reductive tunnel. For others, it is a 
promissory note that delivers little or nothing. Here it will be treated 
as an important conceptual tool, but not one to use as a faux 
explanation for something that has not really been explained.  
Now, if evolution is accompanied by an increase in semiotic 
freedom, there must have been some there to start with, however 
little. To think otherwise breaks the rule, observed since the time of 
Parmenides, of ex nihilo nihil fit. That is, “nothing comes from 
nothing” – an ontological truism that continues to be observed in, 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper c.2002. Personal communication (email exchange). 
2   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs, Scranton: University of Scranton Press, p. 5, fn. 3. 
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for example, conservation laws. Since nature is a causal continuum, 
to impose arbitrary discontinuities is unhelpful. As David Bohm has 
suggested, semiosis occurs to a greater or lesser extent at all levels 
of the natural and human-made world, but “greater or lesser” means 
a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one (see figure 5.3 in 
Bohm 1987). 
This is panpsychism, but it is not a claim that “consciousness 
should be present in atoms.” It is a process view of the world, 
similar to that of A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947). What we take to be 
‘merely’ mechanistic interactions are better seen as the interplay of 
structured causes with structured effects – that is, semiosis. From a 
process point of view, all phenomena, from the sub-atomic through 
the everyday world to prodigious cosmological happenings, reflect 
continual and continuous dynamic interchange. As Whitehead put it: 
“we should reject the notion of idle wheels in the process of Nature” 
(1938a: 214). 
However, as we encounter the world, our commonsense attitude 
is to think of it as made up of separable things, allowing us to go 
about our daily affairs effectively. Science has extended this attitude 
from things which we do encounter to things which we don’t and 
treats the world as thing-like at all scales, from the very big to the 
very small and everything in between. This surmise has a lineage 
that reaches back to Democritus. As the success of science and 
technology in the last four hundred years shows, it is a reliable 
means to discover fundamental ways to manipulate the world.  
But a process view of the world offers a complementary attitude. 
This is to treat ‘things’ as abstractions from what are, in fact, 
processes. This attitude too, has a long Western lineage, conven-
tionally beginning with Heraclitus. More recent examples are 
Whitehead’s organic metaphysics and C. S. Peirce’s view of se-
miosis as a dynamic network which allows nature to develop habits.  
Adopting this attitude does not directly change how we manage 
our encounter with the world. We still act on the basis of the 
classical view, in the short term at least. In the longer term, though, 
it profoundly changes our understanding of that action. If our 
actions and what they act upon are not actually what we think they 
are, they are, eventually, more likely to be harmful, especially action 
en masse. The damage presently being inflicted on the biosphere 
shows this all too clearly. 
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Science and technology are out of control, not only because of 
political and economic forces but also because of fundamental 
limitations to the worldview on which they are based. If we treat the 
world as if it were merely an inert collection of things, the patients 
of our actions, we place ourselves in a privileged but dangerously 
isolated position. If, instead, we treat the world as a web of organic 
processes, then it becomes easier to realise that our actions are 
harmful if they are not in harmony with it.  
The modern scientific worldview has served us well but its 
dangers are now becoming apparent. Trying to understand the world 
by reducing it to mere matter in motion will give us only limited 
understanding. Recent developments, particularly in the life sciences, 
are driving a fundamental re-appraisal of this reductive stance. 
Advances in genetics have shown that development and evolution 
must be treated together. The autopoietic theory of Maturana and 
Varela, allied with Margulis and Sagan’s (2002) symbiogenetics, 
both show how living organisation arises and is sustained by a 
continuous network of semiotic exchange.  
The underlying movement here is towards Whitehead’s surmise 
that: “when you push your observations beyond the presuppositions 
on which they rest [...]. Any division, including some activities and 
excluding others, also severs the patterns of process which extend 
beyond all boundaries [...] connectedness is the essence of all things 
of all types” (1938b: 21) Gilles Deleuze (2006) makes extensive use 
of Whitehead in encouraging us to think of philosophy less as a way 
of describing how the world and more as a means to continually 
rupture and reform our intellectual resources. This benign 
intellectual anarchy will help to repair the damage being done by a 
worldview based on the imposition of boundaries where there are 
none. The limitation of the modern scientific worldview reflects just 
this inability to think about the processes which span conventional 
boundaries. This is the “arbitrary discontinuity” noted above.  
Removing the threshold inserted between what we call organic 
and inorganic phenomena is panpsychism, and it is based on reason, 
not mysticism. Doing so will enrich biosemiotics and place it within 
a necessary ethical framework. It will allow us to see, as theologian 
Abraham Heschel has recently put it, that: “The good does not begin 
in the consciousness of man. It is being realised in the natural 
cooperation of all beings, in what they are for each other. Neither 
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stars nor stones, neither atoms nor waves, but their belonging 
together, their interaction, the relation of all things to one another 
constitutes the universe. No cell could exist alone, all bodies are 
interdependent, affect and serve one another” (Heschel 1976: 121). 
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Thus semiotic freedom is an emergent property and should always 
be analyzed in relation to its proper level. 
[…] 
We shall suggest the term interpretance as the measure of the 
capacity of a system to respond to signs through the formation of 
meaningful interpretants. High interpretance allows a system to 
“read” many sorts of cues in the surroundings; such high-level 
interpretance means that the system will form interpretants in 
response to complex cues that might not be noticed…by low-level 
agents. 
[…] 
All this indicates that there is an aspect of play in the evolutionary 
process...which has been more or less overshadowed…by the 
Cyclopsian focus on selection… “What is characteristic of ‘play’”, 
writes Gregory Bateson “is that this is a name for contexts in which 
the constituent acts have a different sort of relevance or organi-
zation from that which they would have had in non-play”. Bateson 
also suggests the definition of play as “the establishment and 
exploration of relationship” […]. Thus, to the extent that the living 
world is engaged in an open-ended and nonsettled exploration of 
relationships between systems …it can truly be said that nature does, 
in fact, exhibit play-like behavior. It therefore will be as legitimate 
to talk about natural play as a force in the evolution of life-forms, as 
it is to talk about natural selection. Selection acts to settle things… 
thereby putting an end to some element of ongoing play in the 
system while simultaneously providing for the beginning of whole 
new kinds of play.1 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008a. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 
pp. 196–197. 
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There are very many places in Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work where I 
have been brought up short with thought-provoked pleasure: his 
discussion of the central importance of membranes (and skin and 
brain originating from the same germ material) in Biosemiotics, for 
instance, (2008a: 17) and his various discussions of intentionality 
and mind as systemic in biocybernetic, recursive organisation. But 
the things which stand out for me, as a teacher of literature and 
culture, are two. The first is the reference to Gregory Bateson’s 
claim about the reality of biological ‘stories’ in the Introduction to A 
Legacy For Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Bio-
semiotics (Hoffmeyer 2008b: 2). The second is the idea of ‘play-like 
behaviour’ in the chapter from Biosemiotics quoted above. These 
two things (stories and play) seem clearly related. I discuss this 
below with reference to Roman Jakobson’s model of (poetic) 
language (Jakobson 1960). The point I derive is that the develop-
ment of literary meanings in narratives – which readers must play 
with to discover – imitates the processes of natural evolution. In a 
reworking of Jakobson’s schema, I suggest that the paradigmatic 
patterns which are selected (thus forming the genre of a story) are, 
themselves, the subject of playful recombination in and from new 
contexts, thus providing new articulations of patterns for selection. 
Terrence Deacon writes “I believe that the experience of being alive 
and sentient is what it feels like to be evolution” (Deacon, 2002: 
153). Living systems, we might say, are their own creative readers. 
 Thinking about the growth of meaning in literature, one can use 
Jakobson’s model of the two axes of association: the vertical axis of 
paradigmatic (i.e. metaphoric) association and potential substitution 
via similarity, and the horizontal axis of association via metonymic 
contiguity. Jakobson expressed this in his formula (in regard to the 
poetic function – although it surely goes wider) that the relation 
between the two axes consists in the projection of the principle of 
equivalence from the axis of selection to the axis of combination 
(1960: 358). But, as Terence S. Turner argues (1977), a persistent 
narrative (metonymical) association repeated over time hints at 
metonymy’s metaphoric potential and constitutes the patterned basis 
for metaphoric substitution.  
Thus, we need not say that Jakobson’s two axes are wrong, but 
that they are more closely interrelated such that “the universe of 
relations comprising the narrative as a whole [is transformed] into a 
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set of dynamic principles with the power to generate and control the 
order manifested by that universe: in a word, to reproduce itself” in 
narrative time (1977: 141–142). Jakobson is associated with Structu-
ralism (i.e. the attempt to identify structures of meaning-production); 
but it is clear that what his axes actually model is not static structure 
but, rather, the evolution of structuration both as form and as formal 
semiotic constraint (or cause). In literary analyses, we recognise 
these things as the formation (via paradigmatic choices and their 
combination) of choices which both structure and determine specific 
discourses, or genres, in culture, and also develop (final cause) 
constraints on interpretation in narratives. Nonetheless, and while 
formal and final causes put limits on semiotic freedom of inter-
pretance by ‘low-level agents’ (individual ‘cells’ of meaning or 
metaphor/metonym organisation), at the higher level of narrative/ 
story (‘multicellular’) organisation they make complex ‘high-level’ 
interpretants of natural and cultural ‘surroundings’ both possible and 
evolutionarily useful (i.e. meaningful).  
As Turner argues, repeated pattern of paradigmatic structure at a 
‘higher’ narrative level “is really a syntactic or combinatorial 
device” such that “the principle of combination is reciprocally 
projected onto the axis of selection” (1977: 145). Far from being 
mutually exclusive, there is a creative and complementary tension 
between the two axes. In ‘Dante . . . Bruno . Vico . . Joyce’, Samuel 
Beckett gives an example of the evolution of language via both 
kinds of association in the Latin word for ‘law’ (lex): 
 
1 Lex = Crop of acorns. 
2 Ilex = Tree that produces acorns [the Quercus ilex: 
Holm oak or Holly oak]. 
3 Legere = To gather [acorns or people for a village meet 
under an oak tree]. 
4 Aquilex = He that gathers the waters. 
5 Lex = Gathering together of peoples, public assembly. 
6 Lex = Law. 
7 Legere = To gather together letters into a word, to read. 
The root of any word whatsoever can be traced back to 
some pre-lingual symbol. (1976: 114–5) 
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A visual representation of this process looks strikingly like the 
growth of a complex multicellular organism. 
It is surely right to say that biological, as well as aesthetic, life is 
made of stories. Just as a reader plays with resonant patterns in order 
to discover (recursively and in narrative time) the growth of poetic 
meanings, so evolutionary life – on the basis of a primordial 
difference initiated by the coming into being of a membrane – plays 
with patterns of similarity and difference metonymically encoded, 
recursively informed and shifting (as Denis Noble (2006: 104) puts 
it) “from one metaphor to another”. As Laura Shintani has noted, 
Jakobson was fully aware of the correspondences between the 
genetic code and encoding in language. As she writes, in his review 
of Francois Jacob’s The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity, 
“Jakobson introduces the idea that the linguistic model can be in 
some respects mapped on to the problem of molecular heredity […]. 
‘Biologists and linguists as well have observed an impressive set of 
attributes common to life and language since their consecutive 
emergence. […] The makeup of the two codes – the genetic one, 
discovered and deciphered by molecular biology in our time, and the 
verbal one, scrutinized by several generations of linguists – has 
displayed a series of noticeable analogies’” (Shintani 1999: 9–10). 
“Selection”, as Hoffmeyer writes in the main quote, above, “acts 
to settle things”. But combination, allowing the possibility of new 
metaphors emergent from the evolution of hierarchically nested 
meanings, provides “for the beginning of whole new kinds of play”. 
Such abductions, as Bateson drawing on Peirce observed, are the 
basis of creative evolution in biology and in human culture. In 
introducing the idea of natural play and stories, alongside natural 
selection, Hoffmeyer (and biosemiotics) reminds us of the 
‘necessary unity’ between mind and nature, and of the living nature 
of the patterns which connect them (Bateson 2002). 
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GÖRAN DAHL 
EXPO Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden 
The term ‘information” has become nearly omnipresent in modern 
biology (or medicine). 1 
 
Information is a condition for everything and I, too, believe that it is 
omnipresent. So, I think that Jesper Hoffmeyer has made an im-
portant point above, which I agree with 90%: “information” as a 
concept (and/or image/illusion in Jaqcues Lacan’s sense) is used, or 
misused, in so many contexts. My problematique (a French word, 
which I use here in the same way as the French Epistimeologists and 
structuralists – e.g., Gaston Bachelard, Lacan, Louis Althusser – do), 
then, will be to discuss how other perspectives can enrich the 
perspective of Jesper Hoffmeyer. 
As a philosopher (and a Dr. and Professor in Sociology) I refer 
often to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode. I would 
like to call it a manual of understanding the riddle of Hamlet – “To 
be or not to Be, that is the question” – that, as such, stands as one of 
the most important works of the 20th century. “The greatest pre-
judice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice of abolishing preju-
dices” (1989: 329–340) writes Gadamer. And in this, his Magnum 
Opus, he tries to expose the ontological character of the individual’s 
understanding and the world.  
Between you and I something happens: this is dialogue. We try 
to understand others, things, texts, objects of art. Our horizon is 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 185). 
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determined by the place and point of time from where we are and 
when we exist. In this dialogue, something happens, we gain new 
knowledge – a “fusions of horizons” occurs. This is a kind of wise 
(not “essential”) information about the ontological status of 
Verstehen (understanding). Thus, Being is homological to Tradition. 
And understanding this his has consequences for our understanding 
of conflicts (Feuds, Streit) and/or consensus. 
However, there is one, as I see it, minor problem with Gadamer: 
For a conservative thinker like him, Tradition can make it difficult 
to legitimize Critique and Pure Reason. I think that we thus also 
have to make some room for Sigmund Freud’s notion of Deutung (a 
word hard to translate, it is closer to “decoding” than to “inter-
pretation”) and Karl Mannheim’s notion of Dokumentarsinn (Docu-
mentary meaning) when discussing what has been deemed to be, 
and pretends to be, Information. For as Anthony Wilden – along 
with Jesper Hoffmeyer – has reminded us, information is both 
analog (a continuum movement) and digital (binary oppositions and 
differences). 
There is, however one problem: old intellectuals (like me) run 
the risk of becoming “hyper-reflexive” (see Saas on this kind of 
“disorder” and the problems it creates, and is caused by). So we 
have to try to stay sane, by maybe using meditation and under-
standing spirituality. (This is not a command – only friendly advice, 
Jesper!) My conclusion would then be that information should be 
complemented by the experience of quietness and harmony. 
Too, if we remember what Zygmunt Bauman wrote in 1978, we 
can probably improve our understanding of “understanding”. In the 
book Hermeneutics and Social Science, Bauman discusses Wilhelm 
Dilthey, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and writes 
that: “Dilthey […] never ceased to be fascinated by the ideal of 
objective understanding of history” (Bauman 1978: 170). And what 
I take this to mean in that our understanding is not historical in 
itself – and that this, too, then, is a kind of objectivism.  
And as with all forms of objectivism, the ground remains shaky. 
Martin Heidegger postulates that there is no understanding outside 
history: “Understanding is tradition engaged in an endless conver-
sation with itself and its own recapitulation. Understanding is the 
modality of existence” (ibid.). Is this Hoffmeyerean “information”? 
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In Gadamer’s own words: “Where there is real language, the 
thing to be designated is not known prior to the act of designation. 
Rather, within our language relationship to world, that which is 
spoken of is itself first articulated through language’s constitutive 
structuring of our being in the world” (1976: 115). 
In the words of Ingrid Scheibler (2000), Gadamer is situated 
“between Heidegger and 
Habermas”. If we incorporate the ides of George Herbert Mead – 
who made the relation and distinction between “I” and “me” well-
known – we may arrive at the form of a model for “information” 
that looks like this: 
 
I/me–––––––––––––– Language –––––––––––––––––World 
 
Language, or more precisely, “Information” is thus the mediator 
between the world and our selves. And, to quote Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
it is “ubiquitous”. 
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University of Bristol, United Kingdom 
Even though natural science cannot deal with consciousness as such, it 
is possible by way of science to try to understand what is needed in 
order for a system to have consciousness. 1 
 
In 2001, Jesper Hoffmeyer wrote an occasional piece which, after 
translation, was published as ‘Proprioception’. His essay reflected 
upon the form of consciousness in living organisms and the link it 
has with proprioception, as had been outlined a few years earlier by 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1998).  
Even though most people imagine themselves to be ‘conscious’ 
(though in reality this is no more than a deterministic and condi-
tioned, reactive state), it might nevertheless be useful to examine the 
connection between proprioception and the conscious state, since 
the importance of this connection should not be overlooked.  
Etymologically, in ‘prioprioception’ we have proprius (one’s 
own self) and percipere (to receive = to apprehend). This derivation 
gives to proprioception a scope broader than that usually entertained 
by human physiologists – namely, perception of the position of the 
parts of one’s body, especially in relation to their movement. In 
animals, proprioception is assisted by stretch receptors in muscle 
spindles and baroreceptors in the inner ear. Plants, also, are capable 
of perceiving their position in much the same way – by displace-
ment within a gravity field, say, or on account of a light gradient. 
Unicellular organisms, too, show awareness of their own movement 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer Jesper 2002. Proprioception. In: Emmeche, Claus; Kull, Kalevi 
and Stjernfelt, Frederik (eds.), Reading Hoffmeyer, Rethinking Biology. (Tartu 
Semiotics Library 3.) Tartu: Tartu University Press, 31–34 (p. 32). 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
212 PETER W. BARLOW 
 
and position within a volume of fluid; and, moreover, their memb-
ranes contain stretch receptors which make the unicellulars sensitive 
to their own form (Martinac; Kloda 2003).  
Having in mind the etymology of proprioception, one may 
easily – perhaps too easily – slip into speaking of an organism’s 
sense of ‘self’ and, hence, of ‘self-consciousness’. However, the 
notion of movement in relation to proprioception, and thence to the 
awareness of self, concerns the body, or soma. Somatic proprio-
ception leads to apprehension of the somatic self in time and space. 
But is there not another consciousness besides somatic conscious-
ness that is independent of motion?  
 Skipping over 500 years of philosophy, we shall simply claim 
that ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are composite states arising from a 
simultaneous sensation and awareness of soma, psyche and feelings 
(affectivity). It should therefore be possible to reach the self-
conscious ‘I’ about which Hoffmeyer prefers not to comment, 
holding that this topic is too subjective for scientific discussion, 
where the preference is to frame enquiries concerning natural 
phenomena using impersonal words like ‘this’ and ‘it’. 
What is this self-consciousness and self-awareness that troubles 
Man’s thought and has thereby given rise to so much philosophising? 
The solution to this problem becomes clearer by considering the 
question in the light not only of proprioception but also of insides 
and outsides. We find support for our answer in Michael Conrad’s 
(2000) idea that cyclical processes comprise the life of biotic entities, 
which can thereby reach a state of closure and so achieve optimal 
equilibrium with the environment. However, cycles can be disturbed 
and become leaky. Closure fails and gaps in the entity’s boundary 
allow the environment to intrude and force a re-alignment or adap-
tation of the original cycling process and, hence, favour evolution. 
Homeostasis and mutation are the two regulative processes con-
cerned and may thus be recognised as characteristics of life. 
According to Conrad, both are properties built into the physics of 
the universe. 
Closure and anti-closure are exactly what are required in the 
search for, and apprehension of, consciousness and self-conscious-
ness – a search that is embedded in the traditions of religious 
practices (religio sensu ‘I link’), extending from Buddhism founded 
in the 7th century to Subud in the 20th. The common feature to 
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these and related practices is a certain type of relaxation which 
intrudes, via somatic proprioception, upon the boundary between the 
outer somatic and inner psychic/affective selves. Proprioception, the 
awareness of the tensions in the soma, is the shock which calls the 
inner self of affect and psyche to attention, an act which we might 
call ‘psycho-affective proprioception’. 
We may remark a little more upon this boundary between inner 
and outer. The outer somatic portion of an organism is comprised of 
a reactive surface upon which signs, icons, etc., hold sway. These 
items, and the regulatory behaviour they engender, are temporal and 
causative. Together with memory traces, they lead to associative 
thinking. The interior portion wherein the processes of mind, body 
and affectivity meet in conscious association, is atemporal and un-
conditioned, existing within the duration of now, where signs loosen 
their grip. Thoughts arising within this association are pristine, 
untrammelled by habitual, conditioned forms of mentation. The 
inner-outer boundary is nevertheless subject to dynamic, energy-
regulated closure and anti-closure. The atemporal state cannot be 
sustained, and the temporal, sign-conditioned state once again 
dominates. Life, as we know it, cannot function otherwise. 
Relaxation as a therapy for stress was summarised in the context 
of the aforementioned religious practices by Herbert Benson in 1969 
(Benson, Beary and Carol 1974). Earlier, this methodology had been 
given a scientific gloss by Trigant Burrow (1938), who distin-
guished two attentional patterns, ‘ditension’ and ‘cotension’. The 
former pattern focusses upon external objects and mental images, 
the latter upon the somatic, propriocepted tensions to which all 
individuals are subject, but which are only occasionally heeded 
consciously and non-reflexively. Inspiration-expiration cycles 
diminish in frequency and amplitude; and, together with affective-
mental proprioception, there is a retreat from the fantastical, 
neurotic world of the mind to an equilibrated state comprised of 
simultaneous self-conscious awareness of mind, body and emotions.  
The cotensional state allows freedom of the mind from the 
perpetual kaleidoscope of mental associations – the ‘electric memes’ 
described elsewhere (Agnati, Barlow, Ghidoni, Guidolin, Fuxe 
2012), to which icons, in particular, contribute an inordinate share. 
Probably an altered allometry of human cerebral and cranial 
development, as well as the acquisition of language, permitted the 
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exaptation of the neocortex to make possible the harbouring of these 
local electrical neuronal networks of memory. Thus, the quietening 
of the mind by mental proprioception – the damping down of the 
meme-generated fantasy upon which much of culture is built – 
admits the sensation of a presence that the aspirant of self-awareness 
can justly call an ‘I’. Conscious proprioception is the portal at the 
metaphorical foot of “Jacob’s Ladder” or Walter Hilton’s “Ladder 
of Perfection” and is the goal sought by religious contemplatives via 
relaxation and meditation. Nevertheless, full self-consciousness is 
evanescent, as practitioners of meditation well know: self-con-
sciousness requires it to be bound to proprioception by ‘attention’, 
as has been suggested in an academic framework by Michael Posner 
(1994), for example, and later elaborated by Raffone and Srinivasan 
(2009). 
Finally, we recall that microbial cells, by accomplishing an 
outside-inside exchange, are enabled to search for a higher energy 
source (Taylor, Zhulin 1998); and that plants, too, seek actively for 
higher energy in the form of photons. Why should Man not also be 
roused to seek for something higher by attending to the conditions 
for proprioception which leads to self-consciousness? Voluntary, 
intentional proprioception could be a factor in Man’s psychological 
evolution (Ouspensky 1950). 
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QUESTIONS 
STEEN NEPPER LARSEN 
University of Århus, Denmark 
Understanding is and remains subjective. 1 
 
During my reading of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s doctoral thesis Biose-
miotik. En afhandling om livets tegn og tegnenes liv (2005), a 
number of fundamental questions took form in my mind: Can the 
living and non-human biological beings ever be said to ‘understand’ 
what they interpret? Is the ‘mind’ (and a brain of a certain size) not 
a ‘necessary but not sufficient’ condition for the existence of some-
thing that can be called understanding and thinking? If you pour 
water on a dry plant, or the sun shines on a flower thirsting for light, 
it has not freedom to avoid ‘getting a hold on’ the water, nor will it 
turn away from the light source. However, a man can commit 
suicide, choose to starve, be jealous, do others hurt, be anxious, 
‘forget’ by intention, act irrationally, etc. 
The question is, in other words, whether biosemiotics strains 
semiotic insights when they become applied to every living creature 
in the world. It could be that much of the world works quite auto-
matically and sign-indifferently, and it might be the case that some 
cause-effect relationships do not have to be semiotisized. It is not 
free of charge to claim that the world primarily consists of signs. 
Among other things, it is debatable whether biosemiotics is the 
ontological truth about the world. Everything consists of ‘process 
organization’ and not of particles, Hoffmeyer claims – but can 
biosemiotics even specify how it will be able to be falsified as a 
project and as a science? 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2011. Mønstringen af verden, Weekendavisen. (Bøger, 
14 October.) 
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In an eloquently written newspaper article ‘Mønstringen af 
verden’ in the weekly Danish newspaper Weekendavisen, Hoff-
meyer wrote the quote at the top of this page – just after a small text 
sequence on the relationship between gene specifying features and 
‘Planck’s constant of understanding’. But I do not find this assertion 
convincing, because there are probably many sign-oriented pro-
cesses of understanding, e.g. decoding processes and phenomena in 
the living biological and biosemiotic world, which happen not to be 
‘subjective’ at all. And is it possible to use the concept ‘subjective’ 
both as a valid philosophical term and as a scope of logical concise-
ness for deciphering anything other than what is filtered through the 
consciousness of the human animal’s comprehension processes? 
Hoffmeyer insists rightly that such genetic information requires 
interpretation in order to work, implying that there is more at play in 
nature’s complex processes than what can be dealt with using a 
probabilistic and formal information concept. In numerous publi-
cations, he has shown that the cell can interpret the same ‘genetic 
information’ quite differently depending on the context in which it 
finds itself. But does understanding necessarily become ‘subjective’ 
for that reason? It is Hoffmeyer’s credo that when information is 
meant to work, then information will not be a unique thing that can 
be defined in objective terms.  
 He and I have spoken and written a bit together on these things 
recently (October 2011), and as he looks at it, either we have to 
accept that we talk about causality (in an ‘objective’ context) or 
about sign processes (in a relation to ‘the subjective’, which e.g. 
depends on the cellular ‘agenst’). However, I would prefer to 
reserve the term ‘subjective’ to the human action field, including the 
utmost different experiences and cognitive processes which happen 
to take place in different individual and social contexts – and thus 
not use this tern as polar and antithetical to the concept of 
‘objective’. 
Rather, I believe, much clarity would be gained by thinking 
about a ‘third’ form of understanding that is neither ‘objective’ nor 
‘subjective’. Cells may be biosemiotic sign interpreters and not 
causally embedded neutral machines, but they are not ‘subjective’ 
(this being said, although, strictly speaking, we do not know nor can 
ever come to sense or feel what exactly is going on in other people 
or in living organisms when they interpret and ‘understand’). A 
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challenge for biosemiotics could be to try to invent a vocabulary that 
does not fall into one or the other extremes of the historical-over-
bearing dualistic quagmire: i.e., either ‘cold’ objective information 
or ‘hot’ contextual subjectivity.  
Is it fruitful to attribute actorhood, subjectivity and reflexivity 
abilities to everything from cells, DNA sequences, birds and cows, 
to educational processes and research communities? Why use an 
anthropomorphic epistemological conceptual arsenal on under-
standing processes that are neither ‘objective’ nor ‘subjective’? This 
rigid either-or logic is likely to lead us astray, whether we are 
scientists or newspaper readers. We might better heed Wittgen-
stein’s famous statement that we do not share the life of a lion and 
therefore, strictly speaking, cannot know what makes sense for it. 
We live outside its ‘language game’ – i.e. the major signs and 
interpretation processes it is living by and among. (A challenge that 
I want to thank the biologist and philosopher of science, Claus 
Emmeche, for having made me aware of, may be that Wittgenstein 
is only partially right, because we humans, like lions, ‘happen to be’ 
equipped with legs, two eyes, a stomach, may feel breathless, feel 
hunger, etc. But this partial similarity between species does not 
persuade me, nor make it legitimate to equip lions with ‘subjective’ 
understandings.) 
Summarizing my points, I accept the fact that we do not need to 
assume that the cell does not ‘feel’ something at the semiotic level, 
but I doubt that this capacity to differentiate should be labeled 
‘subjective.’ Rather, I fear that the wide and exaggerated use of the 
term ‘subjective’ risks to dilute the concept and displaces it from 
other ‘loaded’ family-resembling concepts, such as reflection, 
awareness, thinking, self-understanding, etc. And does its overuse 
not, too, risk anchoring our own thinking to a dualistic vision: when 
you say ‘subjective’, you are forced to say ‘objective’ in a short 
while. The concepts are as thick as thieves. But if you choose to 
think in liquid scales, and degrees of semiotic freedom, between 
cells, lions and humans, it might be said that it is philosophically 
valid to talk about the ontological ‘subjective’ all the way through 
the living universe. But one has to acknowledge that this 
philosophical ‘taste’ is heading in an explicit collision course with 
the everyday language we also use and are penetrated by in the 
mutual exchange of speech acts and views. Is it a genuine 
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philosophical and biosemiotic ambition not ‘just’ to ‘subjectivize’ 
all living beings but also the power of everyday language? 
Moreover, I very much miss a philosophical discussion of what 
Jesper Hoffmeyer exactly means by life (bios, vita). It will also be 
exciting and courageous if Hoffmeyer one day starts to grapple with 
the big excruciating and attracting ‘why’ questions, both on the 
‘small’ axis: Why did man come to be? – and on the great: Why does 
semiotic freedom ever come to exist in nature? The lazy religious 
dogmatic parks his ‘why’ in God’s transcendent and omnipotent 
sphere, and the enlightenment philosophical-teleological thinking 
(e.g., Kant and others) promotes the view that it is the inherent 
raison d’être of nature to ‘produce’ man, the precious crown of 
creation, as a self-rationalizing, self-perfecting creature.  
Both Leibniz and Heidegger asked – as we know without being 
able to or willing to respond with any metaphysical (self-)security: 
Why is there something rather than nothing? And although this 
question surely is basically still a research-productive and 
unanswered question, I am quite convinced that Jesper Hoffmeyer 
will insist that the life of signs and signs of life flourish very well in 
silence, and on contingent terms, and that they often take the form 
of self-organizing systemic exchanges, and that they cannot be 
captured nor can they become conceptualized by dreaming of ever 
gaining one answer to one of two pivotal ‘why’-question(s).  
Still, however, I cannot help asking him, likewise, why did life 
and life habits evolve in nature at all? And how does he explain the 
groundbreaking and mysterious transformation from matter to life? 
In any event, it would be great enjoying and digesting what he 
writes, if he one day (well, it’ll probably take more than one day!) 
dares to enter into a systematic and critical dialogue with the past 
2500 years of more or less speculative philosophical and theological 
bids on these eternally recurring questions and doubts. 
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BRUCE WEBER 
Bennington College, United States of America 
That [evolution] has ultimately created intelligence is a striking fact, 
which is not easily explained in the absence of a theory of natural 
intentionality (‘aboutness’). Biosemiotics, by positing interpretation in 
the center of its focus, necessarily admits semiosis as an inescapable 
feature of life. 1 
 
It was around twenty years ago that I met Jesper Hoffmeyer at an 
international and interdisciplinary conference. After a day of inter-
acting with scholars of very different backgrounds, I happened to sit 
by Jesper at dinner. Not only was he an affable conversationalist, 
but I found that his excellent command of English allowed me to 
enjoy even more our discussions. I also found that he looked at the 
world much as I did; this was partly explained when we found that 
we were both professors of biochemistry.  
At that time I was very much engaged in applying complex 
systems dynamics (including nonequilibrium thermodynamics, non-
linear dynamics, and information theory) to problems in origin of 
life and evolution. Jesper mentioned his interest in semiotics, which 
was something new to me. The next day, I heard Jesper speak about 
how semiotics could be applied to living systems: something he 
called biosemiotics, and I was immediately fascinated by the poten-
tial of his approach. 
While I had an intuition that there was something important in 
applying information theory to biology, I was also very much aware 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Kull, Kalevi 2003. Baldwin and biosemiotics: What is 
intelligence for? In: Weber, Bruce; Depew, David (eds), Evolution and 
Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered. Cambridge: MIT Press, 253–272 
(p. 253).  
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of its limitations, particularly because it did not effectively deal with 
biological function and biological meaning. I was delighted when he 
published Signs of Meaning in the Universe, as it provided me with 
an insightful introduction to biosemiotics, and I have followed his 
contributions since (Hoffmeyer 1996).  
Not only did Jesper teach me about biosemiotics and how to per-
spicuously apply it, but he also introduced me to other biosemio-
ticians and their work, such as Soren Brier and Kalevi Kull, as well 
as Terrence Deacon, Claus Emmeche, Guenther Witzany, and 
Marcello Barbieri. When my co-author David Depew and I were 
organizing a conference held at Bennington College in 1999 on the 
role of mind and learning in evolution, we invited Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
Kalevi Kull, Terrence Deacon, and Søren Brier to participate and 
contribute to the volume, which added an important and essential 
dimension to the conversation.  
Beyond that, Jesper is one of the finest and most decent scholars 
I have had the pleasure in knowing. 
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JES FABRICIUS MØLLER 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
Life is in every respect communicative. 1 
 
It is an interesting paradox in science, and especially in the huma-
nities, that reductionism generally is considered an invective. This 
goes for we historians as well. We take the implications of the 
problem of induction very seriously – and that is why others often 
call us mindless empiricists.  
The late Henrik Nissen made fun of the tendency among political 
scientists to formulate ‘covering laws’ of society and history with 
the following mock theory: “Whenever a state has acquired un-
contested military hegemony in Western and Central Europe it will 
attack Russia, and the following winter will be unusually cold” 
(Nissen 1981: 199). This applies beautifully to the cases of Charles 
XII (of Sweden), Napoleon and Hitler, but to any historian ‘Nissen’s 
law’ is meaningless in itself because it doesn’t offer any explanation 
or insight into the actual cases: What did Hitler have in mind when 
he invaded? You might as well use the explanation of the comedian 
Eddie Izzard: “Hitler obviously never played Risk as a child”. This 
is both true (since this strategic board game wasn’t invented then) 
and funny, but it doesn’t count as an explanation either.  
My own version of Nissen’s point is the even more pretentious 
Møller’s Theory on Literature: “A comprehensive study of Shakes-
peare’s collected works demonstrates without a doubt that, in reality, 
they consist of nothing more than a combination of common words 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2011. Liv er i et og alt kommunikativt. Weekendavisen, 
Oct. 14. 
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that can be found in any good dictionary. Further studies will most 
certainly demonstrate that this applies to other writers as well”. This 
theory is even more true than Nissen’s – but also even more 
meaningless because it suffers from what we might call ‘reductionist 
overstretch’. 
Historians can never hope to achieve the simplicity and beauty of 
a Newtonian law. However, we too must simplify. Deduction is 
problematic but reduction is necessary. Jorge Luis Borges has 
described the dangers of not reducing in his fable of an empire 
where cartographers were held in such high esteem that they finally 
managed to create “a map of the Empire whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it”. The beauty of 
the fable lies in the fact that it is itself reduced to austere brevity. A 
description of the world in a 1:1 scale simply does not count as 
science since it would be redundant by definition. Any interpretation 
means identifying a pattern, a system or an order that is simpler or at 
least smaller than the totality of what is interpreted. 
A famous reductionism is the “Biologismus” of the late 19th 
century that tried, at least on a theoretical level, to reduce human life 
to its biological components (Møller 2000). It had ontological, 
epistemological and ethical implications, or to put it more bluntly, it 
produced a lot of nonsense, much of which was used to justify 
cruelty against people on a previously unknown scale (Møller 2006). 
The Danish geneticist, Wilhelm Johannsen, wrote as early as 1914 a 
vitriolic and very funny critique of the strange need of his contem-
poraries to reduce human or societal phenomenon to biology. 
(Johannsen 1914) He called for clear demarcation lines between the 
understanding of the human world on one hand and natural expla-
nation on the other. Johannsen didn’t know Dilthey’s distinction 
between understanding and explaining or Windelband’s distinction 
between idiographic and nomothetic but his point was approxi-
mately the same. 
Jesper Hoffmeyer is intellectually seen as a remote descendant of 
Johannsen. He oversteps, so to say, the demarcation line from the 
other side and reinterprets biology – or to be more precise, 
introduces interpretation to the biologists: “Life is in every respect 
communicative”. It is a kind of monism, meaning that the same kind 
of scientific thought applies to both the natural and the human world: 
interpretation rather than the idea of covering laws, patterns of 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
  Reductionism 225 
 
meaning rather than biological facts. Suddenly the humanities have 
colonized biology and not the other way around. It looks very much 
like reductionism, but perhaps it isn’t.  
Hoffmeyer himself denies that he is a reductionist; on the cont-
rary. In one respect he is right. The world is becoming an empire 
where information, communication and interpretation are held in so 
high esteem that the amount of information etc. already outnumbers 
reality. It began already a couple of hundred years ago. At a very 
early stage, the available literature on Shakespeare quantitatively 
overshadowed the oeuvre of Shakespeare himself. The present level 
of communication on anything has probably reached and surpassed 
the 1:1 ratio. From a Hoffmeyerian perspective, of course, there is 
no such ratio. More communication simply means that the world is 
growing. Whatever the case is, the need for reduction in order to 
understand is larger than ever. 
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SCAFFOLDING 
KALEVI KULL 
University of Tartu, Estonia 
Rather than reducing organismic behavior to inherited holistic lumps of 
reflexes, so-called instincts, biosemiotics suggests new subtle kinds of 
learning in situ associated with the establishment of semiotic scaf-
folding. 1 
The primary mechanism behind semiotic emergence is semiotic 
scaffolding, the key to nature’s tendency to take habits in the biological 
realm. 2 
The network of semiotic interactions by which individual cells, orga-
nisms, populations, or ecological units are controlling their activities 
can [...] be seen as scaffolding devices assuring that an organism’s 
activities become tuned to that organism’s needs. And just as the 
scaffold raised to erect a building will largely delimit [...] when and 
how such fine-tuned activity should take place. [...] Semiotic scaffolding 
operates by assuring performance through semiotic interaction with cue 
elements that are characteristically present in dynamic situations such 
as catching of prey, invading host organisms, or mating. 3 
The genome is not controlling ontogeny, it scaffolds it (just as books do 
not determine culture, but they certainly scaffold it). 4 
Semiotic scaffolding is a tool that supports our learning. [...] More than 
anything else the human supremacy over animals is based on our 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer 2011a: 62. 
2   Hoffmeyer 2007: 156. 
3   Hoffmeyer 2007: 154. 
4   Hoffmeyer 2012. 
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creativity when it comes to the invention of semiotic scaffolding, from 
frescoes to airplane stimulators.” 5 
 
Semiotic scaffolding has been one of central concepts and themes in 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work, particularly in his writings after 2005.  
It is a concept used already in Lev Vygotsky’s works, and later 
developed by Jerome Bruner (Vygotsky 1986 [1934]; Wood et al. 
1976; see also Foley 1994), Andy Clark, and others. For instance, 
Clark (2008) speaks about language as scaffolding. Jesper 
Hoffmeyer’s role here has been: (1) to observe that scaffolding in 
this sense is always a semiotic scaffolding, and (2) to demonstrate 
that semiotic scaffolding is at work on all levels of semiosis, from 
the origin of life forward. This entails something very important and 
fundamental for the whole of semiotic theory.  
The way Jesper describes semiotic scaffolding is in terms of its 
instructional bearing – he generalizes this important concept, and 
illustrates it with many examples. However, to specify the definition 
of semiotic scaffolding, stating more clearly its relationship to 
semiosis and code, would give us a central concept for general 
semiotics.  
It is possible, and fruitful, to develop Jesper’s formulations and 
to conclude that semiotic scaffolding is a general result and function 
of semiosis. Semiosis as an active meaning-seeking-making process 
results often with the building of some relatively static or even quite 
solid structures that somehow embed in themselves the findings of 
that active searching-event of semiosis. The resulting structure is a 
scaffolding. It canalizes further behaviour. It is the frame for habits.  
Scaffolding, too, is the building for the development of codes. In 
fact, scaffolding itself looks almost like a code – codes, too, being 
always a product of semiosis. What differs between codes and 
scaffolding is their functionality. A code can be described just as a 
correspondence, whereas scaffolding always has a helping-
supporting task or function. Habit, as a product of semiosis, is 
always, to a certain extent, instructional. Semiosis is a learning 
process that produces scaffolding, that forms habits, that results in 
codes.  
——————— 
5   Hoffmeyer 2011b: 81. 
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Scaffolding, being a product of semiosis – and semiosis being a 
process that takes place in an indeterminate situation of incompati-
bility that life permanently creates and carries on – is a relational 
semi-stable setting. Scaffolding can be reproducible, but this is not 
its universal feature. Therefotre, the role of the genome is secondary 
here (Hoffmeyer, Kull 2003: 262–263). 
Scaffolding is a reduction of degrees of freedom (as noted by 
Wood et al. 1976: 98, and as early as Bernstein 1967) – and this is 
how scaffolding works, the reason it is useful. 
Thus we may think of semiosis as a process that results in 
building scaffolding for further semiosis. The semiosis itself is a 
collaborative learning: the process that occurs when at least two 
codes that are mutually incompatible meet and interact.  
Semiotic scaffolding is likewise so universal a feature of semio-
tic structures that we cannot even imagine a sign relation without it. 
Scaffolding is the way to keep and canalize communicational pro-
cesses. 
Hoffmeyer generalises the notion, so that we can think of the 
whole of an organism’s body as a scaffolding. Scaffolding is what 
results from learning. Semiosis produces scaffolding that support 
semiosis. 
I thank Jesper for all conversations, so creative, we have held 
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LIZ SWAN 
Philosophy Ph.D, United States of America 
Interdisciplinary scholarship only becomes fruitful when we collectively 
take the risk to confront problems in the ways those problems may be 
seen within disciplines other than our own. 1 
 
Albert Einstein is known for his imagination as much as his intelli-
gence. In order to understand the intricate dynamics of molecular 
interaction, he found it useful to imagine himself down at the level 
of molecules so that he could ‘see’ what was happening. In the 
quotation above, Jesper Hoffmeyer challenges us to invoke this 
same power of creative imagination in order to see problems in our 
own discipline through the eyes of those working in other 
disciplines. The field of biosemiotics, deeply enriched by the work 
of Hoffmeyer, constitutes an important exception in the world of 
academe wherein scholars struggle with seeing old problems in a 
new light.  
I believe philosophers need more practice in seeing natural 
phenomena through the eyes of a scientist; this is my project in 
biosemiotics. There are many outstanding ‘problems’ in the contem-
porary philosophical investigations into the nature of life and mind 
that simply melt away once one considers them against the backdrop 
of evolutionary history, as a biosemiotician does. Three brief 
examples will suffice to make my point. An example from 
Hoffmeyer himself concerns the absurdity of philosopher Daniel 
Dennett’s conclusion that whether or not animals have intentionality 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press, 
p. xvi. 
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is beside the point; we have to pretend that they do in order to 
understand their behavior (Hoffmeyer 2008: xvi). Hoffmeyer is spot 
on to call this position absurd. 
The ‘problem of other minds’ is a philosophical problem con-
cerning our ignorance of other human and/or animal minds since we 
can never peer inside and make sure that an inner mental life is 
present and that we’re not simply being fooled by a clever robot. 
John Searle dismisses this skeptical line of thinking by arguing that 
if something is constructed in the same way (i.e., flesh and blood) 
and behaves in similar or at least comprehensible ways, then we 
have to assume that there is a mental life there just as we would 
expect (in other words, if it quacks like a duck…). But there’s an 
even more obvious point to consider, which is this: Why would 
humans be the sole possessors of intentionality in the natural world 
if we are the latest result in an extremely long process of active, 
experiencing, and adapting living things? Considered in this light, it 
makes no sense at all to have to pretend that other creatures have 
intentionality, no matter your philosophical position. 
A second example concerns philosopher David Chalmers’ ‘hard 
problem’, which is to explain why it is that we experience the world 
qualitatively, with colors, sounds, and textures – what philosophers 
call ‘qualia’. In essence, the problem asks, if we are just physical 
creatures, why do we have all this mental experience, why can’t the 
physical processing go on ‘in the dark’, as Chalmers puts it 
(Chalmers 1995: 203). I should note that a lot of philosophers don’t 
take this problem seriously, and I’m one of them, but the reasons for 
why we reject it differ. Again, if we invoke the context of human 
evolutionary history we see that if our ancestors didn’t experience 
the world qualitatively and thus avoid food that smelled rotten, 
water that looked murky, and dark places that made them fearful, we 
would not be here! It’s a philosopher’s trick to separate the nervous 
system from experience and ask why the latter exists at all. Evo-
lutionary biology teaches us that the two are inextricable because 
the main function of the nervous system is to keep the organism in 
touch with its environment, which enables it to behave in survival-
enhancing ways. 
The last example concerns the problem of mental representation, 
a term that has a long, dark past ever since René Descartes proposed 
the theory that inside the head were pictures of all the objects in 
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one’s surroundings, an idea now known as the Cartesian Theater. It 
is common today for philosophers of mind to reject not only the 
Cartesian Theater account of mental representation, but mental 
representation en toto. But the plainest fact available to us after even 
a moment’s reflection is that we do in fact represent in our minds 
not only the body’s internal states, but also environmental surroun-
dings – and not only immediate environment (present in time and 
space) but also things, people, and places in memory or imagination. 
How exactly we do this is an open question in neuroscience, though 
many pieces of the puzzle are available, and researchers are actively 
working on it, which is a better approach than denying the pheno-
menon completely, which is a philosophically untenable position to 
hold. 
Hoffmeyer’s quotation certainly rings true for philosophers who 
have come to biosemiotics with the intention of finding more 
scientifically satisfying accounts of puzzling phenomena in life and 
mind, such as myself. But it also serves the broader purpose of re-
minding thinkers in a multidisciplinary effort such as biosemiotics 
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SCIENCE 
FRANK NUESSEL 
University of Louisville, United States of America 
Biosemiotics suggests that living systems should be studied as semiotic 
systems in their own right. This idea is based on the belief that the 
poverty of information discourse in biological sciences results from the 
reductive neglect of the interpretive aspect of biological information. By 
introducing the concept of the sign, as developed by US chemist and 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce [1839–1914] as a substitute for 
information, it will be assured that the interpretive side of information 
is not neglected. In everyday parlance, a sign is simply “something that 
refers to something else”, like smoke refers to fire. This reference, 
however, cannot be brought about without a process of interpretation. 1 
 
In the above quotation about the need for the study of living systems 
within a semiotic framework, Jesper Hoffmeyer argues persuasively 
for the enrichment of ‘information’ discourse in the biological 
sciences, due to that field’s traditional neglect of the interpretive 
component of biological information.  
Sciences in general, and the biological sciences in particular, 
require the implementation of the scientific method to achieve 
credible and substantive results, and this method evolved over a 
period of more than two millennia. For this reason, it is not possible 
to attribute it to any one person. To be sure, it was initiated by the 
Greeks with Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and the Greek philosophers 
and underwent subsequent modification by Muslim scholars such as 
Ibn al-Haytham (965?–1040?). Subsequently, Roger Bacon (1214–
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 189). 
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1284) introduced inductive reasoning. Later, René Descartes (1596–
1650) proposed deduction as the appropriate procedure for the 
scientific method. Ultimately, Isaac Newton (1642–1727) would re-
fine the process still in use today with his assertion that the scientific 
method required both induction and deduction.  
In its present configuration, the scientific method requires an 
ordered sequence of steps for rigorous research: (1) pose a research 
question; (2) examine and review extant research; (3) propose a 
hypothesis to explain the data; (4) test the hypothesis through 
experimentation; (5) analyze the results of the experiment; (6) draw 
conclusions based on the evidence; (7) determine if the hypothesis is 
true, false, or partially true; and (8) report results.  
With their use of the scientific method, which includes obser-
vation, classification, and explanation (or interpretation), scientists 
have had their greatest success with the first two of these because 
these aspects are the most accessible in terms of observable pheno-
mena. It is this third area – explanation and interpretation – however, 
that has proven to be much more elusive. In this third realm, it is 
only with the introduction of the conceptual framework developed 
by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), that we have been able to 
increase our knowledge of living systemic behavior through the 
notion of semiosis – the comprehension and production of signs. In 
fact, Peircean semiotics deals with the entire complex process of 
verbal and nonverbal messages, including their generation, encoding, 
transmission, decoding and interpretation.  
The example of the sign provided by Hoffmeyer, one based on 
Peirce’s triadic conceptualization of a sign relation or sign action, 
connects the primary sign to its object via the production of an 
interpretant. Hoffmeyer provides the classic example of smoke (sign 
vehicle, the manifestation of the sign without reference to it signi-
ficance), fire (the object to which the sign refers), and fear (inter-
pretant, the system of construal of the relationship of the sign 
vehicle to its object), or the evocation of a specific physio-psycho-
logical response to the sign vehicle. This classic example appears in 
the commonly used English idiom “where there’s smoke, there’s 
fire”, which means that when there is evidence of an event, that 
event is probably taking place. Peircean triadic (and tripodic) 
semiotics is essential to understanding living processes because it 
provides the biosemiotician with a systematic procedure to explain 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
  Science 237 
 
biological phenomena. Interpretation, of course, demands that the 
(bio)semiotician translate the sign relation so that the interpretation 
is both accurate and correct.  
The value of the scientific method has proven to be quite useful 
in the development and advancement of scientific knowledge. In 
this regard, various biological hypotheses that have been superseded 
by later research include spontaneous generation overturned by the 
Darwinian (Charles Darwin, 1809–1882) theory of evolution, and 
abiogenesis, or the development of life from inorganic matter via 
natural processes. A second is Gregor Johan Mendel’s (1822–1884) 
theory of genetics now superseded by molecular genetics. A third is 
the miasma theory of disease, i.e., disease arises from ‘bad air’, and 
subsequently rendered obsolete by the germ theory. These three 
erroneous biological hypotheses, superseded by subsequent research 
and aided by superior instrumentation and the use of sophisticated 
computer programs designed to facilitate and enhance hypothesis 
formation, logical deduction, and empirical testing in a systematic 
and rapid fashion have advanced scientific knowledge significantly.  
All too often, however, reporters and journalists report the results 
of scientific experimentation without critical analysis. As a result, an 
uninformed or under-informed and ignorant public accepts certain 
scientific findings as correct and reliable. Questionable sources, e.g., 
a few reporters and some journalists without appropriate scientific 
training, as well as anonymous blogs and web posting by uncre-
dentialed sources contribute to scientific misinformation. In fact, in 
an essay in the venerable journal Scientific American, Krauss (2009) 
bemoans the ongoing fight of science against media disinformation.  
While ignorant popular purveyors of alleged scientific facts 
contribute to an ever -increasing public ignorance, it is unfortunate 
that a very few disreputable scientists also contribute to this situa-
tion. Again, in the Scientific American, Ioannidis (2011) condemned 
unreliable claims and embellished outcomes in peer-reviewed re-
search in medical journals because of increasing competition and 
conflicts of interest. Moreover, in an article entitled “Scientists’ 
Elusive Goal: Reproducing Study Reproducing Study Results” in 
the Wall Street Journal, Naik (2011) points out that irreproducibility 
of research results has multiple explanations including the use of 
different equipment and materials.  
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In order to combat these two major sources of scientific dis-
information including external misunderstanding (by uninformed 
media representatives) and internal weaknesses (caused by scientific 
deceit and dishonesty and other factors), we must rely on a prin-
cipled application of Peircean (and perhaps Hoffmeyerean!) se-
miotic standards in which the ultimate phase of scientific experi-
mentation – explanation and interpretation – follows ethical 
principles fully embraced by the scientific community. 
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TOMMI VEHKAVAARA, 
University of Tampere, Finland 
Semetic interaction refers to the tendency of living systems to make 
signs based on any persistent regularity: Wherever there has developed 
a habit there will also exist an organism for whom this habit has 
become a sign.1 
 
This principle (or rather, “rule of thumb”) of semethic interaction 
(Hoffmeyer 2008: 189), directs our attention to the dynamical 
connectedness of living units: a connectedness that is based on 
certain cognitive capacities they possess and the related adaptive 
plasticity. This connectedness has an irreducibly semiotic character 
almost independently of the chosen conception of sign or semiosis 
(an issue far from settled in biosemiotics), and in this sense the 
principle can be held as more essential for biosemiotics than perhaps 
more controversial ideas about semiosis at molecular levels.  
What should be specifically noted is the dynamic character of the 
principle. It is not only that when we detect a regularity, we can 
expect to find some biosemiotic agent taking advantage of it, but 
also that whenever a new regularity is established, we may expect it 
soon becoming recognized and exploited by some other agent(s). 
Such recognition may eventually change the conditions of stability 
of the whole ecosystem and if so, it functions as a new evolutionary 
force. Many semethic interactions belong certainly among 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1997. The swarming body. In: Rauch, Irmengaard; Carr, 
Gerald F. (eds.), Semiotics Around the World: Proceedings of the Fifth Con-
gress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. Berkeley 1994. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 937–940 (p. 937). 
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evolutionary forces, forces of the kind where sign-action seems to 
have an irreducible role. 
However, as valuable as such a rule of thumb may be as a 
generator of new hypotheses concerning e.g. ecosystemic stabilities 
or niche construction, there is the danger of getting carried away 
about the role of semiosis in the processes of life and evolution. Too 
semiotic-minded a visionary may over-universalize the role of 
semethic interaction and end up in a kind of loose pansemiotism, 
where signs or semiosis are assumed to be responsible for every 
detail in life processes. Such a lapse is comparable to the adapta-
tionist fallacy that many of the proponents of sociobiology and 
nativist evolutionary psychology have committed. Of the two kinds 
of adaptationism, Optimality adaptationism and ‘Just so’–story 
adaptationism criticized by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Le-
wontin (1979), the latter is relevant here. In it, every identifiable 
common trait is implicitly assumed to be a real adaptation, i.e. that 
nature has really selected it because of its advantageousness, which 
means that only adaptive historical explanations are drawn and felt 
legitimate without any demand of further evidence.  
Biosemiotic thinking can hardly be accused of such ‘Just so’–
story adaptationism because of its opposition to oversimplifying or 
one-eyed natural selectionism. Instead, a biosemiotician may easily 
commit to semiotic ‘just so’–stories, and the cause is of the same 
kind: a too vague, general, formal, or empty basic explanatory 
concept, be it sign/semiosis, or adaptation/selection, and to which no 
alternatives are seen (or they are rejected a priori). It is true that the 
vagueness of basic concepts can also be taken as a virtue that 
prevents us to force our view of nature too violently into 
oversimplified categorizations. The prize for excess vagueness is 
nevertheless the practical emptiness of the whole approach so that 
the use of semiotic terminology is mere renaming that does not help 
us to understand the phenomena any better than without it. Mere 
feeling that we understand better does not suffice. As such, semiotic 
terminology appears as mere reducible rhetoric.  
I would like to pay attention to two points where a careless 
reader of Hoffmeyer (not Hoffmeyer himself) may fall on semiotic 
fallacies when studying semethic interactions. The first one is that 
all ‘persistent regularities’ are not habits due to semiosis and all 
developed habits do not have a semiotic origin; they may as well be 
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‘non-intentional’ side-effects of semiotic processes (cf. CP 5.489) or 
due to material or other physical constraints just like the spandrels 
of San Marco in Venice. Whenever we detect a regularity, we 
cannot say much about the process that has produced it – although a 
detected regularity would be a habit with semiotic origin, it is 
recognized as a regularity independently on its origin. Further 
evidence about its origin is needed if such an issue even happens to 
have any significance.  
The second point is more important. Although a regularity would 
be perceivable and even actually detected by some organism (or 
other biosemiotic agency), such a recognition is by no means neces-
sarily significant to the organism. When perceptual and other cogni-
tive capacities develop during the course of evolution, they often 
develop as general capacities, i.e. even if the perception of some 
environmental features were genuinely adaptive, the same capacity 
may provide, as a side-effect again, a possibility of perceiving a 
myriad of other features that are actually insignificant. Such pos-
sible ‘junk perceptions’ may nevertheless function as an important 
resource of developmental and behavioral plasticity as open possibi-
lities whenever some of such insignificances turn significant.  
Still, there is no necessity, again, that an organism would be able 
to develop any effective means to respond functionally to a detected 
and evidently significant regularity. Dysfunctional effects of the 
changes in weather conditions or of the appearance of a new parasite 
sometimes just have to be taken without any possibility for compen-
sation. In such cases, new environmental features or regularities 
may function as evolutionary forces independently of their possible 
sign-character. Signs may also have non-semiotic effects that can be 
even more significant than their semiotic effects.  
In biosemiotics, we should be careful to make a difference 
between these two kinds of significance that signs – or persistent 
regularities – may have, semiotic and non-semiotic. Such diffe-
rences within semethic interactions cannot be drawn or even seen if 
concepts of sign and semiosis remain too general or vague, if it is 
not made clear what is the difference of a perception of a thing and 
interpretation of it as a sign of something, or if it is not made clear 
who or what is the agent of semiosis to whom this sign-action 
should be significant or meaningful. 
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SUSAN PETRILLI 
University of Bari, Italy 
The ‘meta-membrane’ that is the human skin is indeed a highly specia-
lized manifestation of the very same interior interface-principle 
whereby life processes are most generally built up. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic conception of the ‘semiotic body’ 
can be extended by reading together along with Hoffmeyer, the 
scholars Charles S. Peirce, Thomas A. Sebeok and Victoria Welby – 
all of whose reflections have contributed to redefining the ‘semiotic 
self’ as a complex sign, verbal and nonverbal. As Peirce states, “It is 
that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself [...] the man 
and the external sign are identical, in the same sense in which the 
words homo and man are identical” (CP 5.314).  
 Noticing the similarities in the works of Peirce with the ideas of 
Hans Jonas, Hoffmeyer further observes that: “causality and teleo-
logy do not contradict each other; on the contrary, teleology is a 
precondition for causality to have sense. And telos, of course, is 
something we know of before we know of anything else for we 
know telos from our own bodies – or I shouldn’t say ‘our bodies’: 
we are our bodies, or our bodies are us” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 171). 
The self, then, is an open-ended semiosic process, characterized by a 
capacity for interpretive-propositional commitment unfolding in an 
infinite number of signifying trajectories.  
 As a developing sign, the subject is a dialogical entity, an open 
subject emerging in the intrapersonal and interpersonal inter-
relationship with other subjects. The boundaries of the subject are 
not defined once and for all, but only emerge through dialogical 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. The semiotic body. Biosemiotics 1 (2): p. 175. 
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encounters with other subjects. The self is a community of dialo-
gically interrelated selves whose development is oriented by other-
ness logic. Reading Merleau-Ponty (as interpreted by the Danish 
phenomenologist Dan Zahavi), Hoffmeyer notes: “When I 
experience my self, and when I experience an other, corporeality is 
the common denominator; “we are similar because my experience of 
both myself and of an other is ‘incarnated’. And because my expe-
rience of the self is necessarily an experience of a kind of corpo-
reality, it cannot be separated from an experience of the ‘other’ – ‘I 
am always a stranger to myself, and therefore open to others”’ 
(Zahavi 1999, cited from Hoffmeyer 2008: 174). The subject’s 
identity, in other words, is multiplex, plurifaceted, plurivocal, de-
lineated and modeled in the dialogical relation among its parts.  
 Indeed, if we interpret the word ‘in-dividual’ literally as meaning 
‘non divided, non divisible’, with Peirce, who rejected the “illusory 
phenomenon” of a finite self or self-sufficient self, clearly ‘a person 
is not absolutely an individual’. The social character of self does not 
contradict its singularity, uniqueness or otherness with respect to any 
signifying process that interprets it. Welby, likewise, analyses 
subjectivity in terms of the relationship between the ‘I’ or ‘Ident’, 
and ‘self’ or ‘ephemeron’ (see Petrilli 2009). Self is mortal, 
ephemeral, like the body – whereas the ‘I’ tends towards immortality 
beyond the mortality of body and self. Here the subject is not unitary 
or compact, but presents a surplus, something more with respect to 
closed identity, as it emerges from the dialogical relationship 
between self and I. Ident is not the ‘individual’, but the ‘unique’: “It 
is in fact just our dividuality which constitutes the richness of our 
gifts” (Welby, “I and Self”, undated typescript, in Petrilli 2009: 647). 
 That the subject is an incarnate subject, intercorporeal being, a 
body interconnected to other bodies, expression of the condition of 
intercorporeity, synchronically and diachronically, not isolated from 
other bodies, is essential to our conception of subjectivity. The 
subject is incarnate both in terms of biological evolution and of 
sociality and cultural history. The body is essential to the develop-
ment of consciousness, a condition for its full development, there-
fore of the human being as a ‘semiotic animal’ (Deely, Ponzio, 
Petrilli 2005). Self develops interconnectedly with other bodies, 
human and nonhuman, through which it extends its boundaries, the 
boundaries of the world it experiences. The word is an extension of 
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the body. Echoing Voloshinov from his essay on recent tendencies 
in Western linguistic thought, originally published in Russian in 
1928, the word forms a bridge joining one’s own body to the body of 
others.  
 Hoffmeyer evidences the condition of interconnectivity in terms 
of the association between self and biological reference: “The skin 
has both an inner side and an outer side and an asymmetry is 
therefore established by the skin between that which is inside and 
that which is outside. The “self” exists only in so far as that which is 
inside contains an intentionality toward, or reference to, that which 
is outside – an aboutness, as it is often called. But this outward 
reference rests upon a corresponding inward reference, such that one 
could say: other-reference presupposes self-reference” (Hoffmeyer 
2008: 174). 
 According to Sebeok’s (2001) global semiotics the human being 
is born into the network of life, also a sign network, preexistent to 
the single individual. But human semiosis is characterized by a 
double modality of existence, at least: as biological organisms inter-
connectedly with other organisms in the biosphere; and as a speci-
fication of this vital sign network thanks to the human species-speci-
fic capacity for metasemiosis, or semiotics, or language understood 
as a primary modelling device. 
 Thanks to syntactics characterizing primary modelling, humans 
can construct, deconstruct and reconstruct an infinite number of 
worldviews with a finite number of elements, unlike other animals 
where the relation between modelling and worldview is univocal, 
unidirectional. Nonhuman animals are born into a world they are not 
programmed to modify, if not according to an original bauplan as 
established by the genetic patrimony of their species. Instead, thanks 
to syntactics, human beings are metasemiosic or semiotic animals 
with a capacity for creativity and criticism, suspension of action and 
deliberation. This implies that each human being is invested bio-
semiosically and phylogenetically with a unique capacity for respon-
sibility towards life, care for life in its joyous and dialogical 
multiplicity. The capacity for making decisions, taking a stand, inter-
vening upon the course of semiosis over the entire planet implies 
nothing less. In this sense, the ‘semiotic animal’ is also a ‘semio-
ethical animal’. 
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 The semiotic capacity implies a third modality of being-in-the-
world, specific to human beings, the semioethical (Ponzio, Petrilli 
2003; Petrilli, Ponzio 2010). This is connected to our capacity for 
creative awareness of the other, responsibility for the other, 
answerability, which presupposes the global condition of 
intercorporeal dialogical otherness to which we are all subject 
biosemiosically as living organisms.  
 Semiotics demonstrates that whatever is human involves signs. 
Biosemiotics, which with Hoffmeyer reaches full status as a 
discipline, implies more than this: all life-forms and not just human 
life, whatever is simply alive involves signs. This is as far as 
cognitive semiotics and global semiotics reach. Semioethics pushes 
this awareness even further in the direction of ethics and beyond. 
From a semioethical perspective the question of responsibility 
towards the health of semiosis, therefore of life in its multifaceted 
aspects cannot be evaded at the most radical level, that of defining 
commitments and values. “And telos, of course, is something we 
know of before we know of anything else for we know telos from 
our own bodies”, as Jesper Hoffmeyer has said so well. 
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Whenever there has developed a habit there will also exist an organism 
for whom this habit has become a sign. 1 
 
At my doctoral defense in Tartu, December 15, 2011 (defending the 
thesis: Umwelt transition and Uexküllian phenomenology: An eco-
semiotic analysis of Norwegian wolf management), Jesper Hoff-
meyer was one of my two opponents, along with Dominique Lestel. 
The day before, I had belatedly been made aware of his coinage of 
the term ‘semiotic causation’ well before I mistakenly believed that 
I was coining it. At the defense, I acknowledged Jesper’s coinage, 
and we agreed that our respective descriptions of it are overlapping, 
and that the term deserves emphasis and further development.  
Jesper’s work on the topic of semiotic causation far precedes his 
coinage of the term, and it also relates to other novel neologisms of 
his, including that of ‘semethic interaction’ (first called semetic 
interaction). Semethic interactions occur wherever a regular 
behavior or habit of an individual or species is interpreted as a sign 
by some other individuals and responded to through the release of 
yet other regular behaviors or habits. These, then, are instances of 
regular (systematic, habitual) semiotic causation (and when they 
emerge, there are cases of umwelt transitions). There are countless 
other categories of semiotic causation as well, but that of semethic 
interaction is no doubt crucial for biosemiosis as such.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1997. The global semiosphere. In: Rauch, Irmengaard 
and Carr, Gerald F. (eds.), Semiotics Around the World. Proceedings of the 
Fifth Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. Berkeley 
1994. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter pp. 933-936.  
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A decisive feature of semiotic causation is that what matters 
(what comes to matter) is what is taken to be a sign. A creature that 
releases (potential) signs might or might not succeed in com-
municating its intentions (if any) to another creature, be it a conspe-
cific or not. However, these signs – qua sensual potentialities – 
might nevertheless have an impact. The power of semiotic causation 
originates from the eyes of the beholder. And what a power, what a 
force it is, semiotic causation! One of the most powerful forces of 
nature – manifested in and through our eyes (so to speak)! As 
manifold a realm as biosemiosis constitutes, it is nevertheless no 
unjustified generalization to claim that it is a realm ruled in large 
measure by semiotic causation.  
But, unlike solely efficient causation, such causality is not at all 
easy to predict. En masse, the numerous instances and processes of 
semiotic causation represent all we know as creativity and ingenuity, 
and much of what we recognize as novelty. Jakob von Uexküll 
suggested that we ought to conceive of nature as a symphony – a 
composed whole with contrapuntal relations throughout. Frederik 
Stjernfelt was right to remark that nature (and evolution) is in fact 
characterized by improvisation, and is thus more of a jam. We are 
all results of evolution, which can be conceived of as determined no 
more by chemio-physical constraints and strict laws than by 
ceaseless spontaneity and habit-taking. A species-defining trait is 
but petrified behavior, a habit so fundamental that it is not expe-
rienced as such (in the long run, all behavior is habitual). 
A biosemiotic metaphysics should definitively emphasize emer-
gent phenomena, but not in any naïve manner which would suggest 
that all evolutionary or indeed cultural products are heaven sent. A 
habit is an ambiguous element, and no less imperative in the human 
realm than in the realm of the living at large. Habits define nor-
mality – our immediate horizon, what makes sense to us straighta-
way – and thus condition us to interpret whatever we lay our eyes on 
in certain manners. The question Do habits facilitate easy under-
standing, or impede it? does not have a universal answer, for while 
in one case a habit might enable us to recognize significant behavior 
without difficulty, in another it might just as well fool us to see only 
what we expect. Oh, how many do not confuse their anticipated 
umwelt with their actual umwelt!  
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But Man is an animal characterized by anticipation, an animal 
that in the era of the Anthropocene builds its entire existence on 
anticipation of a future which as it materializes never seems to fulfill 
the needs of this world-historical creature. We, too, are habitual 
animals, and we have in modern times refined a mentality which 
makes us incapable of simply accepting what is here (‘a better 
world’, that is our ultimate destination). Some prejudices die hard. 
Are we, in our global human ecology, refining our habits, or merely 
recycling them? This matter is urgent and crucial.  
As the classical economist John Maynard Keynes wrote some 
eighty years ago, in pondering upon the economic possibilities of 
‘our grandchildren’, it will not at all be easy to change deep-rooted 
habits acquired in poorer times. Keynes foresaw that humankind 
should by now have overcome its ‘economic problem’, the struggle 
for sustenance – and ought to start to develop a taste for prioritizing 
undertakings other than that of ever-increasing wealth. 
 This Q&A is informative: How many stable elements are there 
on Earth? Answer: 81. And of these non-volatile elements in the 
Earth’s crust which, taken as a whole, represent all that we know 
firsthand as natural matter, how many are we humans currently 
mining, and exploiting economically? Answer: 81. This utilization 
of natural matter is certainly habitual, and as we plainly see, the 
habitual borders on the addictive and the compulsive (as well as on 
the spontaneous and the creative).  
What kind of creature are we? Only people of the future can tell, 
for Man is a creature that defines itself – and thus defining ‘hu-
manity’ is an ongoing process, which is in part conducted by way of 
our actual behavior, and cannot be concluded once and for all – 
which is why I am not a post-humanist, but rather a pre-humanist. 
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SEMIOTIC FREEDOM 
MIHHAIL LOTMAN 
University of Tartu / Tallinn University, Estonia 
In the semiotic understanding [...] the chemotactic machinery serves to 
integrate the sensing of the outer world to the reality of the inner world 
as this reality is described in the self-referential or genetic system [...]. 
Thus, from the modest beginnings, we saw in chemotactic bacteria, the 
semiotic freedom of organic systems would have tended to increase, and 
while it has not been easy to prove that any systematic increase in 
complexity, as this concept has traditionally been defined, has in fact 
accompanied the evolutionary process, it is quite obvious that semiotic 
complexity or freedom has indeed attained higher levels in later stages, 
advanced species of birds and mammals in general being semiotically 
much more sophisticated than less advanced species [...]. John Deely 
has called the human being the semiotic animal [...]. Semiosis, sign 
action, takes place all over the life sphere, but only humans know the dif-
ference between signs and things, only humans are semiotic animals.1 
 
One of the most important results in which meaning and relevance 
surpass the boundaries of semiotics, and which demands the re-
construction of the whole scientific paradigm, is an understanding 
that one and the same models function in both the systems that we 
are used to regarding as biological, and those which we consider 
social or cultural. Such attempts at integrating biological and 
cultural understanding are not anything new – one calls to mind, for 
instance, Herbert Spencer, as well as mention Social Darwinism – 
but almost all such previous attempts have been reductionist in their 
nature. Semiotics, on the contrary, approaches the situation from the 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (pp. 195–197). 
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holistic angle. It brings to biology, even at the level of cells, such 
notions as ‘sign’, ‘meaning’, ‘communication’ and even ‘freedom’ 
and ‘creativity’ (poesis). 
It is interesting to note that this paradigmatic shift is a result of 
twofold efforts. On the one hand, it was concluded already in the 
1970s by the Tartu school of the semiotics of culture that text, 
organism, intellect and culture are, in the semiotic sense, iso-
morphic formations – and this judgment was delivered from the 
standpoint of culture. Proceeding from the standpoint of nature, and 
from opposite directions, analogical conclusions are made by 
Biosemiotics which is, first of all, related to Jesper Hoffmeyer and 
his colleagues – who treat living organisms first and foremost as 
semiotic systems, with Hoffmeyer being very accurate in his 
implications and avoiding far-reaching generalizations. However, 
the way he describes biological sign systems often seems to be a 
literal translation of social sign systems.  
Thus, on the one hand, semiotic models of culture are to a great 
extent similar to biological ones, and, on the other hand, biological 
models are codified in the same terms as cultural ones. But one can 
go even further. When Hoffmeyer, following John Deely’s defi-
nition, considers the human being as semiotic animal who, like all 
other animals, uses signs, but is the only one to do it consciously – 
that is, knows the difference between ‘signs’ and ‘things’ – he still 
proceeds from the biological, and not the semiotic, perspective.  
From the biological perspective, organisms, populations and 
species are given in advance and they use different forms of se-
miosis – while from the perspective of semiotics, the signs and 
different strategies of using them are primary. Organisms, popula-
tions and species are in this sense secondary formations, and from 
this perspective, the boundary between human being and other 
animals is not as rigid as it seems in Deely’s and Hoffmeyer’s 
approach. Moreover, an important distinction which has to be made 
is between the intentional and non-intentional use of signs, which is 
somewhere in between knowing and not knowing. The intentional 
use of signs is quite common in the animal world, and it is by no 
means a specific feature of the human being. For instance, many 
mammals, especially carnivores, can lie. That is, they use signs 
intentionally and can successfully draw a line between signs and 
things. 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
  Semiotic Freedom 253 
 
From the semiotic point of view, then, we could distinguish 
between: (1) systems wherein codifying, forwarding and receiving 
information, there is no freedom of choice (and wherein the only 
‘freedom’ is to make a mistake); (2) systems which for themselves 
are without freedom, but mislead certain receivers who belong to 
other species (the first type of mimicry); (3) systems which at least 
to some extent can control their false signals (the second type of 
mimicry); (4) systems which are able to intentionally use signs 
characteristic of other species (e.g., the tiger who makes the sound 
of a deer to lure the latter); and finally, (5) systems which are able to 
reflect over their usage of signs and frequently change sign systems. 
The growth of semiotic freedom is one of the most important 
vectors of evolution. 
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SENSEMAKING 
THERESA S. S. SCHILHAB 
University of Aarhus, Denmark 
Among biochemists, there is a rule of thumb saying that whenever 
nature keeps a store of energy (e.g., food) there will also always be a 
species that makes its living by consuming it. I shall suggest a quite 
similar rule of thumb by saying that there never occurs a regularity or a 
habit in nature that has not become a sign for some other organism or 
species. 1 
 
What does it mean, as Hoffmeyer points out, that there never occurs 
a regularity or a habit in nature that has not become a sign for some 
other organism or species?  
 Relating individual signs to the processes of individual orga-
nisms or species in a one-to-one correspondence – as in the case of 
the sensitivity of the active site in the bacterium E. coli to carbo-
hydrates – describes how life makes sense of the world. However, 
the claim that the habits of nature are signs also seems to make 
sense at a more detailed individual level. Clearly, we can conceive 
of organisms as assemblies of one-to-one correspondences of 
regularities and responses that have individually evolved, but these 
thoughts are often constrained by the consideration of the overall 
functioning of the individual. Thus, the case of our cognitive pro-
cesses easily comes to mind. 
 Human cognition consists of processes that are better explained 
with respect to their own ends than they are from the perspective of 
the entire organism. The obvious reason for this is that intertwined 
development is carved into the delicate constitution of every 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2012. The natural history of intentionality: A bio-
semiotic approach. In: Schilhab, Theresa; Stjernfelt, Frederik; Deacon, Terrence 
(eds.), The Symbolic Species Evolved. Dordrecht: Springer, 97–116 (pp. 108–
109). 
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organism and is based on mechanisms that consist of elements that 
can be traced back to tricks that have worked since the beginning of 
life. Simply put, the material of evolution consists of ensembles of 
processes that have been established in response to the habits of 
nature. Although they can merge into new constellations, each 
mechanism is so formidable that it may prove impossible to disen-
tangle. To summarize, there is no built-in rationality to evolutionary 
progress apart from making sense of the habits of nature. This does 
not mean that evolutionary products do not make sense. They do. 
However, there is no master plan and no watchmaker crafting 
natural design. 
 The existence of multiple processes, each working in individual 
directions but still contributing to a collective purpose, is de-
monstrated in the constraints imposed on the running speeds of 
cheetahs. The cheetah is the fastest land animal in the world. She 
can move from 0 to 103 km/h in three seconds and run at speeds of 
approximately 120 km/h, over short distances of 300 to 400 m. This 
ability makes her potentially the most threatening predator that 
never comes second in a sprint. 
 However, what seems to limit her maximum speed over longer 
distances is not, as one may hypothesize, oxygen depletion but 
rather an accumulation of heat emitted from the working muscu-
lature that incapacitates her while she cools down. This effect is 
pronounced to such an extent that cheetahs can fall prey to local 
monkey species that take advantage of the exhausted carnivore. So, 
the ability of the cheetah to run at unmatched speeds is limited not 
by energy consumption by her muscles but by her inability to 
transpire and control her resulting body temperature. 
 Although the cheetah might actually be better off if she could 
continue her hunt over longer distances and thus keep parasitic 
monkeys at bay, her resulting maximum running speed would be 
influenced by many factors (i.e., the habits of nature) that eventually 
turn out to be counterproductive. These factors include the speed of 
the chemical reaction in neural transmission, the running speed of 
optional prey species, and the abundance of dangerous predators. 
Furthermore, hunting at breathtaking speeds makes sense in open 
terrains where opportunities to escape are abundant, whereas 
hunting in the jungle favours agile predators that can cope easily 
with obstacles and swift directional changes. 
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 Likewise, human cognition consists of many separate processes 
that are productive in their own rights, although which still might be 
conceived of as constraining us at the level of the sensed self (e.g., 
Schilhab 2007a; 2007b; 2012). As beings that excel at consciously 
perceiving ideas, we are clearly misled by the prevailing sensation 
of us as a unity – the self. At the level of the individual, we might 
appear to be coherent and homogeneous, but at the lower levels 
making up the self many ends have to meet and make compromises 
since cognition did not emerge as a fully fledged tool that was 
already perfectly rational. 
 We are all complicated webs of responses to Hoffmeyer’s habits 
in nature. This is proper sensemaking. 
 
Reference 
Schilhab, Theresa 2007a. Interactional expertise through the looking glass: 
A peek at mirror neurons. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
38(4): 741–747. 
Schilhab, Theresa 2007b. Knowledge for real: On implicit and explicit 
representations. Scandinavian Journal of Education 51(3): 223–238. 
Schilhab, Theresa 2012. Levels of immersion and embodiment. In: Schil-
hab, Theresa; Stjernfelt, Frederik; Deacon,Terrence (eds.), The Sym-
bolic Species Evolved. Dordrecht: Springer, 241–251. 
 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
SIGNIFICANCE 
DANIEL MAYER 
University of San Diego, United States of America 
…the information that is contained in the very architectonic structure of 
the complete and fully functioning cell is of great significance… 1 
 
We here give testimony to Jesper Hoffmeyer’s significance: his 
noteworthiness and his meaning; why he outstands and what he 
signs (Hoffmeyer 1996: Ch. 1; 2008: xvi). Sign-nature is his signa-
ture: the significance of significance (Hoffmeyer uses ‘significance’ 
in both senses) emerging from significance; how something became 
someone (Hoffmeyer 1996: viii), how the out-standing becomes 
sign. 
Reflecting on Hoffmeyer. Whence ‘significance’? In a nutshell, 
out-standing is always already potentially a sign. Thus significance 
begets significance. Significance is the mutual co-production of 
Peirce’s Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; or Bateson’s diffe-
rences that make a difference – but all the way down (Hoffmeyer 
2008: 44).2  Thus, for-ness constitutes being. Literally, ‘isness’ – 
ousia, essentia, essence – is through for-ness. For-ness is a precursor 
to the sign. 
Differences that make a difference determine loci by constituting 
boundaries. Boundaries, differentials, distinctional processes 
(whether of temperature, pressure, density, velocity, etc.) are thres-
holds: differences that make a difference for something. It is lumpi-
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: an examination into the Signs of Life 
and the Life of Signs. Scranton:  University of Scranton Press, p. 37, n23. 
2   Hoffmeyer cites P. V. Christiansen making this very equivalence: “the same 
entropic conditions [apply] to any significant event, to every difference that 
makes a difference” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 44, emphasis added). 
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ness all the way down and all the way back (Hoffmeyer here links 
the lumpiness of the universe to signification [1996: 3]). The mate-
rial universe swarms with nestings of such distinctional processes. 
Surfaces within surfaces emerge, membranes, and eventually a 
massively complex ensemble of these can point to the sign-nature of 
skin (‘Surfaces within surfaces’ is the title of this magnificent chap-
ter [2008: Ch. 2]). Something became someone as for-ness emerged 
skinwards. 
1. A critical disagreement. Signifying emerges from significance 
by anticipation. Lumpiness is significant; but signifying requires 
recurrent significance because it pertains to classes of events. 
Classes are established by arbitrary criteria. These allow for re-
current regard of differences that make a difference and disregard of 
differences that do not. Variations of such criteria, randomly pro-
posed, are by natural selection disposed. Hoffmeyer suggests that 
the inside-outside asymmetry of catalytically closed structures is so 
favored (Hoffmeyer 2008:36). But such structures must be 
asymmetric in principle. This, therefore, is an insufficient criterion 
for selection: which asymmetries are selected? Similarly for kinds of 
self-replication; these amount to variations in recurrent proposing: 
which are selected? 
There is an oversight in assuming a need “to cope with an ever 
changing external chemical situation” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 37, em-
phasis added). In a rotating universe, the single ubiquitous feature of 
environments that makes them such is cycling. By definition an 
environment recurs. Which designs thrive? Those that withstood the 
past and are thereby likely to withstand the future. Robust designs 
always already embody predictions of an environment’s future 
states. Tested recurrently, embodiments that withstand recurrence 
recur. Thereby selection in general favors anticipation. Optimized 
by selection, anticipatoriness, the recurrent forness required for 
signifying, brings forth “[l]ife’s agency, it’s inherent future directed-
ness, its survival project” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 35). Anticipative sys-
tems – living beings – are nodes of causation, agency and subject-
ness (see Mayer 2012a). Through anticipation, something became 
someone, significance became signification.  
2. An analytical explication. Nested skins classify, calculate. 
Consider the transposition of the calculus of indications into logic 
(Spencer-Brown 1994[1969]: 114): 
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By this transposition the six expressions of logical conjunction (two 






“This is a proper simplification, since the object of making such 
sentences correspond with these symbols is not representation, but 
calculation” (Spencer-Brown 1994[1969]: 115, emphasis added; 
this expression is equivalent to the one in the table for “a and b”). 
Thus, an architectural structure calculates: in a house one may be in 
the kitchen or in the bathroom or in neither but not in both. In the 
diagram above, a and b state that this is so regardless of further 
nested structures (the larder, a shower.) This parsing of the world, 
calculation or classification, either by formal logic or by living cells, 
is accomplished by surfaces within surfaces. This is the full 
significance of “the very architectonic structure of the complete and 
fully functioning cell” (Hoffmeyer 2008: 37, n23). Sign processes 
(semiosis) = distinctional calculi.  
3. Conceptual extension. Hoffmeyer points to the need for a 
metaphysically in-formed biology and a biologically in-formed 
metaphysics (Hoffmeyer 2008: Ch. 3). We remain as yet a babbling 
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community when speaking of causality, agency, substance, form. 
The nascent language of emergence, scaffolded by Aristotle’s 
hylemorphism, might be named hymenomorphism: the membrane-
foundations of knowing and the known; inquiry into form as 
emergent through nestings of distinctional processes, surfaces, 
membranes, skins (Mayer 2012b). Skinwards is anticipatorywards. 
There is a deep isomorphism between all instances of layer-
produced organization, from societies to cells. All such living 
processes embody he is his own best friend who loves himself best; 
the friend is another self (Aristotle) and the self is another friend. 
Joined in hymenomorphic inquiry into the subjects of nature, we 




Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics, 1168b9 (modified) and 1166a30. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. Biosemiotics: an examination into the Signs of 
Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton and London: University of Scranton 
Press. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Tran. Have-
land, Barbara. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Mayer, Daniel 2012a (forthcoming). Chapter in Approaches to Semiosis of 
Evolution (tentative title). Kull, Kalevi; Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Sharov, 
Aleksei (eds.). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Mayer, Daniel 2012b (forthcoming) PhD Dissertation. Mexico City: Uni-
versidad Iberoamericana.  
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Charles University, Czech Republic 
 
“Not” is a boundary. This boundary, the circumference, is unique be-
cause it exists nowhere but in the mind of the one who has pictured it, 
the observer. The boundary […] forms the very roots of signification. 
Or, to put it another way: the boundary is not a part of the world unless 
“someone” chooses to picture it. And in a sense what or who this 
“someone” might be is exactly the question […] Who is capable of 
making “lumps in nothingness”? When did it start? And to what did it 
lead? 1 
The knack of forgetting holds the key to life’s knack of incorporating the 
present into the future. It is precisely because living systems carry out a 
selection process, forgetting somewhat more of what is “unimportant” 
than of what is “important,” that we can talk about memory. 2 
Yet once this relation had become safeguarded through the strengthe-
ning influence of natural selection, it did thenceforth, however, offer a 
reliable cue for the successive construction of yet further semiotic 
scaffolding. 3 
The growth in semiotic freedom through evolution is caused by the pos-
session in living systems of an extreme semiogenic capacity, a capacity 
based on their ability to read omens […] to take advantage of any 
regularities they might come upon as signifying vehicles, or signs. […] 
Anything is an omen until we understand its true significance. 4 
 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer 1996: 10. 
2   Hoffmeyer 1996: 14. 
3   Hoffmeyer 2007: 157. 
4   Hoffmeyer 2008: 188–189. 
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The string of quotations cited above is not intended to cherry pick 
but to sketch together a central topic of biosemiotic study, which is 
the ancient trope: How is it we are here? When Jesper Hoffmeyer 
tackles this question, the question loses its irrelevance and becomes 
an invitation to consider the structure and function of relational 
phenomena (which, as he shows, is nothing sans the inference of not) 
by inferring the existence of semiotic spandrels. Such spanderls 
serve as those structural constraints of semiotic scaffolding com-
petent to generate origination, abduction, and meaning – and thus 
we see the self as a spandrel of semiotic scaffolding. 
Essentially, as all good biosemioticians know, a sign stands for 
something else – constructively, dynamically, and in actuality. In 
the spirit of Gould and Lewontin (1979), we can further argue that 
semiotic scaffolding must necessarily also form ‘spaces left over’ 
that emerge from functional constraints and that are ‘filled’ (if at all) 
by the realization of some potential. Hoffmeyer pragmatically 
presumes that we must treat such possibilities as real – i.e., as a 
‘cause’ of specifiable consequence; and he places this action central 
to the ongoing emergence of utterly novel being as a consequence of 
the function of semiotic freedom.  
So too, Hoffmeyer’s “semiotic scaffolding” necessarily includes 
both those spandrels inhered by the constraints of semiotic function 
itself (post-physical universals – as it were), as well as those which 
arise from the ad-hoc nature of semiotic synechism – which are 
absolutely unique instances of being. In this, Hoffmeyer offers a 
usable framing of consequentiality (or pragmatic method) by which 
we might better pursue the qualia of lived experience. For as we 
‘earn’ this freedom by ‘reading’ signs as signs, and not rush with 
our attention to their objects, so too, the recognition of the potential 
for future relatedness (which is always a ‘space left over’ within a 
semiosphere) results in a ‘free-er’ reconstruction of the present. The 
identification of semiotic spandrels may well loom large in 
intellectual history, cognitive development, evolutionary biology, 
and many other domains. 
Returning to Peirce with striking regularity, Hoffmeyer seems 
always to begin in firstness – which is not so common as it may 
seem. Rather, it is generally considered that science begins with the 
object with which one studies (in the clash of secondness) – though 
many adhere to the archaic practice and begin with the object that 
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one studies (the stuff of thirdness). But in decades of published 
work, Hoffmeyer consistently begins with the potential adhered 
within some specifiable (i.e. falsifiable) circumstance of an organic 
being minding its surrounds – “regardless of aught else.” The 
‘barrier’ (the ‘not’) that distinguishes the existence of a sensory 
(mental) quale begins the process of relating – which is a real be-
ginning, and a way out of the nothingness of objects ‘in and of 
themselves.’ Moreover, this ‘way’ has a way of generating its own 
consequences – i.e., it is a nothingness that ‘stands’ for a some-
thingness, or a possibility that is also a mode of being.  
It may well be that the chief difference between mankind and so-
called brutes lies here, in the capacity of our ‘non’ sense – which is 
itself a consequence of the scale of the nothingness in which we are 
born, of which we conceive, and with which we are forced to ope-
rate. By this I mean that we engender, we are, and are in the en-
gendering of, relatively impressive nothing. Yet too, as Hoffmeyer 
has well demonstrated, humans are biological organisms with 
semiotically realized mechanisms – which are of the same order as 
all the beasts, though the consequences of our particularities are of a 
vastly different scale. That he so cleanly but provocatively connects 
these normatively disparate notions is both a vital legacy and a very 
real possibility for future study. 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics is thus informed by the return 
to nothing, which is not merely non-existence but a discernable yet 
inchoate – a real but not actualized – potential for furthered 
existence. Such generative ‘non’ sense is built on a respect for the 
reality of not-yet existent ‘things’ and for the ‘spaces left over’. It is 
opposed by a return to ‘objects’ or even to the relational core of 
interaction – both of which build only on the continued syntax of 
sense. In this, Hoffmeyer’s approach to the heritage of previous 
interactions (i.e., biological objects) forever re-engaged in forever-
immediate interaction, avoids both the Scylla of specious meta-
physics and the Charybdis of naïve reduction, by emphasizing the 
generative power of life as biosemiotic habituation – in other words: 
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So we see a fundamental split in our perception of the self, the 
egocentric interior and the not-self or ‘outside’… it is this split, this 
fundamental yearning, that endows the world with signification, that 
makes us desire it. 1 
 
For millennia, Western philosophers have defined ‘meaning’ in 
abstraction from the biological world. The world could be meaning-
ful, the philosophers wrote, only if a purely spiritual agent, a res 
cogitans, were present. The flip side of this idea was equally 
problematic. Those who denied such dualisms felt compelled to 
become deniers of natural meaning altogether. Not to affirm a 
separate ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’, they argued, requires us to be nihilist, 
reductionist, physicalist, atheist, and so forth. 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s proposal for solving the classical conundrum 
is a surprising one. He traces meaning-making back down the 
evolutionary ladder – beyond Homo sapiens, beyond the mammals, 
back to the origins of life. Even unicellular organisms, as Stuart 
Kauffman (1995) likes to say, are “out to make a living.” Wherever 
an organism is “interpreting” its environment, Hoffmeyer argues, it 
is present as an “interpreter.” And when that occurs, meaning-
making is happening. Many of us believe that this semiotic approach 
provides the most powerful explanation of the most fundamental 
nature of biological systems themselves. Philosophically, too, it also 
may be the only way to break the hold of dualism.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, p. 8. 
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When mind and meaning are artificially assigned to humans 
alone, our species is abstracted from its biological heritage. When 
biology is interpreted semiotically, by contrast, the evolution of 
culture and consciousness can be read without either dualism or 
reduction. For example, Hoffmeyer approvingly cites Peirce as 
being “able to construct a theory of meaning that explicitly includes 
the ‘inside aspect’, the experiencing, of mind processes” (2008: 11f). 
With such resources, the door is opened to interpreting science, 
philosophy, art, and religion both in their own terms, and as part of 
the natural evolution of meaning-making systems. 
On this occasion, I would like to pose the question of how far we 
can we take this insight. Can it offer us some guidance when we 
begin to explore traditional metaphysical and spiritual questions? As 
Hoffmeyer shows in Signs of Meaning, even empathy, the traditio-
nal foundation for love, plays an important role in a semiotic theory 
of subjects. Sometimes he even begins to employ the category of the 
“sacred,” only to pull back quickly to safer terrain.  
Maybe now is the time to venture out onto the frightening sands 
of these classical questions, however, following the lead of Gregory 
Bateson’s Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred. 
Could we speak of the emergence of “spirit” across evolutionary 
time? If ‘meaning’ is traceable back to the dawn of life, doesn’t that 
imply a sort of pan-psychism, permeating at least the entire domain 
of life? (A. N. Whitehead, the great pan-psychist and ally of Peirce’s, 
would also be an obvious ally here.) And are there not obvious 
parallels with concepts that are found in many of the world’s 
religious traditions – perhaps most naturally with the dharma 
traditions of India, with “co-depending arising” in Buddhist thought, 
and with the ubiquity of ātman (centers of interpretation) in the 
Hindu philosophies?  
In the end, the semiotic approach to the evolution of meaning is 
further strengthened when its power to address the classical 
questions of metaphysics and spirituality is included within the 
conversation as well. The brilliance of Jesper’s biosemiotics, 
combined with the courage he has shown in taking on questions of 
meaning and value, make this final step a natural extension of the 
work he has already done. 
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STYLISTICS 
EKATERINA VELMEZOVA 
Lausanne University, Switzerland  
Biosemiotics – a science concerned with the signs of life. 1 
 
Historically, semiotics and linguistics, on the one hand, and linguis-
tics and biology, on the other, are so closely connected (via borro-
wings of models and metaphors, the use of similar or even the same 
schemes, concepts and terms, etc.) that it would be tempting, be-
ginning ab ovo – that is, from the very first basic thesis – and fol-
lowing one of Jesper Hoffmeyer’s definitions of biosemiotics, to 
define biolinguistics in a similar way. Therefore, if biosemiotics is 
“a science concerned with the signs of life” (Hoffmeyer 2011a: 80), 
biolinguistics could be defined as “a science concerned with lan-
guages of life” – rather than “the study of the biology and develop-
ment of language”, as it was declared, in particular, at the very first 
“biolinguistics conference” (1974), the participants of which mani-
festly understood biolinguistics differently… It would be particu-
larly captivating, in the study of different “languages of life”, to put 
human “intellectual” language on a par with other “languages of 
life”, including, among others, the emotional (or the affective) 
one(s). As, however, almost every seemingly new concept is in fact 
an old but well-forgotten one, in the history of ideas, one can find 
the word biolinguistics in this very meaning. 
Almost a century ago, in 1915, Swiss linguist Charles Bally 
(who was working at the time on the problems posed by stylistics, 
which he understood as the study of the emotional part of the human 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2011a. Biosemiotics – a science concerned with the 
signs of life. In: Skriver, Morten and Kjeldgaard, Inge Merete (eds.), Livstegn. 
Kunst + biologi. Morten Skriver og Jesper Hoffmeyer. (Katalog.) Esbjerg: 
Esbjerg Kunstmuseum p. 80. 
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language), wrote the following in a letter to his former Russian 
student Appolinaria Solovieva: “It would be better to avoid the term 
“stylistics”, because it is not quite clear […]. It would be better to 
speak simply about the study of spoken emotional language. Some-
times I am inclined to introduce the term “biolinguistics” [bio-
linguistique] (“bios” life), assuming that the spoken emotional lan-
guage is by nature closely connected with real life” (Bally, quoted in 
Fryba-Reber 2001: 126). Later, Bally preferred the term stylistics to 
biolinguistics; nevertheless, his initial “biolinguistic” intentions 
were implemented in a series of writings which considerably broa-
dened the sphere of linguistic researches: earlier, the main domain 
of interest of the majority of European linguists was restricted to the 
study of “intellectual” language par excellence.  
Therefore it was to a large extent thanks to biolinguistics (vs 
stylistics) understood as “a science concerned with one particular 
language (of life)” that linguists began to draw more attention to 
phenomena (for instance, interjections) which seemed to differ 
significantly from the majority of language signs (symbols) and 
whose systemic character was not so evident as that of other parts of 
the language. In this way, another layer was not only discovered, but 
also “officially recognized” in the human language – its “interior 
part that exists because it is defined through its contrast to its 
exterior” (Hoffmeyer 2011b: 81), reminding us once again of “the 




Fryba-Reber, Anne-Marguerite 2001. La revanche de la stylistique: hom-
mage d’Albert Sechehaye à son prédécesseur et ami Charles Bally. 
Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure 54: 125–144.  
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SUBJECTIVITY 
PAUL COBLEY  
London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 
Subjectivity has its roots in the cosmos and, at the end of the day, the 
repression of this aspect of our world is not a viable proposition 1 
 
One of the current pressing questions asked of biosemiotics is 
whether it is, principally, a biologization of semiotics, or a semioti-
zation of biology. Notwithstanding the project’s acknowledgment of 
the latter, which is dear to many biosemioticians – nor the idea that 
biosemiotics is both of the foregoing – I tend to consider the bio-
logization of semiotics as being of key importance. My first 
acquaintance with biosemiotics in the 1990s, directly through my 
acquaintance with Thomas A. Sebeok himself, left me with the 
impression that biosemiotics was radically recasting the very bases 
of semiotics, the humanities and the social sciences. This impression 
was to be reinforced when I read Jesper Hoffmeyer’s Signs of 
Meaning in the Universe (1996). Just before reading it, I had read 
another popular volume, Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea (1996), and had been particularly impressed with the tough-
nosed ‘materialist’ discussion, in the first hundred pages or so of the 
book, of how matter evolves into mind. Undoubtedly, Dennett, with 
his unforgiving Darwinism, seems a strange bedfellow for bio-
semiotics – especially since the latter has been very critical of the 
unequivocal mechanism of natural selection and has sought to 
uncover the significance of agency in nature. Yet, for a searching 
academic reader nurtured by the humanities in the 1990s, there was 
good reason to welcome both Dennett and Hoffmeyer.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, 
Barbara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 57. 
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For much of the humanities is self-obsessed, pace the develop-
ment of ecocriticism, ‘animal studies’, posthumanism and the 
resurgence of zoosemiotics in recent years. In the Western academy 
in the early 1990s, driven by an academic publishing industry keen 
to milk a lucrative fad, ‘postmodernism’ largely dictated terms. 
Without spilling much more ink on this phenomenon, it can be 
largely dismissed now as the high point of an inward high-modernist 
collapse, in which the import of everything outside the Polis could 
be denied or disregarded or repressed in favour of a focus on the 
play of ‘power relations’ among humans in contemporary (read: 
Western) globalized society. In this scenario, questions about 
subjectivity – especially first-person experience – could, at best, be 
effectively bracketed or, at worst, attributed to the ‘ghost in the 
machine’ or found, as with all existence, to be entirely ‘constructed 
in discourse’.  
Dennett’s discussion of matter-into-mind was so resolute, how-
ever, that it served as a powerful antidote to the vision of the world 
offered by 1990s postmodernism: a vision promulgated by the 
dwellers of a huge mansion who had not yet found their way out of 
the cupboard under the stairs to encounter the richness of the rest of 
the house. Yet it was Hoffmeyer’s seemingly paradoxical assertion 
that “subjectivity has its roots in the cosmos” which was really 
striking. Dennett’s discussion, in Darwinian fashion, demonstrated 
the Sebeokean axiom that ‘culture is natural’. In general, this was to 
be expected: any educated citizen of the late 20th-century West 
(apart from religious fundamentalists) knows that humans evolved 
from an ancestor held in common with apes, and that that ancestor 
has its own ancestors. In evolutionary theory, something evolves out 
of something else. So with biosemiotics: the ‘subjectivity’ of lower 
organisms and the ‘subjectivity’ of humans are the respective 
something and something else.  
Yet, I had never read anything about non-animal life that had 
ever asserted, with such conviction and poetry, that there is a con-
tinuity from the lower organism precursors to the most complex 
experiential phenomena in life. For me, Hoffmeyer’s argument 
represented an alternative to both scientism and mechanism, on the 
one hand, as well as to both mysticism and postmodernism, on the 
other. Typically, Hoffmeyer – with his acute sensitivity to the socio-
cultural consequences of ideas – had anticipated as much, when he 
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wrote that “while scientists may be averse to the idea that the natural 
world is populated by subjective and hence fundamentally 
unpredictable beings, humanists and theologists are just as averse to 
the concept of subjectivity being sullied by application to earth-
worms and seaweed” (1996: 43). It was a perspective which suc-
cinctly embodied the idea that ‘culture is natural’. It also seemed to 
represent true, non-partisan, progress in bridging the ‘two cultures’. 
Above all, though, it opened the door of the cupboard under the 
stairs and – for those who would venture out – it foreshadowed the 
traces and formations of the many delights to be found in the 
cupboard, offered clues to how those delights got there, and 
indicated the many associated delights that garlanded the rest of the 
house, and which had evolved to become concentrated under the 
stairs. 
In Hoffmeyer’s short statement on subjectivity that I have 
reproduced above, one is able to see both the scholar and the man. 
There is the concern with that which is seemingly most human: 
subjectivity. The invocation of the cosmos – not ‘lower organisms’ 
or ‘primitive life’ – reveals a Peircean ambition in the realm of 
thought. The use of the idiom “at the end of the day” nicely 
indicates the commonplace nature of this fantastic assertion – and 
although they are technically the words of the translator, such 
English idioms pepper the work that Hoffmeyer has written directly 
in English.  
Such ideas, too, fit in nicely with his recognition of ‘repression’ 
in the quote – for many scholars outside semiotics warn against 
navel-gazing and assume that simply proceeding with research is 
enough. Yet a great part of semiotics – and biosemiotics – is 
compelled to be concerned with how knowledge and much of the 
social world are riven by blindspots, aporia, and the denial of often 
the most commonplace features of the universe. Most recently, 
Claus Emmeche’s work (2011) has addressed such matters in 
penetrating fashion, and this endeavour needs to continue. Then 
there is the final phrase of the quote, describing the repression of the 
fact that subjectivity is rooted in the cosmos as “not a viable 
proposition”. This signals a future agenda, a pressing and massive 
one, for re-enchantment with the world. More personally, one can 
easily picture Jesper uttering this phrase, smiling wryly and apolo-
getically at the same time, and shaking his head slightly. It is the 
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most forgiving of persuasive rhetoric. It is characteristic of the 
genius and the congeniality of the man. 
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SURFACES 
CHARLES GOODWIN 
University of California Los Angeles, United States of America 
We yet again encounter a plethora of biologically important surfaces 
[…] and across all of these membranes there occurs constant bio-
semiotic activity.1  
 
Hearing Jesper Hoffmeyer present these ideas at a colloquium at 
UCLA in 2001 led me to see, in a new way, pervasive phenomena 
that are central to the organization of action, language, bodies and 
tools within situated human interaction.  
 Many phenomena, across very diverse domains, are organized so 
as to bring semiotically charged surfaces with quite different 
properties into arrangements where relevant action (and knowledge) 
can be constructed through specific kinds of sign exchange pro-
cesses. For example, participants systematically arrange their bodies 
into facing formations (Kendon 1990) – ‘ecological huddles’ that 
not only frame and make possible the exchanges of talk that occur 
within them, but also position each party to take into account and to 
operate on the embodied displays being produced by others. Talk 
within these arrangements is likewise organized through the juxta-
position of complex surfaces – for example: utterances organized 
into what conversation analysts call adjacency pairs.  
 Some of my own research has focused on Chil, a man left with a 
three word vocabulary – Yes, No, and And – after a stroke. Because 
of how his limited lexical items enter into sign exchange processes 
with other, more complex semiotic surfaces (both those in the en-
vironment and those currently being put in play by other meaning-
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008c. The semiotic body. Biosemiotics 1(2): 169–190 
(p. 175).  
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making participants), Chil is nonetheless able to act as a powerful 
speaker. By displaying opposition to what has just been said, for 
instance, the one word No – deployed just at that time, just in that 
context – transduces rich linguistic structure in the prior utterance in 
a way that Chil could not construct linguistically himself – while 
effectively transforming it publicly, so as to further his own 
meaning-making ends.  
 Thus, by virtue of the way in which his talk is lodged within the 
processes of an ongoing sign exchange across semiotically charged 
surfaces, Chil is not heard to produce an isolated single word, but to 
be objecting to precisely what was just said. Moreover, Chil can add 
other surfaces – such as expressive prosody, gesture, facial displays 
of stance, etc. – to the three words that he can speak. Through this 
continuous process of semiotic exchange across surfaces with 
distinct semiotic properties, Chil is able to produce highly varied, 
locally adapted action through talk, despite a catastrophically 
impoverished vocabulary (Goodwin 2010).  
 Other possibilities for consequential exchange and transfor-
mation emerge when tools with particular semiotic properties are 
incorporated into the organization of local action. Archaeologists, 
for example, classify the color of the dirt they are excavating by 
using a Munsell chart, an arrangement of color patches that 
scientists have constructed to rigorously and systematically describe 
color. Next to each color patch is a circular hole. To classify a 
sample of dirt, an archaeologist puts it on a trowel under the chart 
and moves it from hole to hole until the best match is found. The 
chart thus creates an architecture for perception: a surface with a 
window – which is to say, an interface – for the comparison of two 
distinct semiotic fields that, through operations on this new arrange-
ment, transduces ‘dirt’ into ‘archaeological data’ (while at the same 
time incorporating into the surface constituted by the chart, a 
sedimented history of human work focused on the task of describing 
color).  
 Moreover, in many archeological excavations, two people use 
the chart to ‘classify color’ together. When one indicates a candidate 
classification by pointing to a particular patch on the chart, and the 
other moves the trowel with the sample dirt to the indicated hole, 
human action is being built through a complex cascade of exchanges 
across diverse semiotic surfaces, including: the dirt itself, the chart 
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with its holes, the finger pointing to a specific place on the chart, the 
responsive movement of the trowel as an interpretant of the imme-
diately preceding action, etc. Through such endlessly enacted ex-
changes across this plethora of semiotically charged surfaces, 
archaeological data, action and knowledge are systematically 
constructed. Countless other examples can, of course, be provided.  
 In brief: Participants in human interaction build action conjointly, 
by organizing their sign exchanges across diverse semiotically 
charged surfaces. Investigation of the practices used to accomplish 
this allows a range of apparently quite distinct phenomena – talk, 
co-operative action, postural configurations creating participation 
frameworks, gesture, tools, the structure and classification of a 
consequential world, and the ways of knowing and acting that are as 
central to science-as-practice as they are to the hopscotch games of 
children (Goodwin 2000), etc. – to be investigated as integrated 
components of the endogenous semiosis used to build human acti-
vities and communities. Jesper Hoffmeyer’s vivid insights into how 
surfaces with different properties organize action through diverse, 
consequential, semiotic exchanges offers us powerful new resources 
for understanding the in-situ organization of human action. 
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SYMBOLOSPHERE 
JOHN SCHUMANN 
University of California Los Angeles, United States of America 
Language has, as it were, its own independent existence – almost as if 
it, too, had something on its mind. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer has introduced an important concept in his 1996 
volume, Signs of Meaning in the Universe. This concept is the sym-
bolic semiosphere which we have named the symbolosphere (Schu-
mann 2003; Logan; Schumann 2005). 
The term refers exclusively to those signs-of-signs relations that 
can create things that do not exist in the biological and physical 
worlds. These things are often ideas and ideologies. Yet in spite of 
the fact that these things are essentially non-physical, (i.e. they can-
not be indexed by pointing), they can and do powerfully influence 
our lives. 
Currently, there is a strong aversion among scholars to dualism – 
or at least to the aspect of dualism in which the mind is seen as 
being separate from the brain. Here I would like to reassert dua-
lism – but in a new way. Ideas and ideologies are generated in an 
individual’s brain and then – among humans who have the powerful 
communication system, language – the idea is distributed to other 
brains where it can be elaborated and spread to still more brains. 
Brains interacting with language generate the emergence of non-
material constructs that influence our lives as powerfully as does the 
biosphere and the phyisiosphere. 
I am suggesting that these emergent constructs (e.g., religion, 
rule of law, attitudes towards violence, love, democracy, political 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (Haveland, Bar-
bara J., trans.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 98. 
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ideas, and culture writ large) cannot be traced to regions or circuits 
in the brain. They are not in the brain nor are they of the brain, but 
nevertheless, they are served by whatever mechanisms of the brain 
they can colonize, co-opt reuse, and inhabit. They are products of 
brains that are capable of creating purely symbolic constructs. They 
have independence from the brain and cannot be reduced to neural 
tissue, nor its firing. I suggest that they are, in fact, what constitute 
the mind. This is the basis of the new form of dualism that we are 
proposing – this nonmaterial mind is independent of the material 
brain (or brains) – and because many brains interacting are required 
to produce minds, one human’s mind cannot be inside, or be the 
product of, that human’s brain. 
Some have objected to this assertion of dualism because it main-
tains that brains are required in order to have minds. Minds, on this 
perspective, are usually seen to arise from interaction among brains 
via language – and the non-material ideas, thoughts, and constructs 
that are created are then processed, learned, and remembered by 
brains. But since the ideas that emerge from interaction among 
brains only exist within (and because of) a powerful symbolic sys-
tem (i.e., language) that represents them, ideas are essentially free 
from the body/brain while, at the same time having downwardly 
causal influence on brains, minds, and behavior. 
For example, the former Catholic prohibition against eating meat 
on Friday powerfully influenced many people's lives, but it left other 
people’s (non-Catholics) lives unaffected. So does that mean the 
unaffected individuals lacked a neural mechanism for avoiding meat 
on Fridays, and when someone converted to Catholicism, did they 
acquire that mechanism – or engage one that was latent? No, the 
idea, the rule, the injunction against eating meat existed indepen-
dently of the brain as part of a non-material mind that, after Jesper 
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DEANA NEUBAUER 
London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 
Semiotic complexity or semiotic freedom as I choose to call it [...] is a 
measure of the depth of meaning communicated or interpreted by living 
systems. 1 
 
The idea of semiotic freedom, as the general expansion of the se-
miosic (meaning-making) capacity of evolutionary life on earth, is 
central to any discourse in biosemiotics. This entails the argument 
that living organisms, from the most simple to the most complex are 
sign-making and sign-receptive creatures. Interestingly, this conti-
nuity between the natural and the cultural world through the idea of 
semiotic freedom was prefigured in the nineteenth century by the 
Victorian writer George Eliot (1819–1890) who articulated the link 
between nature and culture through her concept of sympathy which 
stemmed from her organic understanding of the natural world and 
its application to the interpretation of aesthetic practice as advocated 
by German Romanticism.  
At the heart of German Romantic philosophy lay the idea of the 
re-animation of nature which emphasized the shift from a mecha-
nistic to an organic model of the natural world. This conceptual shift 
meant that reason alone could no longer provide a sense of the 
meaning of nature for the individual subject hence, by the end of the 
eighteen century, the “highest act of reason” was proclaimed as “an 
aesthetic act” (Hölderlin 1796: 155). The importance of art as a 
medium for the interpretation of nature had been advocated by many, 
for instance Kant, Schelling and Goethe in Germany, Wordsworth 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. A biosemiotic approach to the question of 
meaning. Zygon 45(2): 367–390 (p. 377). 
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and Coleridge in Britain, all of whom shared the idea that what had 
been repressed by reason could be rearticulated through aesthetics. 
The emphasis thus put on aesthetics initiated a way of thinking about 
nature’s creativity and human creativity in art as being related and 
interdependent. Most importantly, it postulated the possibility of 
exploring the spiritual, psychological and ethical implications of 
nature as embodied. 
The influence of German Romantic philosophy is evident in 
Eliot’s understanding of art and its form. She asserts that art ‘is the 
nearest thing to life’ (1992a: 264), meaning that traditional forms of 
art which are bound to strict rules of representations cannot represent 
the complexities of human experience and thought adequately, but 
these complexities can only be explored through an organic 
understanding of a work of art. She defines literary form as “wholes 
composed of parts more and more multiplied and highly differenced, 
yet more and more absolutely bound together by various conditions 
of dependence” (1992b: 356). In other words, the form shows how 
something is related to its environment.  
For instance, Eliot believed that if she were to describe a flower, 
she could not only provide a visual description of what it looks like, 
as that would not constitute its form. Instead, she felt she would be 
bound to describe the flower in relation to the soil and the soil in 
relation to the grass and so on. In this respect, the literary form does 
not then depend on the outward appearance, i.e. physical description 
of things, but it depends on its inward relations, which could grow in 
complexity, thus producing a higher form of art. The highest 
example of form would thus be “the highest organism, that is to say, 
the most varied group of relations bound together in a wholeness, 
which has the most varied relations (my italics) with all other 
phenomena” (1992b: 356).  
Thus, for Eliot, the novel as a form of art is organic and its 
complexity does not lie in the number of characters present, but in 
the complexity of their relations which are semiotic in nature. She 
postulates the human ability of sympathy defined as “a mode of 
amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow 
men beyond the bounds of our personal lot” (1992a: 264) as a 
method for the adequate interpretation of the varied relations and 
psychological complexities of the characters in her novels, as well as 
being the necessary condition for a moral agent.  
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Morality, in Eliot’s view, grows from the ability to imagine 
another’s state of mind or the ability to interpret signs; in Middle-
march, for instance, she describes the young, progressive doctor 
Tertius Lydgate as being known as “merely a cluster of signs for his 
neighbours’ false suppositions” (Eliot 1994: 140). Eliot’s fiction is 
fundamentally based on the importance of extending our sympathies, 
or rather – and perhaps much in the spirit of Jesper Hoffmeyer, 
also – on the importance of making us think about extending our 
semiotic freedom by reading the signs of each other more carefully, 
thus ethically.  
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Biosemiotics: Towards a New Synthesis in Biology 1 
 
The conventional version of evolutionary theory – the central theo-
retical framework of the biosciences known as the Modern 
Synthesis – is now more than 70 years old, and calls for its revision 
have come from many directions.  
On the one hand, a number of research areas within the bio-
logical sciences have established new concepts and models that 
pertain to evolutionary factors beyond genetics, such as niche 
construction, non-genetic inheritance, facilitated variation, epige-
netic innovation, etc. – all which demand an expansion of the 
standard framework. On the other hand, proponents of fields outside 
of empirical biology have criticized the framework of the Modern 
Synthesis on theoretical grounds, foremost from the perspectives of 
philosophy of biology and semiotics. An increasing number of 
workshops, symposia, books, and research articles attest to the fact 
that evolutionary theory is undergoing a period of ferment, and, 
despite inevitable resistance from traditionalist quarters, there is 
unprecedented openness for re-thinking some of the key assump-
tions of its pervasive paradigm. 
Jesper Hoffmeyer has been an untiring critic of the received 
theory of evolution, arguing against its reductionist stance, its gene-
centrism, and its overt omissions. In several of his publications 
(1996; 1997; 2008), Jesper reveals the essential shortcoming of 
thinking about evolution solely in terms of variation and selection, 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1997. Biosemiotics: Towards a New Synthesis in 
Biology. European Journal for Semiotic Studies 9(2): 355–376. 
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and, more clearly than others, he points out that evolutionary theory 
has been severely hampered by its deterministic, instructive, program-
like view of genetic information. Exposing the information-theoretical 
fallacy of the deterministic position, he argues that rather than the 
genetic signals themselves, the evolution of the interpretative com-
ponent of signaling should be given primary attention (ibid). Without 
the inclusion of such biological sign study, Jesper sees no possibility 
for a comprehensive explanation of the genotype-phenotype 
relationship. (His view, moreover, receives support from current 
EvoDevo research demonstrating the widespread occurrence of 
developmental drift in the face of extensive conservation of regu-
latory sequences and signaling pathways in disparate organismal 
lineages). 
Jesper's own proposal, that of a Semiotic Synthesis, is more than 
just a new theory about evolution. Rather, it aspires to lay the 
foundation for a unified theory of biology – based on rules of com-
munication – spanning physiology, ecology, behavior, and evolution. 
Semiotic ordering is seen as a key principle in all these aspects of 
life and, hence, as a good starting point for building a unifying 
approach. While semiotics may not replace the Modern Synthesis 
theory any time soon as such – since at this point it remains abstract 
and does not offer the working biologist any practical tools for 
addressing and testing empirical problems of organismal evolution – 
it will certainly contribute to a more pluralistic conception of evo-
lution. Indeed, many arguments from semiotics coincide with pro-
posals for an expanded theoretical framework emerging from beha-
vioral and cognitive biology, evolutionary developmental biology, 
ecology, but also from genomics and epigenetics. The multiple 
overlaps among these proposals, despite their independent starting 
points, all emphasizing a more systems-oriented, multicausal, multi-
level view of evolution, make the argument for a revision of the 
standard model even stronger. 
In two areas, the conceptual overlaps are particularly striking. 
One is emergence. In contrast with the traditional view, most alter-
native proposals emphasize that evolutionary change is not merely 
gradual and continuous but also involves rapid and discontinuous 
forms of change, due to the inherent emergent properties resulting 
from the interacting levels at which evolution takes place. Whether 
emergence is detected in molecular, developmental, behavioral, or 
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communicative systems, it suggests a dynamics of evolution that is 
no longer explainable by the paradigm of steady, incremental, 
variational change on which the Modern Synthesis was based. The 
different new approaches agree that a causal explanation of evolving 
life must include the principles of emergence that pertain at different 
levels of organization, semiotics being one of them.  
A second overlap concerns the non-genetic stabilizing processes 
that must coincide with emergent forms of change. Genetic fixation 
of emergent traits is slow, various other forms of stabilizing 
agencies have been suggested to intervene, at least for a period of 
temporary maintenance during which natural selection can act, 
potentially leading to genetic fixation. EvoDevo proponents speak 
of epigenetic integration or accommodation, ethologists know 
various forms of behavioral and cultural fixation, philosophers of 
science evoke scaffolding processes, Jesper introduces the concept 
of semiotic scaffolding. By this he means that new traits or beha-
viors would be initially stabilized through semiotic feedback loops 
and would thus be kept functional for many generations or even for 
indefinite periods of time. The same has been argued for more direct 
forms of non-genetic stabilization, such as epigenetic integration, in 
which the plasticity of developmental systems to react to local cues 
may functionally accommodate a new trait. Traits that depend on 
epigenetic integration can be maintained for millions of years in the 
absence of direct genetic fixation, but they disappear when the 
epigenetic cue is removed. 
None of this is thought to happen outside the classical mecha-
nisms of population level evolution, such as genetic variation, 
differential reproduction, and natural selection. But it is clear that 
many of the factors that were not part of the orthodoxy have a 
decisive influence on the direction and the outcome of selectional 
processes. Any comprehensive explanatory framework of evolution 
will have to take these factors into account. It has become evident 
beyond doubt that natural selection is not the only, and maybe not 
even the most important, factor in the explanation of the biological 
world. Jesper Hoffmeyer has seen this early on. 
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Thus, from the modest beginnings, we saw in chemotactic bacteria, the 
semiotic freedom of organic systems would have tended to increase, and 
while it has not been easy to prove that any systematic increase in 
complexity, as this concept has traditionally been defined, has in fact 
accompanied the evolutionary process, it is quite obvious that semiotic 
complexity or freedom has indeed attained higher levels in later stages, 
advanced species of birds and mammals in general being semiotically 
much more sophisticated than less advanced species. 1 
 
In the article from which the above quote was taken, Jesper Hoff-
meyer writes: “This inversed arrow of time (future directedness) 
immediately sets functions apart from other kinds of mechanisms 
that always refer backward along some chain of causation [in] 
explaining how the feature occurred”. I believe this to be the crux of 
the issue, as humans conflate function, sign-making processes 
(semiosis and biosemiosis), and conscious or “purposive” processes 
(Sagan 2011). Kant, in the Teleology of Judgment, showed that 
teleology (like causality, space and time) is a mental category that 
we bring to the world. Indeed, it is not so easy to distinguish con-
sciousness from this kind of “future directedness [that] immediately 
sets functions apart from other kinds of mechanisms [that instead] 
refer backward along some chain of causation” –“mechanisms” here 
referring to phenomena such as natural section and Newtonian-style 
action-reaction.  
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper, 2010. Semiotic freedom. In: Davies, Paul; Gregersen, 
Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to 
Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–204 (p. 196). 
 PROOF  
 NOT FINAL TEXT 
 DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
292 DORION SAGAN 
 
 In fact, in my articulation of what I called “Turing Gaia,” I show 
that global thermal regulation – a “Gaian” phenomenon dismissed as 
demanding ‘consciousness’ or ‘communicative purpose’ by leading 
neoDarwinians – is simply a consequence of growth within a 
temperature range. Since such growth was modeled on a computer, I 
argued (Sagan 2010) that these scientists, for whom genuine future-
directed behaviors break the biological taboo against teleology, had 
in essence been fooled into thinking a computer was conscious. 
Moreover, the author of the computer model, James Lovelock, 
interpreted telic global physiology by introducing natural selection 
into later versions of Daisyworld (Sagan; Whiteside 2004). Yet the 
model requires no natural selection to respond purposively; the 
planetary thermoregulatory behavior – the opposite of garbage-in-
garbage-out computer programs – comes from the quite reasonable 
assumption that white and black daisies will grow and die back 
dependent upon temperature. Because they reflect and absorb light, 
this responsiveness to increasing solar luminosity permits them to 
thermoregulate Daisyworld by altering its albedo.  
 The “sleight-of-hand” here is that teleology has been slipped in 
with the sensitive (read: semiotic) tendency of flowers to grow only 
within a specific temperature range, or gradient. While it may be 
anathema to biosemioticians to extend sign-making behaviors 
beyond the realm of the living, consider the evidence: Non-living 
complex systems such as hexagonal-shaped thermal convection cells, 
intricately changing chemical (e.g., Belousov-Zhabotinski) reactions, 
and typhoons multiplying over the Pacific also originate, maintain, 
and grow only within gradients (that they implicitly – and semio-
tically – sense). The differences are in temperature, chemical 
concentration, electron potential, and barometric pressure. Hurricane 
wind speeds, part of cyclically organized storms (to which humans, 
granting kinship, give first names), are directly correlated to 
atmospheric pressure gradients.  
 Whether we like it (in the sense of finding it flattering to our 
vaunted sense of human specialness) or not, such behaviors, whose 
natural teleology (or purpose) is to reduce ambient gradients, are 
genuinely future-directed. The mystery of “Turing Gaia” is that, 
though we would be loathe to grant all gradient-reducing systems 
the property of being conscious, they are as genuinely future-
directed as are we. Indeed, Prigogine and Stengers (1984) have 
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pointed out that disparate parts in nonequilibrium thermodynamic 
systems behave as if they were “communicating”. I would add that 
they also appear to be doing so toward a common end. This is 
future-directedness, function. But, contra Kant and modern self-
organization theorists, such future-directedness does not so much 
“emerge” as inhere in the fundamental telic nature of energetic 
matter, as described by thermodynamics’ second law (Fernandez 
2011). 
 Energy, if not hindered, spreads. This spread, measured by the 
conceptually abused quantity entropy, is simply the observed 
behavior codified by the second law of thermodynamics (which can 
also be described as ‘nature’s tendency to reduce gradients’) – the 
very behavior that is naturally teleological, and mistaken for 
conscious purposiveness (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Moreover, 
contrary to those from Daniel Dennett (1995) to Pope Pius VII, 
naturally appearing complex thermodynamic systems do not “vio-
late” the second law, but produce more entropy than do non-
organized systems. Growing life does so more efficiently, but joins 
non-living complex systems in its sensing of external gradients and 
exploiting them for their energetic potential. Telic behavior is 
implicit in thermodynamically described matter-energy configu-
rations which naturally tend toward equilibrium, and by implicitly 
semiotic complex systems that maintain their boundaries and 
activities until they are finished degrading the energetic gradients 
that they detect, within their capabilities. 
 The notion that “it has not been easy to prove that any systematic 
increase in complexity … has, in fact, accompanied the evolutionary 
process” can, I think, be laid at the foot of the same “teleo-taboo” 
that leads us to conflate end-directed, gradient-reducing processes 
with conscious purpose – this latter granted only to deity and hu-
manity since Descartes. In other words, while the natural telic 
tendency of energy to spread naturally confers future directedness 
upon evolution as a whole, evolutionists as distinct politically as 
Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould both err (and unintentio-
nally provide fuel for creationists by ignoring clear evidence) when 
they characterize evolution as an essentially random process – a 
characterization due not to evidence or investigation, but to a knee-
jerk dismissal of teleology, because to them it smacks of deity.  
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 Taken as a whole, life shows measurable increases in number of 
individuals, species, and taxa; in bacterial and animal respiration 
efficiency; in number of cell types; and, despite periodic setbacks 
from mass extinctions, in global biodiversity, connected sentience, 
and, we might add, “semiotic freedom.” Using living representatives 
of animal groups and plotting a curve according to the order in 
which their groups appeared in the fossil record, Russian scientist 
Alexander Zotin (1984) quantified a striking trend toward increase 
in oxygen efficiency over geological time. Another Russian scientist, 
Vladimir Vernadsky (1998) pointed out that ever more chemical 
elements in the Periodic Table have become incorporated into bio-
spheric processes over evolutionary time. Measured as ergs per 
second per gram and adjusted for mass, complex systems score 
higher rates of energy flow as they’ve evolved from galaxies to stars, 
biospheres, reptiles, mammals, brains, societies, and computers 
(Chaisson 2001).  
 Although there is no space left here to analyze agency, I wish to 
note that for Spinoza a stone, if it were aware, would think that it 
flew of its own volition. Similarly, organisms may be seen as 
complex instruments, unaware of the roots – both causal and telic – 
of their own behavior. Thus to conclude, the semiotic freedom that 
Jesper Hoffmeyer rightly posits to be on the rise over evolutionary 
time can be understood in terms of the telic tendencies of matter-
energy in a thermodynamic cosmos, one in which advanced 
signaling systems such as those seen in sentient life allow for greater 
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It seems as if modern biochemistry cannot be taught – or even thought – 
without using communicational terms such as ‘recognition’, ‘high-
fidelity’, ‘messenger-RNA’, ‘signalling’, ‘presenting’ or even ‘chape-
rones’. 1 
 
This observation – which Hoffmeyer has made on a number of 
occasions, sometimes together with Claus Emmeche (1991) – occurs 
to me as being extremely important to the whole project of bio-
semiotics as a scientific program.  
Biosemiotics, it is true, has other strong argument bases. A priori 
arguments stemming from general philosophical sources such as 
Peirceʼs semiotics, or from theorists of biology like Jakob von 
Uexküll, also form important blocks of arguments pertaining to the 
formal ontology and the regional ontology of biology, respectively – 
but Hoffmeyerʼs observation connects these ideas, importantly, to 
the whole of modern biology and its dependence upon biochemical 
findings. The quote continues as follows:  
“Such terms pop up from every page of modern textbooks in 
biochemistry in spite of the fact, that they clearly have nothing to do 
with the physicalist universe to which such books are dedicated.” (ibid.)  
The observation that semiotic concepts are ubiquitous in bio-
chemistry textbooks can easily be generalized to all of modern 
biology, ranging from molecular biology and to ethology and 
ecology: semiotic concepts of many sorts appear on every level of 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotics of nature. In: Cobley, Paul (ed.), The Rout-
ledge Companion to Semiotics. London: Routledge, 29–42 (p. 32). 
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biological research. This crucial observation is what takes bio-
semiotics away from being armchair speculation only. It directly 
addresses a central conceptual problem in the institutions of biology. 
Thereby, it commits biosemiotics to monitor ongoing conceptual 
developments in empirical biology.  
The importance of such a procedure has been indicated by Ernst 
Cassirer, who never wavered from his important principle that 
philosophy must stay connected to the ongoing evolution of the 
special sciences – from physics to art history, from mathematics to 
the science of religions. The conceptual innovations taking place in 
such sciences must be a primary aim for the philosopher of science 
to compare, clarify, explain, and make coherent.  
Regarding biology in particular, Cassirer followed his own 
advice in the beautiful and overlooked chapter on the epistemology 
of biology in Das Erkennetnisproblem Vol. IV – arguably one of the 
most important texts of 20th century philosophy of biology – which 
covers the development of pre-Watson-and-Crick biology up until 
the time of the chapter’s writing in the 1930s. 
Many biologists, it is true, may respond to Hoffmeyerʼs obser-
vation (and Cassirer's principle) by saying that notions such as 
information, code, signal and communication in biology are mere 
metaphors or shorthands for underlying physical processes. The 
immediate counter-reply would be, then: Why not dispense with 
such “shorthands” in order to say things as they really are?  
Physics, by contrast, has little need to use semiotic vocabulary to 
the same extent as does biology. The immediate suspicion is that 
semiotic vocabulary in biology is there because it serves a real 
purpose – because it refers to processes which may be physically 
instantiated in a high number of different fashions, but which retain 
a formal and functional unity on the higher, biological level of 
organization which makes concepts referring to such unities in-
dispensable. They refer so because semiotic processes are thus 
really taking place, calling for a semiotic description.  
Hoffmeyerʼs basic claim is that this makes it necessary to take 
seriously the pervasiveness of semiotic concepts in biology. Such 
concepts should be taken as technical terms and not as colloquial 
expressions only. But taking such terminology seriously is no easy 
matter. To develop semiotics to a technical level where such con-
cepts acquire a more precise meaning is no mere matter of 
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definition – it is connected to deep issues in theoretical biology and 
to the underlying philosophy of science more generally.  
In short, this is a major goal of the whole current of biose-
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Allowing for semiotic freedom in the organic world significantly 
changes the task of explaining emergent evolution, because semiotic 
freedom has a self-amplifying dynamic. 1 
 
What is semiotic freedom and why do we need this notion? I will 
answer these questions in a roundabout way, by first asking another 
question: What is the nature of the general problem that Hoffmeyer 
addresses with his notion of semiotic freedom?  
In relation to modern biology, Hoffmeyer suggests that his 
biosemiotic approach can show us a way to steer between the Scylla 
of the modern, gene-centered proponents of Neo-Darwinist 
orthodoxy and the Charybdis of the religiously inclined proponents 
of “intelligent design”. In Hoffmeyer’s view, there is an alternative 
that avoids both the scientific notion of determinism and the 
religious notion of fate/God’s will. Both alternatives adhere to the 
notion of something inevitable. Hoffmeyer’s point is that evolution 
is open-ended, and that this runs counter to all notions of a 
determinate end. Thus, Hoffmeyer offers his tertium datur: the bio-
semiotic perspective and the notion of semiotic freedom. 
As an intellectual historian concerned mainly with the history of 
contemporary philosophy, I cannot but think that the problem that 
Hoffmeyer is focusing on is a version of the Kantian problem of 
——————— 
1   To my knowledge, Jesper Hoffmeyer presented the idea of semiotic 
freedom in English for the first time in his essay “Some semiotic aspects of the 
psycho-physical relation: The endo-exosemiotic boundary” (Hoffmeyer 1992). I 
first became acquainted with this idea in his book En snegl på vejen (Hoffmeyer 
1993). The quote is from Hoffmeyer 2010: 196. 
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“nature and freedom” – which is to say that it is a metaphysical 
problem – and in my opinion, Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic approach 
brings us one step further in the direction of an understanding of the 
emergence of freedom in nature. At the general level, then, 
Hoffmeyer contributes significantly to the task of overcoming the 
dualistic models of thinking that we have inherited from the modern 
tradition that extends from Descartes to Kant, and that stretches 
further beyond them, i.e. into the tradition of modern scientific 
thinking. As I see it, he does this with his notion of semiotic freedom, 
which aims at a bio-semiotic overcoming of the split between nature 
and culture. From my point of view, then, Hoffmeyer thus bypasses 
the “human, all too human” tendency to situate the problem of 
freedom unilaterally within a “philosophy of praxis” – which is 
what 20th century philosophy has been inclined to do, whether is 
was in its “materialistic”, “naturalistic” or “linguistic” form.  
What is more, the notion of semiotic freedom makes it possible 
to do different kinds of multidisciplinary semiotic research into the 
emergence of freedom in nature, holding empirical facts before our 
eyes, but without the obligation to present our results within the 
logic of causal explanation. Instead, we have recourse to a logic of 
forms, i.e. a logic that deals with parts and wholes (totalities), which 
can do without a definite teleology. This logic of forms relieves us 
from any burden as to the necessity of this or that identifiable vector 
in the logic of the “straight line” – a line which always leads us into 
the impasse of determinism. Instead of simply speaking of teleology, 
Hoffmeyer speaks of “teleodynamics” – which allows for freedom 
in nature – i.e., semiotic freedom. 
The notion of semiotic freedom is about the progressive self-
liberation of the semiosphere by way of processes in which both 
genealogical or vertical semiosis and ecological or horizontal se-
miosis are integrated into increasingly complex systems. The in-
crease in semiotic freedom, which comes as a result of this 
progressive self-liberation of the semiosphere, does not primarily 
refer to the increasing multitude of semiotic processes in general – 
i.e. to a quantitative growth in semiotic processes – but rather, to 
changes in the qualitative aspect of semiotic processes as such: An 
increase in semiotic freedom carries along an increase in the 
richness or depth in the meaning that the semiotic system is able to 
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communicate. Hence, Hoffmeyer tentatively defines semiotic free-
dom as that “depth of meaning” (Hoffmeyer 1993: 91).  
From the point of view of the history of ideas, then, there are 
three main ideas that Hoffmeyer extends and contributes to with his 
biosemiotic approach and his notion of semiotic freedom. Firstly, 
there is the idea of spontaneity, i.e. the idea of an active and creative 
force in nature, which emerges in the human being as an essential 
part of being human, but which is also prevalent in living nature as 
such. Hoffmeyer's contribution is philosophically stimulating in that 
he opts for a perspective that does not see the human being as the 
exclusive site of this freedom. 
 Secondly, Hoffmeyer advances the idea that even though the 
parts contain the whole in themselves, there are more to the whole 
than what the parts are able to display. It is in order to think this 
“more” that we need holistic conceptions about emergent properties 
and systems. In this respect, from my perspective as an historian of 
20th century philosophy, Hoffmeyer’s contribution is rewarding in 
that he connects this idea to the problem of life and not solely to the 
problem of language and/or praxis. 
 Thirdly, Hoffmeyer is able to put into perspective the meta-
scientific problem of how the life sciences are supposed to account 
for their own perspective and presuppositions: In general, one 
cannot utilize the scientific language of this or that scientific 
discipline, in order to account for the meaning of the results of this 
of that discipline, without running into the problem of self-reference. 
Hoffmeyer neatly explains to the reader how this is a problem for 
every living creature, and how the problem becomes importunate for 
us as human beings – no small merit! 
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Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of information. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work has transformed our understanding of 
biological processes. He has done this by developing several basic 
premises of Peircean semiosis within his own examination of 
biological dynamics. He began with the observation that life is not 
random, but exhibits obvious continuity of types. How can this be? 
After all, as he says, “in principle everything is forgotten once it 
dies” (1996: 13). But continuity of type is a reality, and therefore 
“the essence of procreation lies in a principle which we will call 
coding – or, even better, semiosis” (1996: 13). To explain this, Hoff-
meyer sets up several basic axioms. 
First, is his acceptance that biological reality is an informational 
reality. That is, organic matter is not simply inert-mass-pushed-
around-by-other-mass. Rather, it is self-organized within principles 
of information – understanding that term to mean ‘knowledge of 
something’ and which includes an awareness of the distinction 
between self and other. His analysis of biological organisms as 
informational systems means that he defines biological processes as 
semiotic – which is to say, as making and using ‘signs’. To achieve 
this analysis, he specifically rejects the Saussurian dyad, or linear 
triangle model of the sign, where a mechanical Observer-Agent 
merely substitutes ‘this meaning’ for ‘that object’ Hoffmeyer 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2010. Semiotic freedom: An emerging force. In: Davies, 
Paul; Gregersen, Niels Henrik (eds.), Information and the Nature of Reality: 
From Physics to Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–
204 (p. 187). 
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chooses instead to use the Peircean model of the sign: a relational 
triadic process made up of three interlocked relations that resemble 
the spokes of a wheel (1996: 17–22). In other words: 
 
not this:    but this: 
  
 
Here, one can see that the linear triangle as a morphology (shape) is 
an isolate form, with its three nodes or points-of-meaning con-
necting only to each other – and thus requiring an external agent to 
kinetically move ‘this object’ to ‘that meaning’. The Peircean triad, 
on the other hand, sets up a morphology that is both self-organized 
and relational. Each spoke or relation is able to connect to myriad 
other spokes and relations, and thus the biological organism that 
operates in this informational mode actually operates as a complex 
interconnected network. 
Following this outline of biological reality as an interactive 
informational process, Hoffmeyer then explores it further. He exa-
mines the nature of that triad of relations and accepts the Peircean 
analysis that reality both ‘takes normative habits’ – and also that 
reality allows for ‘freedom’ or ‘anarchy’ and thus, the emergence of 
novel inventive modes of existence (1996: 27). One relation focuses 
on acknowledging and maintaining ongoing commonalities within 
the self and with other biological systems; another relation focuses 
on acknowledging novelties; another relation on developing pro-
fitable reactions to these novelties (1996: 21–24). These three 
relations provide different ontological capacities: both stability and 
adaptive novelty are self-organized within informational interactions 
with the environment. Thus, Hoffmeyer concludes that “living 
creatures are self-referential, they have a history, they react selecti-
vely to their surroundings, and they participate in the evolutionary 
incorporation of the present in the future” (1996: 51).  
These basic premises enable us to understand the biological 
realm as, not mechanical, as it is within the neo-Darwinism 
paradigms of pure random changes and ‘might-makes-right’ results 
of Natural Selection, but as a complex informational process, 
wherein the biological realm operates, as described by Peirce, as a 
rational process – and thus takes functional charge of its existence. 
The perspective that the biological realm is an informational realm 
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means that the organism is capable of future-oriented, predictive and 
self-controlled interactions with its environment, rather than being 
limited to strictly mechanical and reactive action. How does this 
realm operate? We return to the semiosic triad. 
As Kull et al. (2009: 168) state, the biological realm operates as 
a function – “a process organized around an implicitly represented 
end”. The Peircean triadic sign can be analyzed as the function of 
f(x)=y, acting as a single morphological reality. This simply means 
that a normative rule, f, is examining the input data, x, infor-
mationally, so as to enable the system to anticipate the effects of that 
data on its nature, and to develop itself to constructively interact, y, 
with the environment (Taborsky 2006; 2008). 
These basic principles, based on Hoffmeyer’s unique application 
of Peircean semiosic analysis to the field of biology, result in a 
perspective of biological processes that includes a self-controlled 
continuity of type – in other words, an “inherent intentionality of 
biological information” (Hoffmeyer 2010) – i.e., a self-organized 
adaptive flexibility to environmental stimuli and evolving inter-
actional informational relations.  
The results of the use of semiosis or informational processing 
within the biological realm are far-reaching and – as in diffusion – 
this new approach is spreading, directly and indirectly. I can refer to 
a 2011 paper by Garzon and Keijzer that claims that “plants exhibit 
intelligent behavior, that they have ‘root-brains’ (see also Hoff-
meyer’s ‘floating brains’ of the immune system, Hoffmeyer 1996: 
87) and that they possess internal control structures in many ways 
functionally similar to neuron-based control structures” (Garzon, 
Keijzer 2011: 155). Thus, “plants can be considered to be minimally 
cognitive and […] they constitute an important domain for cognitive 
studies” (Garzon, Keijzer 2011: 156).  
Or, to repeat Hoffmeyer’s words: “nothing in biology makes 
sense except in the light of information” (2010: 185). 
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Indiana University Press.  
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TYCHE! 
VEFA KARATAY and YAGMUR DENIZHA 
Boğaziçi University, Turkey  
Apparently real systems do not have formal origins; formalizations 
become possible only after realizations, never before. Thus the need for 
deterministic causation fades away and it becomes more plausible to 
see irreversible time as a real phenomenon. Something just happens in 
evolutionary systems that no formula could have predicted and this 
strongly supports the conception of chance fluctuations as an 
ontologically real aspect of our universe. The combination of chance 
fluctuations and chaos dynamics can be seen as responsible for the 
making of history in the true sense of this word as a unique and 
unpredictable series of temporal events at a macro-scale. 1 
 
We wholeheartedly share Hoffmeyer's opinion in his opening 
sentence, which necessarily makes these emerging realizations the 
true objects of interest. Later in the same paper, Hoffmeyer invokes 
a quotation from Peirce that begins: “Uniformities are precisely the 
kind of fact that need to be accounted for. […] Law is par 
excellence the thing which wants a reason” (CP 6.12–13) and which 
exhibits great parallelism to Simondon’s approach to ‘the indi-
vidual’: “It is the individual, as a constituted individual, that is the 
interesting reality, the reality that must be explained” (Simondon 
2009: 4). 
The French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1924–1989) wrote on 
a very similar track to C. S. Peirce about the real nature of onto-
genesis (which he examined in great detail under the general title of 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2006a. Genes, development, and semiosis. In: Neumann-
Held, Eva M.; Rehmann-Sutter, Christoph (eds.), Genes in Development: Re-
reading the Molecular Paradigm. Durham: Duke University Press, 152–174  
(p. 155). 
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individuation) as a process starting from the physical, reaching 
through the biological and psychic, to the collective domains.  
For Simondon, ontogenesis begins and continues with the 
process of individuation, and the individual constitutes only a result 
(or a phase) of it. He criticizes earlier philosophical quests for a 
‘principle of individuation’ which governs this process right from 
the beginning, with the argument that a principle itself is an 
individual, hence it cannot precede the process that will give birth to 
it. Indeed, both “formalization” – which Hoffmeyer places neces-
sarily after realization – and “uniformity” or the “law” which Peirce 
wants to explain, can be considered as “individuals” in Simondon’s 
broad sense. Agreeing on the apparent unpredictability of real 
systems that persists along with the apparent regularities in nature, 
the metaphysical question of the source of this unpredictability 
remains as the main issue.  
Alberto Toscano, in his comparative work on theories of indivi-
duation summarizes Peircean cosmogony as follows: “In the final 
analysis, Peirce’s concern is with the genesis of regularity. Arguing 
that mechanical laws that suffer no exceptions are unable to account 
for the diversity of phenomena, and a fortiori for their own 
functioning, Peirce posits both a chance beginning (of the evolution 
of laws) and a continuous irruption of chance (into the evolution of 
laws). This is the core tenet of the doctrine he dubs Tychism” 
(Toscano 2006: 125).  
Toscano then draws our attention to the words of the eminent 
Peirce-scholar, Karl-Otto Apel: “[...] the principle of individuation 
is subordinated by Peirce to a ‘principle of absolute, creative spon-
taneity or possibility, without which phenomena like variety, hetero-
geneity, differentiation, specification, and growth cannot be ex-
plained’ ” (Toscano 2006: 135). Peirce, without the aid of the scien-
tific developments yet to come, particularly that of chaos theory and 
theory of open systems, seems to have had no other choice than 
resorting to "chance" as an explanation for the unpredictability and 
creative spontaneity in nature. 
Yet more than half a century after Peirce, chaos theory has 
demonstrated that even deterministic systems may be unpredictable 
if they are of the chaotic type. Such systems are unpredictable in the 
long-term because they have the inherent property of amplifying any 
initial measurement error and because a real observer cannot make 
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any measurement without producing an error, no matter how small 
(Strogatz 1994: 324). So, a real system can be long-term unpredic-
table for a real observer without any necessity for randomness. 
Our main point of disagreement with the Peircean cosmogony is 
exactly about the role he attributes to “pure chance” (or a ‘primeval 
chaos’ or ‘chance-medley’ (Toscano 2006: 125)) as a source of 
unpredictability. Instead, we propose Simondon’s conception of 
ontogenesis that starts with a metastable preindividual field con-
sisting of “pure potentiality”. During the ongoing process of 
individuation, this pure potentiality becomes actualized – without, 
however, being completely exhausted, such that there is always 
room for further individuation. Alberto Toscano provides an illu-
minating comparison of the two approaches: “Peirce’s philosophy of 
habit ultimately presupposes the essentially undifferentiated charac-
ter of the preindividual, whether as pure multiplicity or homogeneity, 
together with a seemingly inevitable, and ultimately teleological, 
progression to differentiated order. The introduction of metastability 
and disparation as traits of the preindividual allows Simondon to 
confront the persistence of heterogeneity, and to think of indivi-
duation as a real resolution – the invention of a relation – rather than 
as the ineluctable work of a repetition that is mitigated only by 
absolute chance or spiritual spontaneity.” (Toscano 2006: 151) 
So, we part company with Jesper Hoffmeyer at the point where 
he adopts Peirce’s Tychism. We think that the apparent unpre-
dictability of real phenomena not necessarily supports the con-
ception of chance fluctuations as ontologically real. Simondonʼs 
preindividual reality – without requiring more commitment than 
chance fluctuations – seems to be at least an equally eligible can-
didate for the same role. Furthermore, while Simondon and Peirce 
exhibit great similarities, particularly in their approaches to ques-
tions of crucial importance to biosemiotics, Simondon’s theory is 
supported with references to quantum mechanics, cybernetics, infor-
mation theory, general systems theory etc., which Peirce could not 
have known about. 
In conclusion, we suggest that adopting Simondon’s ontogenetic 
theory of individuation as a metaphysical account for making of 
history would be a fruitful step on behalf of both the philosophy of 
science and biosemiotics.  
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ANNA ARAGNO  
Psychoanalytic Theorist, United States of America 
Uniting is indeed the guiding principle behind this life that lies between 
birth and death: consciousness’ brief illumination of its body-brain. 
Only in our consciousness do we appear to ourselves as one, or as 
‘someone’. 1 
 
As a psychoanalyst I spend a great deal of time exploring and 
analyzing the very human problems surrounding identity, 
separation/individuation, and, predominantly, the difficulties and 
obstructions to making what is unconscious, conscious. Yet 
recalling that blissful state of undifferentiated merger that was ours 
in childhood – and that can be ours again, fleetingly, in the arts, in 
nature, listening to music, in deep concentration, or during orgasm – 
I sometimes question the benefits of this touted ‘consciousness,’ and 
wonder if it isn’t over rated! I sit in a tiny office, part of my New 
York Institute, which I call my analytic “cell” and ponder what 
advantages there are in being so “separate” and conscious. It has 
been my experience, in fact, that it is when body and mind, and I 
and ‘thou,’ are most united, that we experience those moments of 
greatest transcendence and deepest joy in this life. We do not leave 
the Garden of Eden, and walk out into ‘consciousness’, without 
incurring a significant loss! 
But then, as I listen to dreams and free- associations spilling into 
the tiny room in “evenly hovering” attention mode, I begin hearing 
meanings seeping through the haze of words – much deeper poetic 
and fantastic meanings, murmuring from a substratum of human 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, p. 124. 
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experience where words have not yet shone a light, and where 
undifferentiatedness is the norm rather than the exception. Here, 
siblings and sensations turn into insects and creepy creatures; 
emotions are tsunamis or typhoons; moods manifest in dark or 
sunny days; complex ideas and abstractions form coded equations or 
geometric patterns; interpersonal dynamics reveal their starkest 
truths; and loneliness or ecstasy, alike, take us to the stratosphere.  
Signs, symbols, and signification dominate the semiosphere of 
our Innenwelt. So when I read my first biosemiotic text, Signs of 
Meaning in the Universe – audacious title that it is! – I suddenly 
found my little analytic cell expanding! Biosemiotics, the new 
unifying discipline to which I had just been introduced, beckoned – 
its hierarchic premises and continuous principles synchronous with 
models of mind and ideas that I had already been toying with for a 
number of years. The tiny semiosphere I work in, and the semantic 
field of which it is a part, stretched and met Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 
universe of meaningful signs!  
It is significant, in this context, to draw attention to Freud’s over-
arching conceptual dualism in vital processes that are embodied in 
the extreme polarization of love and hate, or creation and 
destruction, in the two principles of the Life and Death instincts: 
Eros – binding and joining together in ever new unities – versus 
Thanatos, dividing and tearing things apart. Unity and separateness 
are indeed at the foundations of consciousness, since in order to see, 
communicate, remember, or know anything we are obliged to single 
it out, identify it, and give it a name: that is, to ‘signify’ it. Yet 
without joining in empathically to share and understand another’s 
deeper silent experience, we can never really hear or grasp the full 
breadth of unconscious signs being transmitted to us, or their 
meanings. The secret, then is to enter in and to step out, to unite and 
separate discriminately, and at will, consciously, from the center of 
that brief illumination where “I”, just as Hoffmeyer suggests, has 
made us appear as ‘someone’ to ourselves.  
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JOHN DEELY 
University of St. Thomas, United States of America 
Biology is immature biosemiotics. 1 
 
Jesper Hoffmeyer’s work challenges the exclusive reliance of 
modern biology on the idea of vis a tergo (mechanistic causalities of 
the past determining the future through the present), by 
demonstrating how the action of signs (‘semiosis’) introduces into 
behavior of organisms rather a vis a prospecto by which the future 
changes the relevance of past determinations to the present in 
opening the way to outcomes that cannot be simply predicted on the 
basis of mechanistic causality (‘brute interactions of Secondness’, as 
Peirce might put it). Emmeche, Kull, and Stjernfelt ‘said it all’ in the 
title of their 2002 monograph: to read Hoffmeyer is to rethink 
biology. 
Hoffmeyer introduces in particular two ‘new notions’ required 
for full understanding of biological evolution: semiotic scaffolding 
and semiotic freedom. Key to both notions is the fundamental idea 
entitling one of his later essays (Hoffmeyer 2010a): ‘Relations: the 
true substrate for evolution’. The fact that in principle “a relation 
could be drawn between any two physical objects in the world”, 
while “in all but very few cases” such relations “turn out to be 
absolutely uninteresting”, Hoffmeyer observes (ibid.: 90), has led to 
the situation in modern science where “a strangely obvious thing” 
has come to be “generally dismissed by science as not really ‘real’”. 
——————— 
1   Hoffmeyer, Jesper 2008. ‘Biology is immature biosemiotics’, Semiotics 
2008, ed. J. Deely and L. Sbrocchi (= Proceedings of 16-19 October 33rd annual 
meeting of the Semiotic Society of America in Houston, TX). Ottawa: Legas, 
2009, 927–942. 
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 Hoffmeyer notes the difference between relations among things 
independent of awareness and these same relations once involved in 
awareness as enabling deception and some manipulation of 
surroundings. In this way, he demonstrates, the reality of relations 
among living creatures introduces a vis a prospecto (a ‘future anti-
cipation’) into interactions, contrasting with exclusive use of vis a 
tergo relied upon by hardcore traditionalist evolutionary biologists 
(such as Dennett, Dawkins, et alia) to cling to the Cartesian denial 
of any ‘final causality’ in nature. Hoffmeyer shows how the reality 
of relations (within animal awareness in particular) makes possible 
an increasing freedom in living activity (vis a prospecto) as we 
ascend the evolutionary scale. In turn, this increasing freedom 
brings about new conditions and states which become the scaf-
folding upon which biological evolution depends in and for 
development of increasingly complex forms. 
 For relation has a singular being as the only form of finite being 
having status as awareness-independent or awareness-dependent 
determinable by circumstances alone: nothing of the being proper to 
relation as suprasubjective determines relation itself to be on one or 
the other side of that line. Only circumstances under which relation 
here and now exists or there and then existed do that. Precisely this 
indifference to awareness- (or ‘mind-’) independence in its proper 
reality is the feature of relation (its ‘singularity’) making semiosis in 
nature possible in the first place.  
 Hoffmeyer deftly points out that semiosis is the only form of 
causality involving nonbeing as well as being, precisely by reason of 
relation’s singularity. (When Peirce observes [1907: CP 8.332] that 
“Thirdness is the triadic relation [...] considered as constituting the 
mode of being of a sign”, he at the same time recognizes [with 
Hoffmeyer] that relations even when awareness-independent are not 
free-floating entities independent of subjectivities but require a 
foundation or basis in a subjectivity that belongs itself to the 
awareness-independent dimension of physical reality. This founda-
tional dependence of suprasubjectivity [relation] upon subjectivity 
[Secondness, brute interaction], then, gives nature ability to prove-
nate relations – awareness-independent or awareness dependent 
depending upon circumstances at the time.) 
 In this way relation’s singularity enables even lifeless being to 
fall under the vis a prospecto that becomes fully actual with the 
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achievement of life. To quote Hoffmeyer (2008a: 938): “contrary to 
physically based interactions [between subjectivities], semiotic 
interactions [as involving suprasubjectivity] do not depend on any 
direct causal connection between the sign vehicle and the effect. 
Instead, the two events are connected through the intervention of an 
interpretive response” – which, as originally noted by Peirce, “need 
not be mental”. 
 In sum, the “complicated capacity for anticipation” Hoffmeyer 
outlines (2008b: 35; 2010a: 93) as required for ‘more sophisticated 
systems’ to emerge and survive is rooted in relation’s singularity as 
opening nature to Thirdness – not only at the level of life (cf. 
Hoffmeyer 2010b), but even at the physical level of pre-life when 
and wherever the universe definitively exhibits the openness of 
movement toward a future (vis a prospecto) where life will become 
actual within the cosmic whole. As Hoffmeyer put it in 1998: 
“Rather than an either-or category semiosis is a more-or-less pheno-
menon ... implicit in the whole idea of evolution as a process of 
increasing semiotic freedom.” 
 I would note, finally, what sets Hoffmeyer’s work apart from 
many of his semiotic colleagues in 2012: he really understands that 
biosemiotics cannot afford to repeat in reading of nature the error 
that Saussure and his epigones made in reading of culture, namely, 
reduction of sign-action (semiosis) to translation of ‘codes’. 
Biosemiology is as much part only of biosemiotics as is semiology 
of semiotics; a Barbierian equation of the former two is as much a 
‘pars pro toto’ fallacy as was the original equation of the latter two 
among Saussureans. Sebeok first identified the fallacy; Hoffmeyer 
after Sebeok fully avoids it by understanding the role in nature of 
relation’s singularity. 
 It is not too much to say that Jesper Hoffmeyer is to biosemiotics 
what Albert Einstein was to relativity theory, to wit, the single 
figure at the forefront of the theoretical coalescence of a scientific 
development which was inevitable as ‘in the air’ (that is, inevitable 
as a development whose ‘time had come’, and so would coalesce 
around someone or other), yet required someone in particular to 
articulate the vision and lay out the arguments making the ‘in-
evitable development’ an actual historical phenomenon. 
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BY JESPER HOFFMEYER  
IN ENGLISH 
Compiled by Kalevi Kull 
 
Below is a chronological list of published English-language texts by 
Jesper Hoffmeyer.1 I have tried to make this list as complete as 
possible; however, some there may still be some publications that 
are unaccounted for here.2 An earlier list of his publications from 
1968 to 2002, in all languages, has been published in Tartu 
Semiotics Library 3, 2002. 3  A list detailing all of Jesper Hoff-
meyer’s works in Danish (which are particularly numerous), as well 
as his works translations into many other languages for last ten 
years, has yet to be compiled.4  
 
1968 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1968. Inhibition of growth of Salmonella typhimurium 




Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Neuhard, Jan 1971. Metabolism of exogenous purine 
bases and nucleosides by Salmonella typhimurium. Journal of 
Bacteriology 106(1): 14–24. 
 
——————— 
1   His full name is Jesper Normann Hoffmeyer. However, he almost never 
used the middle name.  
2   Particularly, publications appearing in conference abstract books and other 
smaller publications.  
3   Emmeche, Claus; Kull, Kalevi; Stjernfelt, Frederik 2002. Reading Hoff-
meyer, Rethinking Biology. [Tartu Semiotics Library 3.] Tartu: Tartu University 
Press, 61–71. 
4   In the current list, the alphabetic enumeration of entries within a particular 
year corresponds to the markings in Emmeche et al. 2002. 
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1977 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1977. Energy and the need for a new socio-political 
homeostasis. In: Thill, Georges (ed.), Un lieu de contrôle démocratique 
des sciences: le débat nucléaire. A Case of Democratic Control of 
Sciences: The Nuclear Issue. (Actes du Colloque interdisciplinaire et 
international. Proceedings of the Conference.) Namur: Faculté 




Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1987. The constraints of nature on free will. In: 
Mortensen, Viggo; Sorensen, Robert C. (eds.), Free Will and Deter-
minism: Papers from an Interdisciplinary Research Conference. Århus: 
Århus University Press, 188–200. 
 
1988 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1988a. Bioinformation techniques and the view of 
nature. In: Thill, Georges; Kemp, Peter (eds.), Le Triomphe des 
biotechnologies: la domestication de l'animal humain – The Triumph of 
Biotechnologies: The Domestication of the Human Animal. (Actes du 
Cours de l'Inter-University Centre de Dubrovnik, mars 1986.) Namur: 
Presses universitaires de Namur, 83–92. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1988b. The historical logic of domestication. In: Thill, 
Georges; Kemp, Peter (eds.), Le Triomphe des biotechnologies: la 
domestication de l'animal humain – The Triumph of Biotechnologies: 
The Domestication of the Human Animal. (Actes du Cours de l'Inter-
University Centre de Dubrovnik, mars 1986.) Namur: Presses univer-
sitaires de Namur, 107–115. 
 
1991 
Emmeche, Claus; Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1991. From language to nature: The 
semiotic metaphor in biology. Semiotica 84(1/2): 1–42. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Emmeche, Claus 1991. Code-duality and the semiotics 
of nature. In: Anderson, Myrdene; Merrell, Floyd (eds.), On Semiotic 
Modeling. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 117–166. 
 
1992 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1992. Some semiotic aspects of the psycho-physical 
relation: The endo-exosemiotic boundary. In: Sebeok, Thomas A.; 
Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (eds.), The Semiotic Web 1991: Biosemiotics. 
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1993 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1993a. Asian perceptions of nature. Tidsskrift Antro-
pologi 27: 183–184. 
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1993b. Biosemiotics and ethics. In: Witoszek, Nina; 
Gulbrandsen, Elizabeth (eds.), Culture and Environment: Inter-
disciplinary Approaches. (Nature and Humanities Series vol 1.) Oslo: 
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